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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Research Questions
Ten years after the onset of the financial crisis that shook up the world econ-
omy, it can be said in 2018 with a high degree of certainty that the direct
pressure of the crisis has finally subsided. Even though this might give some
sense of relief to policy makers around the world, there remain important
challenges affecting our societies that still need to be tackled. Focusing on
industrialized countries, many of these challenges are posed directly or indi-
rectly by the ageing of population. In OECD countries, life expectancy at 65
has increased between 1990 and 2015 from 16.09 to 19.48, while the average
fertility rate has decreased from 1.92 to 1.67 (OECD, 2017a). These devel-
opments combined imply that societies are getting older. Figure 1.1 shows
that old-age dependency ratios have risen across the board between 2000
and 2015.1 The average has increased from 23.50 to 28.56 during these years.
According to projections by the UN (2017), it is expected to increase up to
35.20 by 2025, and to almost double by 2050 with respect to 2015.
The ageing of population implies challenges in two main dimensions.
First, it implies a challenge for the sustainability of pension systems. The
latter have to stay financially sound while, at the same time, they have to
guarantee adequate pensions and minimize risk of poverty in old age. Only
between 2015 and 2017, four out of every five countries in the OECD have
carried out at least one reform with the intention to balance this trade-off
between financial sustainability and pension adequacy. Most reforms have
1Old age dependency ratios in Figure 1.1 are computed as the number of individuals
aged 65 and older for every 100 working age individuals (i.e. individuals aged between 20
and 64 years). For further details, see UN (2017).
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Figure 1.1 Old Age Dependency Ratios in OECD Countries
Source: UN (2017). Notes: Old-age dependency ratios are calculated as the number of individuals
older than 65 years for every 100 working age individuals, i.e. between 20 and 64 years of age. For
more information on data sources for each country and forecasting methodology, see UN (2017).
consisted of increases in the retirement age as well as changes in benefits,
contributions and/or tax incentives. However, due to the complexity of the
issue and to political constraints, often these reforms have only partially suc-
ceeded in balancing finances while fulfilling income expectations of retirees
at the same time.2 Therefore, work remains to be done both in the design
and the implementation of pension system reforms.
Second, the ageing of population implies a challenge for the sustainability
of healthcare systems. In OECD countries, long-term care expenditures have
experienced an average increase of 3.2% between 2009 and 2015, which is
the largest compared to increases in expenditures on other services offered
by healthcare systems (OECD, 2017b).3 In 2015, 13% of individuals aged 65
and older in OECD countries were recipients of long-term care. In addition,
2For further information on reforms implemented in OECD countries in recent years
and the problems they have encountered, see OECD (2017a)
3Other services include inpatient care, outpatient care, pharmaceuticals, prevention and
administration. The years before the crisis, the increase in average long-term care expen-
ditures was substantially larger, namely 6% between 2003 and 2009.
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79% of all long-term care recipients were 65 or older, while 52% were 80 or
older.4 Therefore, given the projection in Figure 1.1, long-term care expen-
ditures are very likely to keep increasing in the coming years. In response
to this, governments should apply reforms to prevent healthcare costs from
blowing up, while making sure that good quality care is provided for those in
need. Most reforms so far have consisted of programmes in support of home-
and community-based care provision.5 Even though these reforms decrease
costs for institutionalized care, they usually do not take proper account of
the (often unmeasured) costs and side effects of informal long-term care pro-
vision.
Given the current demographic prospects, it is unlikely that in any case
pension and healthcare systems will increase their generosity in the coming
years. Therefore, before implementing further reforms, policy makers should
have a proper understanding of the economic situation of those affected by
them. The latter crucially determines the extent to which retirees, and those
close to retirement, will be able to maintain an adequate standard of living
in these changing circumstances. In European countries there is a substan-
tial share of individuals who reach the retirement age having zero or negative
wealth (EU, 2015). These are the individuals who are the most likely to suffer
from cuts in pension benefits and long-term care provision. Therefore, gov-
ernments should design special policies aimed at improving their situation
to ensure they do not fall into poverty. However, there is also a large share
of individuals who reach retirement having accumulated different positive
levels of wealth throughout their working life. Both the motives behind the
accumulation of this wealth and its composition are crucial aspects that any
reform of the pension and healthcare systems should take into account.
In the present context of demographic change and institutional reforms,
this PhD thesis aims at answering several research questions concerning
wealth accumulation and saving motives of older households. In Chapter 2,
I tackle the question of whether individuals view their housing wealth as an
instrument to save for retirement. Figure 1.2, shows that across a range of 20
European countries, above 70% of older households are homeowners.6 Figure
1.3, shows that, among homeowners, housing wealth represents on average
4All figures on long-term care provided here are based on data on formal care provision.
Exclusion of data on informal care (which are usually scarce and difficult to collect) implies
that the costs of long-term care and the number of recipients might be understated.
5For further information on reforms implemented in OECD countries in recent years,
see OECD (2017b)
6A household is considered to be older if at least one of the members is 60 or older.
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Figure 1.2 Share of Homeowners Among Older Households
Source: SHARE Notes: A household is considered to be older if at least one of the
members is 60 or older. The data employed correspond to wave six of the SHARE,
which was conducted in 2015.
Figure 1.3 Housing Share of Total Assets of Older Homeowners
Source: SHARE Notes: A household is considered to be older if at least one of the
members is 60 or older. The data employed correspond to wave six of the SHARE,
which was conducted in 2015. Total assets are defined as the sum of financial assets
(current accounts, saving accounts, bonds, stocks and mutual funds) and housing (main
residence and other real estate). The SHARE imputes missing wealth information using
a technique described in Christelis (2011)
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about 90% of the assets in the household portfolio. These figures imply that,
out of those households who have managed to accumulate wealth throughout
their life, most of their wealth is in the form of housing. For a household, be-
ing a homeowner implies having a large part of its wealth in a rather illiquid
form. However, it also implies receiving an imputed rent, which should be
taken into account when measuring disposable income, and it implies own-
ing a large asset that could eventually be liquidated to finance expenditures
during retirement. Therefore, it is important to understand whether or not
households accumulate housing wealth considering the possibility of using it
to finance expenditures during retirement.
Even though housing wealth can be used to finance regular and/or ex-
traordinary expenses during retirement, the economic literature shows that
housing wealth generally does not decrease during retirement.7 In Chapter
3 I ask the question of why this is the case and, in doing that, I explore
further the relation between housing and retirement savings. A plausible
explanation for this phenomenon might be the high transaction costs that
liquidating housing usually implies. However, it may also be that households
regard housing wealth as precautionary savings to be used only in case of an
emergency, or that they view it as a consumption good to be passed on as a
bequest to their children. To answer these questions I review in Chapter 3 the
different possible motives behind the accumulation and lack of withdrawal
of housing wealth, paying special attention to the interplay between housing
and the bequest motive.
In Chapter 4, I leave the focus on housing wealth and pay full attention
to the question of whether older individuals save due to a bequest motive.
To understand whether individuals are prepared to sustain their standard
of living under the current policy changes, it is important to ask what are
the motives behind wealth accumulation. If governments assume individuals
are ready and willing to substitute pension income with private wealth to fi-
nance day-to-day consumption, they may face an unpredicted reaction from
those whose savings respond mostly to a precautionary and/or a bequest
motive.8 Therefore, when considering pension and long-term care reforms,
7There is a branch of the economic literature showing that wealth during retirement
does not decline as much as a stripped down version of the life cycle model would predict.
An additional branch of the literature shows that housing wealth in particular does not
decline during retirement. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 provide review of these streams of literature.
8In Section 3.2 I briefly review the economic literature on the saving motives older
individuals. Extensive reviews can be found in van Ooijen et al. (2015) and De Nardi et al.
(2016).
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Table 1.1 Research Questions
Chapter 2 Do households regard housing wealth as an instru-
ment to save for future expenditures?
Chapter 3 Why does housing wealth generally not decrease
during retirement?
Chapter 4 Do individuals save due to a bequest motive?
Chapter 5 What is the effect of inheritance receipt on con-
sumption, labour supply, and retirement decisions?
governments must consider saving motives as a factor in their decision mak-
ing. Furthermore, the focus on identifying and quantifying the bequest motive
potentially provides useful information that can be used as an input for the
optimal calibration of inheritance taxation.
In Chapter 5 I stick to the topic of inheritances and bequests but shift
the perspective from the donor to the receiver of the transfer. The increase
in longevity and the ageing of population imply that individuals are increas-
ingly older at the moment of receiving an inheritance from their parents
or other family members. Furthermore, several recent studies (e.g. Piketty
and Zucman, 2014) suggest that the aggregate share of inherited wealth over
total wealth has been increasing in the last decades, and it is expected to
keep doing so in the future. Inheritances may thus represent large transfers
of wealth that could have important effects on the economic situation of in-
dividuals around the retirement age. Therefore, in Chapter 5 I tackle the
question of whether inheritance receipt has an impact on relevant aspects
such as consumption patterns, labour supply, and retirement behaviour of
older individuals. The answer to this question may give an idea of how any
change in wealth due to social security reforms might affect the economic
behaviour of individuals close to retirement.
1.2 Research Design
To answer the research questions outlined in Section 1.1, and summarized
in Table 1.1, I employ a variety of methods. These are focused both on the
theoretical analysis of individual behaviour within the framework of the life
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cycle model, and on statistical and econometric analysis of microeconomic
data. In Chapters 2 to 4 I use data for the Netherlands, while in Chapter 5
I use survey data at the European level. In Chapters 2 and 3 the data come
from the Dutch National Bank Household Survey (DHS), in Chapter 4 I use
administrative data provided by Statistics Netherlands, while in Chapter 5
the data come from the Survey on Health Ageing and Retirement in Europe
(SHARE). Even though it is difficult to say to what extent the Dutch reality
is comparable to that in other countries, understanding the Dutch case pro-
vides a benchmark that may be used as a reference for studies using similar
data on other countries.
To study whether households regard housing as an instrument to save
for retirement, in Chapter 2 I include housing in a very simple version of the
life cycle model (without a bequest motive) and study how unexpected house
price shocks affect saving behaviour. I assume that, if homeowners view hous-
ing wealth as an instrument to finance future expenditures they will decrease
(increase) other forms of savings if house prices increase (decrease). I derive a
savings equation from the theoretical model which I estimate using the DHS
data. These data have the advantage that they allow measuring the degree
to which house price changes are expected or unexpected using subjective
house price expectations. This is an important contribution with respect to
previous literature (e.g. Disney et al., 2010; and Browning et al., 2013).9
This literature uses expectations that are imputed using empirical models
of the evolution of aggregate house prices, which is a strategy that does not
take proper account of the correlation between individual characteristics and
house price expectations.10
In Chapter 3, I change the methodological standpoint and conduct the
analysis mainly through a review of the literature. I review both the literature
on savings of retirees and the literature on housing wealth during retirement.
I then bring the two together by reviewing two of the most recent models on
retirement savings with housing, namely those in Yang (2009) and Nakajima
and Telyukova (2013a, 2017). By combining the presence of housing with
elements that come from the literature on retirement savings (namely the
precautionary saving motive and the bequest motive), these models repre-
sent the current state of the art in the theoretical modelling of retirement
9Both Disney et al. (2010) and Browning et al. (2013) study the effect of house price
changes on household consumption.
10Several studies (e.g. Beshears et al., 2013; and Niu and van Soest, 2014) have shown
that house price expectations strongly depend on subjective perception and individual
characteristics.
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savings with housing. After reviewing the models, I propose several ways in
which this literature might advance in the future both theoretically and em-
pirically. In the last section of Chapter 3, I employ again the DHS data to
give an idea of how the questions and hypotheses that come up during the
literature review might translate empirically. The evidence I present in that
case is purely descriptive.
To identify the bequest motive for saving, in Chapter 4 I replicate and
expand the methodology by Kopczuk (2007). To do so, Kopczuk uses US
estate tax data and compares wealth at time of death between expected and
unexpected deaths. He defines expected deaths as those caused by a previ-
ously diagnosed illness. Kopczuk’s argument is that if, after controlling for
lifetime income and age, those who die expectedly do so with less wealth, that
is because they start transferring part of their estate in the expectation of a
near death. He argues that this behaviour reflects the presence of a bequest
motive for saving. The available administrative data for the Netherlands al-
low me to reproduce Kopczuk’s strategy and expand it in several ways. Most
importantly, I am able to refine the definition of expected death by account-
ing for the time between diagnosis of the terminal illness and the time of
death, and I can connect every deceased individual to his/her children in the
administrative dataset. In addition, the Dutch institutional context prevents
any major role of income shocks and medical expenditures explaining declines
in wealth at the end of life.11
Similarly to Chapter 2, in Chapter 5 I rely again on a formal theoreti-
cal analysis based on the life cycle model. However, in that case housing is
excluded from the model and the focus is on studying how individuals react
to the receipt of an inheritance. Most previous literature has focused on the
effect of inheritances on labour supply.12 I adopt a more holistic approach
and explore how individuals trade off between consumption, labour supply
and early retirement responses. To estimate the equations that derive from
the theoretical model, I use data from the SHARE on ten European coun-
tries and apply an empirical strategy that relies on Brown et al. (2010). The
SHARE provides information on inheritance receipt and, most importantly,
it provides information on inheritance expectations, which allows me to em-
ploy the strategy by Brown et al. (2010) to distinguish between expected and
11In the Netherlands individuals are to a large extent insured against long-term care
expenditures and against income shocks caused by working disability. For a description of
the healthcare system, see Bakx et al. (2016). For a description of the disability insurance
system, see Koning and Lindeboom (2015).
12I briefly review this literature in Section 5.2. For an in depth review, see Cox (2014).
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unexpected inheritances.
1.3 Results and General Conclusions
The evidence I present in both Chapters 2 and 3 strongly suggests that
households are in general reluctant to use housing wealth to finance retire-
ment consumption. In Chapter 2 I show that a simple life cycle model with
housing and without a bequest motive predicts that individuals will sell their
main residence towards the end of life to finance consumption. In such a
model, they will smooth fluctuations in housing wealth by adjusting other
type of savings. However, the empirical evidence in Chapter 2 shows that
Dutch homeowners do not modify their saving patterns in response to house
price shocks. This result holds when using different measures of saving and
house price changes, and when stratifying the sample by age. In addition
I run a series of robustness checks, which include accounting for long-term
house price expectations and for the willingness to sell the main residence in
the short term. None of these change the main results, which suggest home-
owners do not consider their house as an asset to be sold during retirement
to finance regular and/or extraordinary expenditures.
In line with the results in Chapter 2, in Chapter 3 I show that Dutch
retired homeowners rarely move home. In addition, they report a very low
willingness to liquidate the wealth contained in the main residence. The lit-
erature on housing wealth during retirement suggests that this is a general
pattern that holds in Europe and in the US. The two models I review in
Chapter 3 propose several explanations for this phenomenon. Yang (2009)
highlights the role of the transaction costs of moving home, while Nakajima
and Telyukova (2013a, 2017) suggest the utility benefits of homeownership
and the bequest motive as the main drivers of the low withdrawal rate of
housing wealth.13 The descriptive evidence I present shows that there is a
strong correlation between homeownership and the self-reported willingness
to leave a bequest. This correlation holds after controlling for wealth, in-
come and a range of other economic and demographic variables. This result
seems to be in accordance with the findings in Chapter 2 and with the main
take-aways of the model by Nakajima and Telyukova (2013a, 2017). All of
13As explained by Nakajima and Telyukova (2013a, 2017), the utility benefits of home-
ownership capture factors such as emotional attachment to the residence and the neigh-
bourhood, the capacity to adapt the house to the own taste, tax exemption of imputed
rents, tax deduction of mortgage interest payments, and insurance against rental price
fluctuations.
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these strongly point to the idea that homeowners are unwilling to withdraw
housing wealth during retirement because they see it as an essential part of
a bequest to be passed on to the next generation.
While Chapter 3 shows that Dutch individuals (specially homeowners)
generally report to be willing to leave a bequest to their children, Chapter 4
shows that the revealed preference approach based on Kopczuk (2007) pro-
duces results that point in a similar direction. When applied to the Dutch
administrative data, the approach by Kopczuk shows that individuals with
long terminal illnesses die with less financial wealth than individuals who
experience an unexpected death. However, the effect is only strong and sig-
nificant for males at the top half of the wealth distribution who die while
still being married. This result is reasonable since most of those in the sam-
ple who die single have previously experienced either widowhood or divorce,
which are events that usually carry a negative wealth shock (see e.g van Ooi-
jen et al., 2015; and Poterba et al., 2015). Furthermore, most of those who die
while being married are males, which is due to their shorter life expectancy
with respect to females. Therefore, I follow Kopczuk and interpret the results
for married males as reflecting transfers to heirs in the expectation of a near
death. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that, in the Nether-
lands, the institutional context prevents medical expenditures and income
shocks from playing a major role in explaining lower wealth for those who
die expectedly.
The evidence in Chapter 5 shows that in the SHARE about 25% of in-
dividuals who are 50 years or older and are working in wave one (conducted
between 2004 and 2005) report receiving an inheritance between wave one
and six (conducted in 2015). This suggest inheritance receipt is a common
phenomenon that could have a relevant impact on the economic situation
of individuals around the retirement age. However, the results show that,
even after focusing only on unexpected inheritances, inheritance receipt does
not appear to have a major impact neither on the retirement age nor on
the amount of hours worked per week. Given the precision of the estimates,
small increases in the probability of retirement and small reductions in hours
worked cannot be ruled out. However, these would be of a magnitude that
could hardly imply a considerable impact on the economic situation of indi-
viduals close to retirement. Regarding the effect on consumption, the preci-
sion of the estimates does not allow to rule out major effects. Therefore, it
is more difficult to reach a conclusion in this case. Large standard errors are
most likely due to low quality of the consumption data, which largely relies
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on imputed values provided by the SHARE.
1.4 Policy Recommendations
In this section I list several policy implications that derive from the analyses
conducted in this PhD thesis. Since the data I use are mostly Dutch,
some of the policy implications I discuss fit specially in the Dutch context.
Nevertheless, all policy implications listed here are to a large extent relevant
for any country that is reforming the pension and healthcare systems to ac-
commodate them to the ageing of population. Even though the implications
I discuss are evidence based, I acknowledge that they all may have both
advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, my intention here is often more
that of initiating a policy debate rather than outlining a strict policy line.
Facilitate the liquidation of housing wealth to finance expenditures
in special circumstances
The evidence I present in Chapters 2 and 3 suggests that households do
not generally plan to use housing wealth as a source of funds to finance
general consumption during retirement. This finding agrees with a large
body of literature, which I review in Section 3.3, showing that housing
wealth generally does not decrease during retirement in Europe and in the
US. However, the review of this literature highlights a pattern indicating
that when a precipitating event occurs (e.g. nursing home entry, widowhood,
and divorce) the probability that retired homeowners liquidate housing
increases. This suggests the presence of a latent demand for liquidating
housing wealth under these circumstances. Therefore, governments should
gather information about this latent demand, and facilitate the drawdown
of housing wealth for those households who consider it necessary.
This policy can be implemented in two main ways. First, it can be done
by decreasing the transaction costs implied by the sell and the purchase of a
house. For instance, for retirees who suffer a precipitating event governments
can reduce the taxes associated with a housing move. In addition, in this
situation governments can directly aid retirees in the process of selling,
buying, renting a new place and/or selecting a nursing home. Second,
governments can facilitate the access of retirees in need of cash to financial
products that allow to totally or partially liquidate housing wealth without
the necessity to leave the home, e.g. reverse mortgages and/or loans that
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use the house as a collateral. This could be done by partially subsidizing
interest payments, and/or by providing guarantees to financial institutions
who may arguably find it too risky to lend to individuals who are in the last
phase of their life.
Stimulate the market for reverse mortgages
Besides facilitating the use of housing equity for those households who
suffer a precipitating event, governments can also consider promoting the
demand for releasing housing equity among the wider public. In that sense,
a lot remains to be done in terms of the introduction of reverse mortgages.
Both in the US and and in most European countries they are either rare
or non-existent. This may be due to both demand and supply problems.
On the demand side, a recent Dutch survey reveals that nine in every ten
homeowners do not know what a reverse mortgage is, while those who have
heard of it mostly do not know the details.14 To the extent that this is
representative of the situation in other countries, campaigns delivering basic
and transparent information to the general public can be useful to generate
interest and stimulate demand. On the supply side, financial institutions are
usually not willing to offer reverse mortgages due to asymmetric information
potentially deriving in an adverse selection problem. Therefore, they are
only willing to do it charging their costumers high commissions and interest
rates.
An interesting way to promote reverse mortgages could be by linking
them to long-term care expenditures. This can help bring the demand
and the supply together since, on the one hand, long-term care recipients
might have an incentive to liquidate housing, while, on the other hand,
the reduced life expectancy of those in need of long-term care might be a
factor that mitigates adverse selection, thus making it more attractive for
financial institutions to enter the market. Another way of promoting reverse
mortgages could be by giving individuals the flexibility to choose whether
they prefer to receive it either as a lump sum, a stream of payments over a
period of time, or a life annuity.
Stress the possibility to use reverse mortgages as a way to time
bequests
14This survey was conducted by Dillingh et al. (2015). I discuss it further in Section
3.3.3.
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Chapter 3 strongly suggests that the low withdrawal rate of housing during
retirement happens because households view their main residence as a
bequest to be passed on to the next generation. This would imply an
important reduction of the market niche for reverse mortgages, since the
latter imply in most cases that the house becomes property of the provider
of the reverse mortgage once the household moves or dies. In such a context,
it seems difficult to start a market for reverse mortgages that could benefit
those who are willing to spend (totally or partially) their housing wealth.
A plausible solution to this problem could be marketing reverse mort-
gages as an instrument that, besides helping provide liquidity for general
consumption and long-term care expenses, can as well provide a way to
optimally transfer bequests. Given the recent increases in life expectancy,
individuals are now likely to receive bequests at an increasingly advanced
stage of the life cycle, which might not always be the preferred option. A
reverse mortgage can offer a solution to this problem, since it would allow
parents to transfer housing wealth at any time they prefer without moving
out of their home. Reverse mortgages can thus increase flexibility in the
timing of bequests, which can result in benefits for both parents and heirs.
Taking into account this aspect may help start a market which, in the end,
could be beneficial for both households with and without a bequest motive.
Take into account housing wealth and/or imputed rents for eligi-
bility to means tested programmes
Having a house in the portfolio implies two things. First, it implies having
an asset that could potentially be liquidated. Second, it implies receiving an
imputed rent that is often not taxed.15 Therefore, conditional on facilitating
and providing the proper tools to liquidate housing wealth, governments
should consider the possibility of including housing as part of total wealth
for eligibility to means tested social policy programmes. In addition, if the
means test is based on income, governments should consider the possibility
of counting imputed rents as part of disposable income. This is something
important to take into account for governments considering the introduction
of means tested long-term care provision.
15In the Netherlands, 0.55% of the market value of owner-occupied houses is included in
taxable income. That makes the Netherlands one of the very few OECD countries where
imputed rents are taxed. For an overview, see Andrews et al. (2011).
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If a means test is based on wealth, an important issue to consider is that,
if individuals have a strong preference for leaving a bequest, they might
start transferring part of their wealth in the expectation of a future means
test. In that way they may manage to leave a bequest and at the same time
become eligible for publicly provided long-term care. Taking this issue into
account, it is important to couple means tested programs with a so called
look-back period and/or an increase in taxes for inter-vivos transfers. A
look-back period refers to setting a window of time before the means test
during which any wealth that has been transferred to a third party is taken
into account for the test.
Promote the exchange of bequests for informal long-term care
provision
As a way to cope with increase healthcare costs, fostering the provision
of informal care within families and communities is an interesting idea.
However, governments should consider that providing informal care may
imply a major disruption in the labour supply of the provider. Taking into
account both the advantages and the costs of informal care, governments
may encourage the exchange between informal care provision and inter-vivos
transfers and/or bequest. This could be done for example by providing
inheritance and/or inter-vivos transfers tax brakes for those individuals who
are recognized and registered as informal care givers.16
This is an especially attractive measure in a context in which individuals
have a strong bequest motive for saving while having most of their wealth
locked up in housing. The literature and the evidence documented in
Chapter 3 indicate that a non-negligible share of retirees are already using
the promise of a future bequest as a way to stimulate care provision by
family members. These retirees may have an incentive to use the house
as a bequest, since it is both a visible and illiquid asset that can easily
be used to signal that a bequest will follow if enough care is provided.
This suggests there are grounds to extend inheritance and inter-vivos tax
benefits to encourage individuals to provide informal care to family and close
16In the Netherlands a person who provides informal care can apply to be recognized by
the government as an informal care giver (mantelzorger in Dutch). If the status is granted
the care giver can enjoy several benefits to compensate for the costs of provision (Oldenkamp
et al., 2018). These benefits include tax breaks and special working arrangements. This type
of initiative gives a good example for other countries who consider encouraging informal
care provision.
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community members. However, in all cases sufficient compensations should
be provided for informal care givers to compensate for possible foregone
earnings.
Consider the bequest motive for saving when setting inheritance
taxes
Given that individuals seem to generally hold on to their wealth until the
end of their life, and that recent studies indicate that the share of inherited
out of total wealth is increasing, inheritance taxation should be considered
as a potentially important source of revenue. In addition, as an indirect way
to use housing and retirement savings to finance long-term care provision,
revenue generated through inheritance taxation could be earmarked for the
public provision of this type of service.
Any consisting of a reform of the inheritance tax schedule should take
into account that bequests can be either accidental or intentional. The
evidence I present in this thesis suggest that individuals do generally have
the bequest motive in mind when accumulating wealth. Therefore, to the
extent that bequests are intentional, governments should take into account
that individuals will exploit possible loopholes to avoid inheritance taxes
and in that way maximize the size of the bequest. This implies that, for
inheritance taxes to be effective, they should be coupled with the same taxes
rates and exemptions for inter-vivos transfers and/or with a large enough
look-back period. Such measures should ensure that transfers made in the
last years of life are counted as part of the bequest.
Account for behavioural responses to inheritance receipt when
setting inheritance taxes
Chapter 5 shows that inheritance receipt is frequent in Europe among in-
dividuals who are between 50 and 65 years of age. Inheritances represent
transitory shocks to lifetime income that can, nevertheless, be large enough
to affect the economic situation of a household. The literature I review in
Section 5.2 suggests that inheritances may have an effect on consumption,
labour supply, and retirement behaviour. In addition, there are a few studies
that suggest that inheritances have an effect on entrepreneurship and on the
willingness to leave a bequest.
The evidence I present in Chapter 5 shows that, at the European level,
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unexpected inheritances do not seem to have a major effect on labour sup-
ply and retirement behaviour of older workers. Even though I cannot rule
out the presence of small effects, it can be said that the response does not
seem to be dramatic. This result implies that the fine tuning of tax rates on
inheritances and inter-vivos gifts is not likely to imply major distortions in
terms of the labour market situation of older workers. Therefore, if inheri-
tance taxes are increased, it does not seem to be the case that older workers
will have to work more or retire later to compensate for the lost revenue. In
addition, if inheritance taxes are reduced, this result implies that individuals
will not work less or retire earlier, which, in case it happened, could derive
in an additional loss of revenue through a decrease in income tax payments.
1.5 Future Research
The different analyses I perform in this PhD thesis leave several doors open
for future research. In Chaper 2, one of the main contributions of the anal-
ysis is the use subjective expectations to differentiate between expected and
unexpected house price shocks. To do that, previous literature (e.g. Disney
et al., 2010; and Browning et al., 2013) has used aggregate expectations that
derive from empirical models of the evolution of house prices, which is a
strategy that does not account for individual heterogeneity in house price
expectations. Even though the strategy I employ represents a step forward
with respect to previous literature, there is still room for improvement in
the measurement of house price expectations. For instance, it can be that
shocks to one-year expectations do not have an effect on saving due to the
long term commitment that housing usually implies. If individuals plan to
stay for decades in their current residence and only perhaps sell it in the dis-
tant future, then long-term expectations arguably are more important than
short-term expectations. In Sections 2.5.4.1 and 2.5.4.2 I deal with this issue
to the extent that the DHS data allow. However, future research should fur-
ther explore the role of longer term expectations.
The findings in Chapters 2 and 3 point at an interplay between the evolu-
tion of housing wealth during retirement and the bequest motive for saving.
However, the evidence so far does not allow taking a stand on the direction
in which causality runs. It can be that, due to high transaction costs and
the utility benefits of homeownership, households remain attached to their
home and, later on, rationalize it as an asset to be bequeathed. However,
it can also be that, regardless of the transaction costs and the advantages
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of homeownership, households with a strong bequest motive buy a home
with the original intention to leave the house as a bequest. Either through
structural modelling of the type in Nakajima and Telyukova (2013a, 2017)
or through reduced form type of analysis, future research should focus on a
deeper understanding of the connection between housing, bequests and re-
tirement savings. The streams of literature I briefly review in Sections 3.5 and
3.6 (i.e. the literature on altruistic and strategic bequests, and on housing
as a commitment device) provide fruitful venues for future research in this
direction.
Chapter 4 provides several extensions to the previous work by Kopczuk
(2007). However, it still leaves substantial scope for future improvements.
Most importantly, the role medical and non-medical expenditures requires
further examination. Even though the Dutch system for long-term care pro-
vision prevents any major role of medical expenditures in explaining the
results of the analysis, Bakx et al. (2016) show that in recent years around
5% of medical expenditures in the Netherlands have been out of pocket. Even
though this is a low proportion, it can still imply that results are partially
driven by wealthy individuals incurring additional expenditures to receive
medical treatment in special conditions. Furthermore, the results can be ex-
plained by individuals with a terminal illness increasing their non-medical
expenditures due to an adjustment in their rate of time preference.17 In fu-
ture work, I will tackle these issues in three main ways. First, by increasing
the sample to the whole population and using the variation provided by the
different types of terminal illness. Second, by exploiting the available data
to capture wealth dynamics during the last years of life. Third, by coupling
these dynamics with the wealth dynamics corresponding to the children of
the deceased individuals.
The results in Chapter 5 suggest that individuals do not react strongly
in terms of labour supply and retirement to inheritance receipt. However,
further work is required to fully understand why this is the case. Three main
possible explanations for these results are left for future research. First, the
theoretical analysis predicts that inheritances will not have an effect unless
they are large enough with respect to previous wealth and expected future
income. It might be thus that inherited amounts are not large enough in
relative terms to cause a disruption in labour supply or to change retirement
17van Ooijen et al. (2016) find using Dutch panel data that bad health during retire-
ment is associated with lower non-medical expenditures. Their result gives credit to the
interpretation of the results in Chapter 4 reflecting transfers related to estate planning.
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plans. The SHARE data provide information on inherited amounts only for
inheritances that take place between waves one and two, which is not enough
information to properly test this hypothesis. Second, there are a few studies
(e.g. Cox and Stark, 2005; and Stark and Nicinska, 2015) suggesting that
inheritance receipt increases the willingness to leave an inheritance. This
could at least partially explain why individuals do not seem to spend their
inheritance by working less. Third, it might be that labour market and retire-
ment legislations across Europe are not flexible enough to allow individuals
to spend their inheritance by reducing hours of work or retiring earlier. This
last point implies future work should compare results country by country
thus exploiting country-specific variation in labour market and retirement
legislation.
Besides further investigation of the small labour supply and retirement
responses, Chapter 5 leaves as well a door open for a deeper understanding of
the possible consumption response to inheritance receipt. The data I employ
in Chapter 5 only capture food consumption and heavily rely on imputed
data due to nonresponse. The results of the analysis cannot rule out large re-
sponses in consumption. Intuitively, it make sense to think of larger responses
in consumption compared to labour supply and retirement decisions, since the
latter are usually restricted by labour market and social security regulations,
while consumption might be more discretionary. In addition, consumption of
luxury goods will arguably be more sensitive to an inheritance shock than
consumption of necessity and inferior goods. Therefore, conditional on data
availability, future research should focus on studying how consumption of
different types of goods may react to inheritance receipt.
Chapter 2
House Price Shocks and
Household Saving∗
2.1 Introduction
When a household decides to become a homeowner it is usually investing
a large share of its wealth in a single and rather illiquid asset. Therefore,
the main residence may be considered not only as a consumption good, but
also as an investment good. This chapter investigates whether homeowners
indeed view their home as an investment that can generate capital gains and
be used to save for the future. According to the life cycle model, if housing is
regarded as an investment, homeowners will offset unanticipated house price
increases (decreases) by decreasing (increasing) their savings. Intuitively, if
house prices increase households will have less need to save by other means,
while if house prices decrease they will consider other saving instruments. If,
after controlling for other competing explanations, the data reveal a nega-
tive effect of house price shocks on saving, one may thus conclude that the
evidence is consistent with housing being used as an investment. Answering
this question provides a better understanding of whether housing wealth can
be considered as part of retirement savings. This is relevant for two main
reasons: the increasing fragility of pension systems, and the generally high
level of exposure of household portfolios to housing.
Very few studies have previously investigated the relation between house
price changes and saving at the micro level. Exceptions are Engelhardt (1996)
and Rouwendal and Alessie (2002). There is however a large literature that
has studied the other side of this relationship, i.e. the effect of house price
*This chapter is based on Suari-Andreu (2015).
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Figure 2.1 Evolution of House Prices and Economic Growth
Source: Statistics Netherlands. Notes: Average nominal house prices are given rela-
tive to 2008 and are based on all transaction excluding new homes. The real rate of
GDP growth, is given in terms of 2005 prices. The left axis measures house prices
while the right axis measures GDP growth.
changes on household consumption. This literature has mainly focused on
three competing explanations.1 The first argues that changes in the value of
housing affect consumption through their effect on household wealth (e.g.,
Campbell and Cocco, 2007; Disney et al., 2010; and Browning et al., 2013).
The second focuses on the role of housing as an asset that can be used as
a collateral to borrow and finance consumption (e.g. Aoki et al., 2004; and
Leth-Petersen, 2010). The third investigates the role of macroeconomic fac-
tors that may affect both house prices and consumption simultaneously (e.g
Attanasio and Weber, 1994; and Attanasio et al., 2009).2 In this chapter, I
investigate how the first of these three explanations translates into a relation
between house prices and saving.
To conduct my analysis, I exploit the changes in house prices experi-
enced in the Netherlands between 2003 and 2013.3 Figure 2.1 shows how
house prices increased up to 2008, year in which there was a clear turning
1For a thorough review of this literature, see Browning et al. (2013).
2Attanasio et al. (2009) argue that increases in expected future incomes have a positive
and simultaneous effect both on demand for housing and non-durable consumption.
3I focus on this particular period because it perfectly captures the boom and bust cycle
in the Dutch housing market.
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point coinciding with the start of the Great Recession. The period I consider
is specially interesting because of the size of the house price fluctuations and
the largely unexpected nature of the 2008 turning point. I start by exploring
at the theoretical level how these changes might have affected the saving be-
haviour of households. Following Artle and Varaiya (1978) and Li and Yao
(2007), I set up a life cycle model with housing in which there is no bequest
motive and, for the sake of simplicity, house prices represent the only source
of uncertainty. The main prediction of the model is that homeowners view
the main residence as an instrument to finance consumption later in life,
and thus they will adjust saving to smooth unanticipated house price shocks.
Since older households have a shorter lifetime horizon to smooth changes in
wealth, the model predicts that the size of the effect increases with age.
To test the model implications I employ panel data from the Dutch Na-
tional Bank Household Survey (DHS) for the period 2003-2013. The DHS
provides a novel measure of saving by asking respondents how much money
they have put aside in a given year. In previous literature (i.e. Engelhardt,
1996; and Alessie et al., 2002) saving is measured as the yearly change in
wealth, which makes it difficult to disentangle active (dis)saving from capi-
tal gains (or losses) and portfolio reshuﬄing. For the sake of robustness and
comparison with previous literature, I employ a second measure of saving con-
sisting of the yearly change in long-term financial assets. Furthermore, since
negative (positive) changes in mortgage debt can be considered as saving
(dissaving), I employ a third measure of saving that consists of subtracting
the yearly change in remaining mortgage debt from the the yearly change in
long-term financial assets.
Regarding house price changes, the DHS provides self-reported house
prices and self-reported biennial changes in house prices. Most importantly,
it provides subjective expectations on the evolution of house prices, both at
the level of the own house and at the market level. I use these subjective
expectations to compute measures of the unexpected change in house prices.
To do so, I subtract the expected change for a particular year from the self-
reported change for that same year. As a result, only the unexpected part of
the change is left. For the sake of robustness, I construct additional measures
of the change in house prices using data from Statistic Netherlands (CBS
in its Dutch acronym) at the provincial level, and data from the National
Association of Real Estate Agents (NVM in its Dutch acronym), who divide
the Netherlands in 76 regions and provide yearly average house price values
for each region.
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The contribution of this study to the literature is threefold. First, I exploit
the boom and bust cycle around the year 2008 in the Dutch housing market.
This period is specially interesting due to size of the unexpected house price
shocks observed. Second, this is the first study in the literature on house
prices and saving to clearly disentangle active from passive saving. Third, to
my knowledge this is also the first study to use subjective expectations to
capture unexpected house price shocks. This is a clear contribution to the
existing literature, which has always relied on aggregate expectations derived
from autoregressive models of the evolution of average house prices.4
Controlling for a series of demographic and economic variables, unob-
served household effects, and aggregate macroeconomic effects, the panel re-
gression results show no significant effect of the change in house prices on
saving. The analysis does not yield significant results for any combination
of house price and saving measure that I use, and neither when I condition
the effect on age, on having negative home equity, on the sign of the house
price change, and on having a National Mortgage Guarantee (NMG).5 In
most cases, the magnitude and precision of the coefficient estimates I find
allow ruling out any significantly large effects. The results are in essence un-
changed by a series of robustness checks considering long run expectations,
lagged house price effects, and measurement error caused by rounding in self-
reported house price changes. The latter robustness check is conducted by
using the CBS and NVM measures of the change in house prices (unaffected
by rounding) as an instrument for self-reported measures.
These results disagree with Engelhardt (1996) and Rouwendal and Alessie
(2002), who find a negative relation between house price changes and saving.
However, these studies do not separate expected from unexpected house price
shocks, and do not separate active from passive saving. Additionally, the re-
sults of this chapter contrast with most of the literature on house prices and
consumption, which usually does find some effect. However, the results agree
with Browning et al. (2013), who rule out a wealth effect of housing, and
argue that any correlation between house prices and consumption is likely
due to housing being used as a collateral, and/or due to macroeconomic fac-
4Several contributions (e.g., Case et al., 2012; Beshears et al., 2013; and Niu and van
Soest, 2014) suggest that house price expectations are correlated with individual charac-
teristics. This implies individuals may deviate from average expectations in a systematic
way.
5The NMG is a government-provided insurance scheme that applies if a homeowner,
under certain unfavourable circumstance (e.g. unemployment, divorce or work incapacity),
must sell his/her house and the proceedings do not cover the full remaining mortgage debt.
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tors affecting both variables simultaneously. In any case, my findings suggest
that households do not regard the housing asset as a saving instrument. Even
though the purchase of a house usually implies per se investing a large share
of household wealth in a single asset, the results are compatible with a story
in which households view housing as a consumption good. If that is the case,
they will not worry about house price fluctuations since they do not consider
selling to use the proceeds. The results are also compatible with a scenario in
which households view housing as a bequest to be passed to the next gener-
ation, and with a scenario in which transaction costs of liquidating housing
are too high. These are possibilities that I study further in Chapter 3.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents the
theoretical model. Section 2.3 explains the empirical methodology. Section 2.4
describes the data and provides preliminary evidence. Section 2.5 presents the
results. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter. The appendices provide variable
definitions, summary statistics, a derivation of the likelihood function I use
in the estimation, a plot of the confidence intervals of the main estimates, a
derivation of the measurement error due to rounding, and several extensions
of the theoretical model.
2.2 Life-Cycle Model With Housing
In this section I borrow modelling aspects from Artle and Varaiya (1978) and
Li and Yao (2007) to construct a very stylized life cycle model with housing.
The aim of the model is to show under which assumptions households will use
the housing asset as an instrument to save for retirement. I show as well how
this derives in a negative relation between house prices and saving. Following
Engelhardt (1996), the model must rely on two crucial assumptions. First,
households must be able to somehow liquidate housing wealth so it can be
substituted with other forms of wealth. Second, households must not regard
the house as a bequest. Following these assumptions I construct a very simple
setting in which there is neither lifetime nor income uncertainty, housing is
constant and additively separable from consumption in non-durables, there
is no bequest motive, and the tenure decision (owning versus renting) is
exogenous.6
Consider a household that lives for four periods and maximizes the utility
6Separability between consumption in non-durables and housing implies that the
marginal utility of consumption will not be affected by housing. This excludes comple-
mentarities between consumption in housing and other types of consumption, and allows
focusing on the investment dimension of housing.















where Ct is consumption in non-durable goods period t, H is constant hous-
ing, ρ is the rate of time preference, γ is the rate of relative risk aversion, θ is
the preference for housing and λ is the utility gain from owning the occupied
house.
In the Netherlands there is no down payment constraint and households
can borrow 100% of the value of a house. However, a certain level of previous
income is required. Therefore, the house is purchased at the beginning of the
second period. Since there is no bequest motive, the house is sold in the last
period and the proceeds are used for consumption. Therefore, the household
is a renter in the first and fourth periods. Taking this information into ac-
count, and assuming uncertainty in future house prices, the lifetime budget
















where Θ and Ω are lifetime consumption and lifetime labour income respec-
tively, E1 denotes the expectation at period one, αt is the unitary price of
housing, φ is the transaction cost incurred to sell the house, Kt is the cost of
renting, M is the mortgage loan, rM is the interest rate on the mortgage and
r is the return on savings.7 The terms on the left hand side of (2.2) comprise
lifetime income, which is the sum of lifetime labour income plus the amount
the household expects to receive when the house is sold at period four. The
terms on the right hand side of (2.2) comprise lifetime expenditures, which
are the sum of lifetime consumption in non-durables plus lifetime housing
related expenditures. The expectation operators are due to uncertainty re-
garding future house prices, which implies uncertainty in future mortgage
payments and rental prices.8 Note that at period two the household pays
7See Section 2.D.1 in Appendix 2.D for further details on the set-up of the lifetime
budget constraint and the derivation of the closed form solution for consumption. Section
2.D.2 provides a version of the model in which the household remains a renter throughout
the whole life cycle.
8I employ point expectations, implying that the expected future value of house prices
affects consumption and saving decisions of the household while the variance (i.e. house
price risk) does not. House price uncertainty implies uncertainty in mortgage payments
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only interest on the mortgage, while at period three pays interest plus the
principal.
At period one the household sets an optimal plan by choosing consump-
tion in non-durables and housing such as to maximize (2.1) subject to (2.2)





where the superindex 1 implies consumption as planned in period one, Λt is
a factor containing ρ and r that distributes lifetime income among the four
periods of life,9 and Ξ is what I call the owning factor. The latter equals
the net contribution of housing to lifetime income, i.e. the proceeds from
selling at period four minus all the lifetime housing related expenses. If the
expectations regarding house prices are satisfied in all periods, the house is
sold at the expected price and actual consumption in each period equals the
plan set in period one.
If at a given period the expectation about the house price level is not
satisfied, the household will re-optimize its choices taking into account the
new information. Assuming that an unexpected shock in house prices will
have a positive effect on the owning factor, realized consumption will then




where ηt is the forecast error equal to the difference between actual consump-
tion at t and the plan set at τ . Note that ηt will differ from zero only if the
shock in house prices affects the owning factor. For that, the shock has to be
perceived as permanent to the extent that it has an affect on the expected
sale price at period four. Furthermore, for a given size and degree of persis-
tence of the shock, the contemporaneous effect on consumption will be higher
the older the household is. That is simply because a shorter lifetime horizon
implies a lower number of periods to smooth the shock to housing wealth.
In terms of savings, the contemporaneous effect of an unexpected change
in house prices is given by
S2 = S1(1 + r) + Y2 − Cτ2 −MrM − η2 (2.4)
since M = α2H, and in rental prices since I assume Kt = δαtH, where δ determines the
sensitivity of the rental price to the house price.
9In case ρ = r, then Λt = 1 and consumption is the same in all periods.
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if it takes place at period two, and
S3 = S2(1 + r) + Y3 − Cτ3 −M(1 + rM )− η3 (2.5)
if it takes place at period three, where St and Yt denote savings and income
at t respectively. The negative sign in front of the forecast error implies
that households decrease (increase) savings to smooth over time the increase
(decrease) in consumption implied by the unexpected shock. The intuition
is that, since housing is used to finance consumption in the last period of
life, when house prices increase households have less need to save by other
means, while if they decrease households compensate by increasing liquid
savings. The later in life the shock occurs, the less periods there are to smooth
consumption so the higher has to be the compensatory increase in savings.




To estimate the effect of house price changes on saving I set up an empirical
approximation to Equations (2.4) and (2.5) in the model. I focus on Equation
(2.5) since, besides mortgage interest payments, it includes the repayment of
the principal and thus is more comprehensive. Moving lagged savings to the
left of the equality and substituting in planned consumption as expressed in
Equation (2.3), allows rewriting (2.5) as
∆S3 = S2r + Y3 − Ω + E1Ξ
Λ3
−M(1 + rM )− η3, (2.6)
where ∆S3 = S3−S2 denotes saving. Equation (2.6) shows that the forecast
error that results from an unexpected house price change has a negative effect
on saving. To estimate this effect, I set up the linear regression equation
∆Sit = β0 + β1HPCit + X
′
itβ2 + dt + ci + εit, (2.7)
where i and t are household and year indices respectively, HPCit is the (un-
expected) percentage change in the house price, Xit is a vector containing
economic, demographic and psychological characteristics of the household
(i.e. value of the house, household income, household wealth, mortgage ex-
penditures, loan to value ratio, education level of the household head, age
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of the household head, household structure and risk aversion), dt is a time
effect which I control for by introducing year dummies, and ci + εit is the
composite error term, where ci captures unobserved time-invariant household
heterogeneity, and εit captures unobserved effects that vary across households
and over time. I assume εit is independent over i and is normally distributed
with mean zero.
2.3.2 Estimation
As I explain further in Section 2.4, the main measure of saving I employ is
drawn from a survey question that asks about the yearly amount of money
put aside by households. Respondents are given seven intervals that range
from “less than 15 hundred Euros” to “more than 75 thousand Euros”, and
they can also report that no money was put aside. This variable can be used to
apply linear regression methods by taking the midpoint of each interval. This
option implies assigning a value of zero to the observations with no money
put aside and a value of 75 thousand to observations in the top interval. This
method is not entirely satisfactory since those coded with zero may have
actually dissaved and those coded with 75 thousand may have actually saved
more.
As an alternative to the interval midpoints approach I apply interval
regression estimation. To that end, I define a new variable, int ∆Sit, that
takes values ranging from one to seven corresponding to each interval, and
takes value zero if the respondent reports no money put aside. Relying on the
normality of εit, the next step is to derive a likelihood function defining the
probability that int ∆Sit equals each possible value from zero to seven as a
function of the independent variables in Equation (2.7).10 Once the function
is defined, I use maximum likelihood to estimate the coefficients. As explained
by Wooldridge (2010), the resulting estimates are directly interpretable as if
the dependent variable was continuous.
An additional issue to take into account for the choice of estimator, is
the high chance of a non-zero correlation between the unobserved household
effect ci and the explanatory variables. This correlation would render the
estimates inconsistent due to omitted variable bias. The usual candidate to
tackle this issue is the fixed effects estimator. However, it cannot be combined
10Interval estimation is the same as ordered probit, but with known cut-off points that de-
limit the intervals that define the the values of the ordered dependent variable. In Appendix
2.B I provide the derivation of the log-likelihood function. For additional information on
interval estimation, see Wooldridge (2010).
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with maximum likelihood due to the so-called incidental parameter problem
(Wooldridge, 2010). For this reason I employ a method proposed by Mundlak
(1978), which assumes that ci has the structure
ci = X¯
′
iγ + ui, (2.8)
where X¯i is a vector containing the household-specific time averages of the
time-varying regressors in Equation (2.7), and ui is a household-specific error
component which I assume to be uncorrelated with the regressors. By substi-
tuting (2.8) into (2.7), the latter assumption allows solving the bias caused
by the presence of ci. However, due to the inclusion of the household-specific
time averages of the explanatory variables, the estimation of the unknown
coefficients in Equation (2.7) will only exploit the variation that takes place
within households over time.11
Since I combine interval estimation with the Mundlak method, the esti-
mator I employ can be labelled as interval regression with Mundlak terms,
where the the Mundlak terms refer to the household-specific time averages
of the explanatory variables. When using other measures of saving that are
not given in intervals, I apply OLS with the Mundlak terms added to the
specification.
2.4 Data Description
To estimate Equation (2.7) I use data from the Dutch National Bank House-
hold Survey (DHS), which is an internet based panel survey that provides
data for around 15 hundred to two thousand Dutch households every year
since 1993.12 It provides information on economic, financial and psychologi-
cal aspects of both individual and household behaviour. Most important for
the analysis in this chapter, it provides measures of saving, assets, liabilities,
house prices and house price expectations.13 Data on house price expecta-
tions are only available from 2004 onwards. Therefore I use data from 2004
until 2013, which is a period long enough to capture the boom and bust cycle
11Mundlak (1978) proves that, when estimating a linear model, the result of the Mundlak
estimator is equivalent to that of the fixed effects estimator.
12Households without a computer and/or access to internet are provided with a ba-
sic computer and internet connection to complete the survey. Attrition is dealt with by
biannually refreshing the sample with new households to keep the panel representative of
the Dutch population. Compensatory household weights are used to correct for unequal
selection probabilities.
13For definitions, sources and summary statistics of all variables I use in this chapter, see
Tables 2.A.1 to 2.A.3 in Appendix 2.A.
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in the Dutch housing market.
To construct my sample I take only the responses from household heads,
I exclude those households that moved during the sample period, and I split
the sample between homeowners and renters. After this selection, I exclude
observations with missing values in any of the variables I use, and I exclude
the top and bottom 1% of all measures of saving and house prices changes to
avoid the effect of extreme outliers. I am left with a sample of 1035 homeown-
ers and 637 renters. The panel is unbalanced and each household is followed
for 3.5 waves on average.
2.4.1 Measures of Saving
Respondents of the DHS are asked every year how much money their house-
hold has put aside during the last twelve months. First, the questionnaire
asks if any money was put aside. Those who respond affirmatively are pro-
vided with seven intervals that range from “less than 15 hundred Euros” to
“more than 75 thousand Euros”. This measure of saving has the advantage
that it allows to separate active from passive saving.14 Nevertheless, it has
the disadvantage that is given in intervals and that it does not capture dis-
saving. Figure 2.2 shows yearly average responses, which I compute taking
interval midpoints and assigning a value of 75 thousand to those who report
“more than 75 thousand”. The solid columns show a clear increase in aver-
age saving between 2005 and 2009. After 2009 there are yearly fluctuations
but average values stay at a higher level compared to earlier years in the
sample. The percentage of respondents reporting no money put aside stays
rather constant over time at a value between 20% and 30%. These responses,
to which I assign a value of zero, are excluded from the computation of the
averages in Figure 2.2.
In addition to money put aside, and for the sake of comparison with the
previous literature, I employ as well the yearly change in long-term financial
assets (LTFA) as a measure of saving. I define LTFA as the sum of sav-
ing accounts, private pensions and employer sponsored saving plans.15 The
solid line in Figure 2.3 shows the evolution of the average yearly change in
LTFA. Following Rouwendal and Alessie (2002), negative (positive) changes
14Engelhardt (1996), and Rouwendal and Alessie (2002) employ changes in wealth as a
measure of saving, which does not separate active saving from capital gains and losses.
15Saving accounts include any type of saving account plus deposit books and savings
certificates. LTFA excludes any financial asset characterized by high liquidity and low
return. For a thorough explanation of how household assets are classified in the DHS, see
Alessie et al. (2002).
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Figure 2.2 Average Saving (Money Put Aside)
Notes: The survey question asks how much money the household has put aside in a
given year. Respondents are provided with a series of intervals. Yearly averages are
computed taking the midpoint of each interval. The striped columns indicate the
percentage of households who report no money put aside, to whom a zero value is
assigned. The zeros are not included in the averages. The left axis measures saving,
while the right axis measures the percentage of zeros.
Figure 2.3 Average Saving (Change in Long-Term Financial Assets)
Notes: LTFA stands for Long-Term Financial Assets, while RMD stands for Re-
maining Mortgage Debt. Long-term assets are the sum of saving accounts, private
pensions and employer sponsored saving plans. See main text and Appendix 2.A for
further details.
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in remaining mortgage debt (RMD) can be considered as saving (dissaving).
Therefore, I employ a third measure of saving which consists of subtracting
the yearly change in RMD from the yearly change in LTFA.16 The time evolu-
tion of the this measure’s average is depicted by the dashed line in Figure 2.3.
Note that, even though these measures do not separate active saving from
capital gains (or losses) and portfolio reshuﬄing, they have the advantage
of capturing dissaving. Figure 2.3 shows that the average change in LTFA
is rather stable but decreasing in the second half of the sample. The dashed
line suggests a surge in mortgage deleveraging between 2009 and 2012.
2.4.2 Measures of the Change in House Prices
The DHS provides the self-reported house price as well as the self-reported
change in the house price since two years before the interview.17 I compute
then two measures: the first, self-reported 1, by taking the yearly percent-
age change in the self-reported house price; and the second, self-reported 2,
by transforming the two-year self-reported change into a yearly change. To
obtain self-reported 2, I assume that the percentage change in the last two
years can be decomposed into two identical annual changes. Ideally, the two
measures should provide the same value. Figure 2.4 shows how on average
they are very close (see solid lines).
I complement the DHS self-reported measures with measures provided
by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) and by the National Association of Real Es-
tate Agents (NVM). CBS provides average house prices at the province level
(there are 12 provinces in the Netherlands), while NVM divides the Nether-
lands in 76 regions and provides average house prices for each of them.18 With
this information I generate the variables CBS provincial and NVM regional.
The solid line in Figure 2.4 shows how the average of CBS provincial changes
over time.19 Compared to CBS provincial, the self-reported measures show
less pronounced declines in 2009 and 2012 compared to CBS provincial. This
16For households with a life-insurance mortgage, the DHS dataset allows considering the
cash value of the life insurance as and additional part of the mortgage loan. Life-insurance
mortgages are a popular type of mortgage in the Netherlands which couple the mortgage
loan with the purchase of a life insurance.
17This information is only available for homeowners.
18Both measures are based on all transactions taking place in a given year excluding
new homes. Using postal code data corresponding to all the DHS respondents, I place each
household in a corresponding NVM region. In that way I match DHS data with NVM house
price data.
19NVM regional has virtually the same average as CBS provincial since both variables
are based on the same underlying house transactions.
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Figure 2.4 Average House Price Changes
Notes: Self-reported 1 is the average change in the self-reported price of the own
house. Self-reported 2 is the average self-reported change in the price of the own
house. See main text and Appendix 2.A for further details.
Figure 2.5 Average Unexpected Change in House Prices
Source: DHS; Notes: Unexpected changes are computed by subtracting expected
changes from realized changes for each particular year. Averages are taken once
the subtraction is performed for each household in the sample. See main text and
Appendix 2.A for further details.
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might be due to homeowners being reluctant to acknowledge a decline in the
price of their house.20
In addition to house price measures, the DHS provides information on
house price expectations. Homeowners are asked every year how much they
expect the price of their house and the average market price will change
during the following year. I use these questions to generate the variables ex-
pected 1 and expected 2 respectively. With these, I compute measures of the
unexpected change in house prices in the following way: for every year I sub-
tract from the actual change in house prices the change that was expected
for that particular year. After the subtraction, only the unexpected part of
the change is left. When the actual change is above (below) the expected
change, the household experiences a positive (negative) shock. Subtracting
expected 1 from self-reported 1 and self-reported 2 I generate unexpected 1
and unexpected 2 respectively. Subtracting expected 2 from self-reported 1
and self-reported 2 I generate unexpected 3 and unexpected 4 respectively. In
addition, I generate unexpected 5 and unexpected 6 by substracting expected
2 from CBS provincial and NVM regional. Figure 2.5 shows how the averages
of unexpected 1 and unexpected 2 change over time. It shows that previous to
2008 homeowners in the sample experience on average positive house price
shocks. However, this situation is reversed after the year 2010 with two large
negative shocks in 2011 and 2013.21
The availability of subjective expectations arguably provides a consid-
erable advantage with respect to previous literature, which usually employs
imputed rather than self-reported expectations. For instance, Campbell and
Cocco (2007), Disney et al. (2010), and Browning et al. (2013) construct
models of the evolution of aggregated house prices and subtract forecasted
house price changes from realized changes for a given year.22 They use thus
measures of unexpected changes in house prices that are not self-reported
and do not fully take into account individual heterogeneity. Several studies
(e.g., Case et al., 2012; Beshears et al., 2013; and Niu and van Soest (2014))
have shown that house price expectations depend on subjective perception
and individual characteristics.
20van der Cruijsen et al. (2014) employ DHS data and find that homeowners tend to ve
over-optimistic about the price of their house.
21All other measures of the unexpected change in house prices show an evolution that is
in all cases not too different from that one in Figure 2.5.
22Disney et al. (2010) aggregate house prices at the county level in the United Kingdom,
while Browning et al. (2013) do so at the municipal level in Denmark.
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2.5 Results
In this section I present first the results obtained when using money put aside
as a measure for saving. After, I present the results obtained when using the
change in LTFA and the change in LTFA minus the change in RMD. For
all equations I estimate the Mundlak terms are jointly significant at the 1%
level. This result implies a non-zero correlation between the household effect
ci and the regressors in Equation (2.7). Therefore, ci cannot be treated as a
random effect and the inclusion of the Mundlak terms is warranted.23
2.5.1 Baseline Estimation
Table 2.1 shows the results obtained for homeowners when employing the dif-
ferent measures of the change in house prices described in Section 2.4.2, i.e.
self-reported 1, self-reported 2, CBS provincial and NVM regional. In addi-
tion, I use the one-year-ahead expected percentage change in the price of the
own house (expected 1 ) and the one-year-ahead expected percentage change
in the average market price (expected 2 ). The coefficient β1 in Equation (2.7)
can be interpreted as the change in saving (given in Euros) as a consequence
of a one percentage point increase in house prices. All of the estimates of
β1 shown in Table 2.1 are not significantly different from zero. The point
estimates range from -6.5 to 76.6. These results imply that a one percentage
point increase in the change in the house price (which implies a 2.76 thou-
sand Euros increase if I take the average house value in the sample) implies a
change in saving that is in any case smaller than 0.02% of the yearly average
money put aside in the sample (i.e., 4.69 thousand Euros).
Given the precision of the estimates, the 95% confidence intervals allow
ruling out any sizeable effects. Only the estimate of the effect of the variable
CBS provincial has a very high standard error, which is not surprising since
this measure only varies at the provincial level. Even though it is based on
the same underlying housing transitions as CBS provincial, the variable NVM
regional provides more precision since there are 76 NVM regions, while there
are only 12 provinces. Despite the gain in precision, the estimate is still not
significantly different from zero. In addition, Table 2.1 shows a positive effect
of income, and a negative effect of ltv ratio, mortgage expenditures and house
23It can be shown that testing for the joint significance of the Mundlak terms is equivalent
to conducting a Hausman test with the null hypothesis stating E(ci|HPCit,X1it) = 0. For
more details, see Mundlak (1978).
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Table 2.1 Money Put Aside: Interval Regression with Mundlak Terms (Homeowners)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Income 87.77*** 87.54*** 87.54*** 87.64*** 87.74*** 87.66***
(18.42) (18.44) (18.43) (18.45) (18.42) (18.40)
Wealth 6.15* 6.29* 6.17* 6.10* 6.15* 6.166*
(3.42) (3.40) (3.40) (3.42) (3.39) (3.40)
House -13.14** -14.15*** -13.56*** -13.59*** -13.56*** -13.62***
value (5.39) (4.84) (4.70) (4.71) (4.72) (4.735)
Mortgage -23.86*** -23.88*** -24.00*** -23.89*** -23.97*** -23.96***
exp. (5.94) (5.93) (5.90) (5.96) (5.88) (5.90)
Ltv ratio -17.67*** -17.47*** -17.49*** -17.26*** -17.15*** -17.39***
(6.37) (6.46) (6.47) (6.52) (6.41) (6.42)
Age -118.34 -176.51 -119.79 -111.15 -99.65 -100.27
(94.10) (115.46) (98.03) (97.29) (90.84) (90.84)
Higher 673.35* 721.29** 679.11* 679.18* 676.81* 669.65*
education (357.50) (350.50) (361.46) (360.50) (356.09) (358.02)
N. of -81.12 -62.20 -71.96 -75.69 -83.13 -81.43
children (629.45) (627.38) (627.42) (629.81) (629.16) (628.89)
N. of 208.39 219.93 209.17 208.82 212.04 208.37
child out (217.74) (218.34) (217.86) (218.51) (217.48) (217.16)
Partner 149.89 101.09 122.49 124.95 141.39 137.96
(479.02) (479.58) (479.15) (479.11) (478.78) (478.41)
Risk -4.76 -5.71 -2.81 -2.39 -4.58 -3.75













Constant 5874.36*** 5090.88*** 5891.38*** 5917.43*** 5683.26*** 6055.38***
(1466.77) (1504.80) (1483.24) (1481.62) (1519.07) (1454.66)
L.likelihood -5961.98 -5958.18 -5961.63 -5961.61 -5962.11 -5962.30
Observations 3726 3726 3726 3726 3726 3726
Households 1035 1035 1035 1035 1035 1035
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by household, are reported in parentheses. Dependent variable
is money put aside in the last 12 months. To ease interpretation of the coefficients, all monetary
explanatory variables are given in thousands of Euros while the dependent variable is given in
Euros. Time averages of all variables are included in the specification except for higher education,
CBS provincial and NVM regional. *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level,
* significant at the 10% level. For variable definitions and summary statistics, refer to Tables
2.A.1 to 2.A.3 in Appendix 2.A.
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Table 2.2 Money Put Aside: Interval Regression with Mundlak Terms (Homeowners)
- Unexpected Change in House Prices -
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Income 95.91*** 94.76*** 95.40*** 95.54*** 95.41*** 95.54***
(20.38) (20.38) (20.40) (20.37) (20.36) (20.34)
Wealth 3.48 3.48 3.51 3.53 3.50 3.53
(3.30) (3.29) (3.29) (3.29) (3.29) (3.29)
House -7.09 -9.95** -9.17* -9.26* -9.13* -9.19*
value (5.26) (4.84) (4.74) (4.74) (4.69) (4.70)
Mortgage -22.52*** -22.76*** -22.90*** -22.87*** -22.95*** -22.95***
exp. (4.30) (4.20) (4.41) (4.45) (4.29) (4.37)
Ltv ratio -17.19*** -16.39** -16.76** -16.63** -16.80** -11.64**
(6.56) (6.66) (6.62) (6.63) (6.60) (6.62)
Age -144.31 -144.74 -141.71 -141.70 -141.91 -141.92
(106.99) (107.10) (107.05) (107.03) (107.13) (107.02)
Higher 788.54** 806.03** 787.49** 793.36** 786.82** 790.83**
education (379.06) (375.30) (380.23) (382.14) (379.30) (380.48)
N. of 114.36 98.71 122.33 121.49 121.21 119.61
children (629.97) (627.23) (627.49) (628.52) (628.47) (628.90)
N. of 290.80 290.13 290.68 290.10 290.52 288.40
child out (209.41) (210.26) (208.43) (208.82) (209.66) (209.43)
Partner 382.59 403.43 402.32 395.74 403.92 396.25
(514.43) (514.14) (515.43) (515.13) (516.14) (515.72)
Risk -83.58 -75.78 -77.26 -79.21 -76.35 -77.38













Constant 5771.61*** 5311.70*** 5651.13*** 5676.84*** 5642.41*** 5680.83***
(1535.82) (1512.44) (1539.04) (1534.81) (1545.47) (1536.55)
L.Likelihood -5166.20 -5164.74 -5166.83 -5166.71 -5166.84 -5166.75
Observations 3235 3235 3235 3235 3235 3235
Households 940 940 940 940 940 940
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by household, are reported in parentheses. Dependent variable
is money put aside in the last 12 months. To ease interpretation of the coefficients, all monetary
explanatory variables are given in thousands of Euros while the dependent variable is given in
Euros. Time averages of all variables are included in the specifications except for higher education,
unexpected 1 and unexpected 2. *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *
significant at the 10% level. For variable definitions and summary statistics, refer to Tables 2.A.1
to 2.A.3 in Appendix 2.A.
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Table 2.3 Money Put Aside: Interval Regression with Mundlak Terms (Renters)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income 54.07** 55.50** 46.25** 50.46**
(22.83) (22.81) (23.20) ( 23.40)
Wealth -10.77 -10.46 -12.09 -11.53
(17.08) (16.83) (17.39) (17.09)
Rent -10.23 -14.99 -10.11 -13.03
(11.50) (11.23) (13.78) (12.01)
Age -73.62 -72.45 -92.44 -109.20
(105.99) (105.95) (110.61) (110.78)
Higher education 579.82 581.72 339.98 347.19
(495.84) (494.98) (508.85) (508.15)
N. of children -1080.04* -1064.90* -1252.74** -1227.91**
(568.61) (555.34) (623.39) (599.26)
N. of child out -84.13 -55.54 -80.84 -46.29
(188.17) (182.89) (188.69) (183.39)
Partner 1921.39 1951.69 1673.14 1835.61
(1761.93) (1788.42) (1865.55) (1884.79)
Risk aversion 16.18 19.02 31.74 36.00
(85.55) (84.96) (89.33) (88.41)
Saving for a house 3347.60*** 3181.85***
(731.51) (703.47)
CBS provincial 101.10 116.47
(177.03) (183.05)
NVM regional -100.88 -104.45
(147.41) (147.38)
CBS prov. × saving for a h. -105.18
(122.81)
NVM reg. × saving for a h. 72.43
(163.60)
Constant 877.84 155.02 -1158.79 -472.72
1238.43 1613.01 (1687.78) (1279.90)
Log Likelihood -3084.23 -3082.37 -2976.20 -2974.67
Observations 2082 2082 2082 2082
Households 637 637 637 637
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by household, are reported in parentheses. Dependent vari-
able is money put aside in the last 12 months given in Euros. To ease interpretation of the
coefficients, all monetary explanatory variables are given in thousands of Euros while the de-
pendent variable is given in Euros. Time averages for all specifications are included in the
specifications except for higher education, CBS provincial and NVM regional. *** significant
at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. For variable
definitions and summary statistics, refer to Tables 2.A.1 to 2.A.3 in Appendix 2.A.
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value.24 Both wealth and higher education have a positive but less significant
effect.
Table 2.2 shows the results I obtain when using the different measures
of the unexpected change in house prices I describe in Section 2.4.2. The
model in Section 2.2 predicts that only unexpected changes in house prices
will have a contemporaneous effect. However, similarly to Table 2.1, all of
the β1 estimates in Table 2.2 are not significantly different from zero. The
size of the point estimates and the standard errors are very similar to those
in Table 2.1, and thus they allow ruling out any large effects that could be
economically relevant. This result suggest that homeowners do not compen-
sate fluctuations in the price of their home by adjusting liquid savings.
Table 3 provides the results I obtain when estimating the effect of house
price changes on money put aside by renters.25 The specification I employ is
very similar to that in Equation (2.7). The only difference is the exclusion of
the homeowner-specific control variables (i.e. house value, mortgage expen-
ditures and ltv ratio) and the inclusion of the yearly total expenditures in
rental payments. Columns (1) and (2) show that there is no significant effect
of CBS provincial and NVM regional.26 Columns (3) and (4) show that there
is no significant effect even for those renters who report to be saving for the
purchase of a house. In addition, the results in Table 2.3 show that renters
have a lower propensity to save compared to homeowners, and that those
who are saving for a house are indeed saving significantly much more than
other renters.
2.5.2 Interaction Effects
Even though I do not find a significant effect when using the whole sample of
homeowners, there are particular subgroups that could be more affected than
others. The model in Section 2.2 predicts that the effect will be stronger for
older vis-a`-vis younger households. To test this hypothesis I generate three
age categories: less tan 35 (age1 ), between 35 and 65 (age2 ) and 65 or more
(age3 ). Table 2.4 provides the results I obtain when interacting the dummies
24Note that the coefficient on the house value variable is not the main coefficient of
interest since it captures the effect a change in a stock (the value of the main residence)
on a flow (saving), while β1 captures the effect of a flow (house price changes) on a flow
(saving).
25In Appendix 2.D I use the theoretical model to predict how renters will react to unex-
pected changes in house prices.
26In the DHS, renters are not asked questions about house prices. Therefore self-reported



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































for these age categories (age1 is the reference category) with all the measures
of the change in house prices reported in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. In this case, the
estimate of β1 captures the effect for the younger group, while the addition
of β1 and the corresponding interaction coefficient provides the estimate for
the middle aged and older groups respectively. Table 2.4 shows that the es-
timates for all three age groups are not significantly different from zero.
In addition to the age interaction effect, I test whether the effect depends
on having negative home equity and on having a National Mortgage Guar-
antee (NMG). I define households with negative home equity as those for
whom the remaining mortgage debt exceeds the self-reported market price
of their house. These households are highly leveraged and thus are likely to
have a lower stock of liquid savings. Therefore, I expect them to be less able
to react to house price shocks compared to households with positive home
equity. Households with an NMG are entitled to receive financial help from
from the government if they have to sell their house for a price below the
remaining mortgage debt.27 Therefore, I expect them to be more indifferent
to house price changes compared to households without an NMG. Tables 2.5
and 2.6 provide the results I obtain when interacting the different measures
of house price changes with a negative equity dummy and an NMG dummy.
The results show how the estimated effects for all these different subgroups
are not significant as the p-values are always above or very close to 0.1
Several contributions to the literature (e.g. Engelhardt, 1996; and At-
tanasio et al., 2009) argue that households may perceive negative and posi-
tive changes in house prices differently. I test this by generating a dummy for
negative changes and interacting it with the different measures of the change
in house prices. This experiment is almost the same as testing for a structural
break around the years 2009 and 2010, since all house price change measures
I employ show clear turning points from positive to negative changes around
these years. Table 2.7 shows that, in this case as well, the estimates are not
significantly different from zero. These results suggests that there is no asym-
metry in the effect since households do not react neither to positive nor to
negative changes in house prices.
27Table 2.A.2 in Appendix 2.A shows that there are about 7% household-year observa-
tions with negative home equity in the sample, and about 30% household year observations
with an NMG.
44 House Price Shocks and Household Saving
2.5.3 Alternative Saving Measures
2.5.3.1 Change in LTFA
The first columns in Tables 2.8 and 2.9 provide the results I obtain when using
the yearly change in LTFA as a dependent variable. As explained in Section
2.4.1, I define LTFA as the sum of saving accounts, private pensions and
employer sponsored savings plans. The first column in Table 2.8 shows that,
when not distinguishing expected and unexpected changes in house prices,
the estimates of β1 are all not significantly different from zero. Only when
using NVM regional I obtain an estimate that is significant at the 10% level.
However, this result is not robust across different measures of the change
in house prices. Compared to Table 2.1, the estimates in Table 2.8 are less
precise. Therefore, it is less clear in this case whether the actual effect is close
or not to zero. The first column in Table 2.9 shows that most of the measures
of the unexpected change in house prices yield as well insignificant estimates.
Only unexpected 4 yields a slightly significant estimate, which is again not
robust across specifications.
A concern related with the use of ∆LTFA as a dependent variable is that
the estimates on the control variables hardly make sense. For instance, there
is no significant effect of income and the point estimates for the coefficient
on the higher education dummy are negative. The fact that there is not even
a significant effect of income reveals that ∆LTFA does not capture active
saving accurately, and makes the case for the variable money put aside as a
better measure of saving. I consider in this case the same interactions as in
Section 2.5.2 and the effect on ∆LTFA for renters. However, the results do
not add any substantial information since they do not yield clearly significant
effects. 28
2.5.3.2 Change in LTFA Net of Change in RMD
Rouwendal and Alessie (2002) argue that negative (positive) changes in RMD
can be considered as saving (dissaving). Since mortgage debt is an important
component in the portfolio of Dutch homeowners, I consider an additional
measure of saving by subtracting the change in RMD from the change in
LTFA. This measure accounts for the fact that households may not increase
their stock of savings as a consequence of the fall in house prices because
28For economy of space, the results are not reported here. They are available upon re-
quest.
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Table 2.8 Pooled OLS with Mundlak Terms (Homeowners)
∆LTFA Adjusted R2 ∆LTFA-∆RMD Adjusted R2
Self-reported 1 -17.37 0.07 -289.47* 0.14
(30.05) (150.69)
Self-reported 2 104.38 0.07 192.02 0.14
(119.49) (266.78)
Expected 1 -227.79 0.08 453.24 0.14
(148.45) (344.94)
Expected 2 -100.61 0.07 -765.87** 0.15
(136.09) (385.97)
CBS provincial 9.39 0.07 1226.64 0.14
(263.53) (803.91)
NVM regional -183.47* 0.08 79.60 0.14
(103.59) (249.36)
Observations 3718 - 3494 -
Households 1028 - 979 -
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by household, are reported in parentheses. ∆LTFA stands for
the change in long-term assets, while ∆RMD stands for the change in remaining mortgage debt.
The same control variables as in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 are included in the estimation. Time averages
are included for all variables except for higher education, CBS provincial and NVM regional.
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. For
variable definitions and summary statistics, refer to Tables 2.A.1 to 2.A.3 in Appendix 2.A.
Table 2.9 Pooled OLS with Mundlak Terms (Homeowners)
- Unexpected Change in House Prices -
∆LTFA Adjusted R2 ∆LTFA-∆RMD Adjusted R2
Unexpected 1 -26.13 0.07 -192.73 0.15
(25.44) (120.50)
Unexpected 2 42.90 0.06 15.98 0.15
(73.32) (157.32)
Unexpected 3 -68.04 0.06 138.90 0.15
(89.77) (202.78)
Unexpected 4 -151.29* 0.06 -103.65 0.15
(84.68) (163.26)
Unexpected 5 -19.74 0.06 288.89 0.15
(81.06) (233.92)
Unexpected 6 -151.52 0.06 0.94 0.15
(109.05) (181.05)
Observations 3227 - 3052 -
Households 939 - 896 -
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by household, are reported in parentheses. ∆LTFA stands for
the change in long-term assets, while ∆RMD stands for the change in remaining mortgage debt.
The same control variables as in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 are included in the estimation. Time averages
are included for all variables except for higher education, unexpected 1 and unexpected 2. ***
significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. For
variable definitions and summary statistics, refer to Tables 2.A.1 to 2.A.3 in Appendix 2.A.
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they are deleveraging instead.29 When using this measure of saving, I include
as additional explanatory variables a set of dummies indicating the type of
mortgage held by the household. In this way, I account for the fact that some
type of mortgages (e.g. interest only mortgages) do not allow for revisions of
the monthly payments.30
The second column of Table 2.8 shows that most of the measures of
the change in house prices I employ yield coefficient estimates that are not
significantly different from zero. Nevertheless, the variable self-reported 1 has
a sizeable and slightly significant effect. Expected 1 appears to have as well a
statistically significant effect. This suggests that indeed households may draw
down their mortgage debt when house prices decrease. However, a word of
caution is pertinent since, once again, these results are not robust to most
of the measures of the change in house prices that I employ. In addition,
they are not confirmed by the analysis based on the unexpected change in
house prices, which, as shown in the second column of Table 2.9, yields only
insignificant estimates. Regarding the control variables, this last measure of
saving yields slightly more sensible results compared to ∆LTFA. I find again
a significant, and large in magnitude, effect of income and I find as well a
slightly significant negative effect of age. Once more, I estimate the effect
of the change in house prices taking into account all the interaction effects,




The absence of an effect of the unexpected change can be due to the short
run nature of the expectations I use. Since housing is in any case a long-term
investment, long run expectations may be more relevant than one-year-ahead
expectations. The DHS provides an opportunity to study this issue since it
asks respondents about their expectation regarding the yearly average per-
29Considering that the main residence may be used as a collateral in debt contracts,
it is reasonable to expect that liquidity constrained households will not react to house
price changes by changing their stock of savings, but by adjusting their stock of debt. This
argument is in line with the literature studying the effect of housing on consumption via
its use as a collateral, e.g. Leth-Petersen (2010).
30For an outline of the Dutch mortgage market and the different types of mortgages
therein, see van Ooijen and van Rooij (2016).
31For economy of space, the results are not reported here. They are available upon re-
quest.
Chapter 2 47
centage change in house prices ten years ahead. Table 2.A.2 in Appendix
2.A shows that the sample average of this variable is positive (3.34%) and
larger than the average one-year-ahead expectation (-0.082%), suggesting
that households expect house prices to generally increase in the long term.
However, if I use long-term expectations as provided by DHS as explanatory
variable I still do not find a significant effect on money put aside by house-
holds. Results of this and all robustness checks described in this section are
not included for economy of space. They are all available upon request.
2.5.4.2 Willingness to Sell
A plausible explanation for the results I obtain is that individuals generally do
not think about selling their home. It can be that only those who are willing
to sell in the short run, and thus are more likely to be actively aware of house
prices developments, are truly affected by unexpected house price shocks. The
DHS asks homeowners whether they are searching for a new accommodation,
which could imply looking for another bought accommodation, for a rental
house or for a nursing home. Table 2.A.2 in Appendix 2.A shows that the
dummy variable looking for a house takes value one for 5% of the household-
year observations in the sample.
Assuming that looking for a new location goes together with selling the
current one, this group of homeowners is particularly sensitive to sudden
changes in house prices. To test this I create a dummy that takes value one
if a homeowner is looking for a new accommodation and zero otherwise.
Interacting this variable with the different measures of the change in house
prices yields no significant effect for this particular group of homeowners.
This implies that a change in house prices does not affect saving even when
households are willing to sell their house in the short run.
2.5.4.3 Measurement Error
There is a branch of the econometric literature that points at the mea-
surement error problem caused by the tendency of survey respondents to
round their answers towards given numbers.32 The histograms in Appendix
2.C show a clear tendency to round towards particular values in the self-
reported measures of the (expected) change in house prices I use. According
to de Bresser and van Soest (2013), it is reasonable to assume that round-
ing is correlated with individual characteristics such as age, education, risk
32For a summary, see de Bresser and van Soest (2013)
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aversion and other attributes that may not be observed. If this is the case, it
can be shown that rounding leads to a bias that depends on the correlation
between the rounding error and the independent variables included in the
regression equation.33
To address this problem, I use the variables CBS provincial and NVM
regional, as instruments for self-reported 1, self-reported 2, unexpected 1 and
unexpected 2, and estimate β1 by means of two-stage least squares. I assume
the CBS and NVM measures are uncorrelated with the rounding behaviour
but correlated with self-reported house prices and house price changes. With
F-values clearly above ten, the first-stage regressions show a clear effect of the
instruments on the regressors measured with error. The resulting estimates
of β1 are slightly less precise and still not significantly different from zero.
2.5.4.4 Lagged Effect
An additional plausible explanation for the results has to do with the timing
of the effect. Homeowners may not react immediately to changes in house
prices. Instead, it may take some time before households realize an upward
or downward trend in house prices that might end up having a substantial
effect on the price of their main residence. To check for this, I lag the differ-
ent measures of the change in house prices for one and two years. Lagging
the total change in house prices one and two periods yields no evidence of
a statistically significant effect. Even though less precise due to the loss ob-
servations implied by the lagged variables, the results of the analysis of the
contemporaneous effect are confirmed by the analysis of the lagged effect.
2.5.4.5 Sample Selection
Note that for each output table the same observations are used across columns
for the sake of comparability of results. This implies dropping only very
few observations when running some of the regressions. However, in a few
cases the loss of observations is quite substantial. For instance, in the sixth
column of Table 2.1 about two thousand observations are dropped to equalize
the number of observations across columns. Additionally, for all measures of
saving (except for money put aside) and of the change in house prices I
drop the top and bottom 1% of observation in the distribution to avoid the
33In Appendix 2.C I provide a derivation of the bias caused by the measurement error
problem. I show that the direction of the bias will depend on the sign of the correlation
between rounding and the explanatory variables included in the model.
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effect of extreme outliers. To check whether dropping observations for both
reasons influences the results by affecting sample selection, I rerun all of the
regressions including all observations that were dropped in the main analysis.
The results still show no significant effect of house price changes on household
saving.
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter I show that, assuming the main residence can be liquidated
and that there is no bequest motive, the life cycle model predicts that home-
owners will eventually sell their main residence and use the proceeds for
non-durable consumption. This implies that homeowners offset unexpected
negative changes in house prices by increasing liquid savings. Given the size
and degree of persistence of the shock, the effect will be stronger the older the
household is. I test these hypotheses by employing a whole range of measures
of saving and of unexpected house price changes. These measures are drawn
from the Dutch National Bank Household Survey (DHS), from Statistics
Netherlands (CBS) and from the National Association of Real Estate Agents
(NVM). This chapter adds novel contributions to the literature in several
ways. First, this is to my knowledge the first study to use measures of the
unexpected change in house prices based on subjective expectations reported
by households; second, I employ a new measure of saving which captures
active saving more accurately compared to previous literature; and third, I
exploit the recent sharp fluctuations in the Dutch housing market, which
provide a very relevant case study for the question at hand.
Controlling for a series of demographic and economic variables, as well as
for both unobserved household fixed effects (using the method developed by
Mundlak (1978)) and aggregate macroeconomic effects, the panel regression
results show no clearly significant effect of any of the measures of the
change in house prices on saving. The precision of the estimates allows in
most specifications ruling out any sizeable effects. This result holds when
I condition the effect on age, on having negative home equity, on having
a national mortgage guarantee (NMG) and on the sign of the house price
change. Furthermore, the results remain unaltered to a whole range of
robustness checks that take into account long term house price expectations,
willingness to sell the main residence in the short run, measurement error in
the house price change, and lagged effects of changes in house prices.
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My findings are in contrast with Engelhardt (1996) and Rouwendal and
Alessie (2002), who find a negative effect of house price changes on saving.
However both of these studies do not distinguish neither between expected
and unexpected changes in house prices, nor between active and passive
saving. This means their results will capture for instance any correlation
between house prices and returns on savings. In addition, the results of this
chapter contrast with most of the literature on house price changes and
consumption, which usually finds a statistically significant effect. However,
the results are in agreement with Browning et al. (2013). Exploiting a reform
in Denmark that allowed using the house as a collateral for borrowing only
after 1992, they are able to disentangle the wealth effect of housing from
the collateral effect of housing. They conclude that the wealth effect of
housing is negligible, and that any correlation between house price changes
and consumption is due to housing being used a collateral, and/or due to
aggregate macroeconomic factors affecting both variables simultaneously.
The results in this chapter imply that individuals do not adjust saving
to house price fluctuations. That is the case even when the house price
changes are of the size observed in the Dutch housing market during the
period between 2004 and 2013. Therefore, my findings do not seem to be
compatible with a model in which homeowners use their housing asset as
an instrument to save for the future. Several features could be added to the
model to explain the lack of sensitivity of saving to house price fluctuations.
For example, this phenomenon would be compatible with a model in which
high transaction costs deter individuals from liquidating housing. As well, it
would be compatible with a model in which households view their house as
a bequest to be passed on to the next generation, an aspect I pay further
attention to in Chapter 3. In any case, the results suggest housing and liquid
saving are not easily substitutable. This requires a word of caution when
considering housing as part of retirement saving. A better understanding of
this issue is crucial in the present context of fragility of pension systems and
high homeownership rates among retirees.
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Appendices
2.A Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics
Table 2.A.1 Variable Definitions and Sources
Variable Definition Source
Saving Measures
Money put aside Money put aside in the past 12 months. DHS
∆LTFA Yearly change in long-term assets (saving ac-
counts, private pension and employer spon-
sored saving plans).
DHS
∆LTFA - ∆RMD Yearly change in long-term assets minus yearly
change in remaining mortgage debt.
DHS
House Price Change Measures
Self-reported 1 Yearly percentage change in the self-reported
house price with respect to the previous year.
DHS
Self-reported 2 Reported yearly percentage change in the
house price with respect to the previous year.
DHS
Expected 1 Expected percentage change in the house price
for the next year with respect to the present
year.
DHS
Expected 2 Expected percentage change in average house
market prices for the next year with respect to
the present year.
DHS
Longexp Expected yearly percentage change in average
house prices in ten years.
DHS
CBS provincial Average percentage change in house market
prices at the province level
CBS
NVM regional Average percentage change in house market
prices at the NVM region level.
NVM
Unexpected 1 Self-reported 1 minus lagged Expected 1. DHS
Unexpected 2 Self-reported 2 minus lagged Expected 1. DHS
Unexpected 3 CBS provincial minus lagged Expected 1. DHS/CBS
Unexpected 4 NVM regional minus lagged Expected 1. NVM/CBS
Unexpected 5 CBS provincial minus lagged Expected 2. DHS/CBS
Unexpected 6 NVM regional minus lagged Expected 2. NVM/CBS
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Table 2.A.1 Variable Definitions and Sources (continuation)
Variable Definition Source
Control Variables
Income Yearly total net income of the household. DHS
Weatlh Net wealth (main residence and mortgage ex-
cluded).
DHS
House value Amount the household expects to get for the
first residence if sold.
DHS
Mortgage exp. Yearly amount of mortgage related expendi-
ture (first residence).
DHS
Age 1; Age 2;
Age 3
Dummies indicating age of the household head.
Age 1: 35 or younger, Age 2: between 35 and
65, Age 3: above 65.
DHS
Higher education Dummy indicating higher education. DHS
N. of children Number of children living in the household. DHS
N. of child. out Number of children living outside of the house-
hold.
DHS
Partner Dummy indicating the presence of a partner. DHS
Risk aversion Index variable indicating how much household
heads agree with having save investments with
guaranteed returns, 1: totally disagree, 7: to-
tally agree.
DHS
NMG Dummy indicating the presence of a national
mortgage guarantee
DHS
Ltv ratio Remaining mortgage plus cash value life insur-
ance, divided by market price of residence.
DHS
NHE Dummy indicating negative home equity. DHS
Rent Yearly amount rent for main residence. DHS
Saving for a
house
Dummy indicating whether a renter is saving




Dummy indicating whether a homeowner is
looking for a new accommodation.
DHS
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Table 2.A.2 Summary Statistics (Homeowners)
Variable Mean Median St. Dev. W. St. Dev. Min. Max.
Money put aside 4.67 3.25 6.60 4.44 0 75
∆LTFA 0.77 0 19.40 17.21 -10.72 107.88
∆LTFA - ∆RMD 0.42 0 47.89 40.20 -259.56 285.00
Income 35.86 31 14.21 6.93 12 75
Wealth 61.98 33.59 80.37 34.55 -49.44 486.66
House value 275.71 250 110.91 27.53 0 695
Mortgage exp. 4.88 3.98 5.35 2.53 0 48.02
Ltv ratio 36.13 28.77 35.07 13.13 0 197.92
Age 1 (0-35) 0.06 - - - - -
Age 2 (35-65) 0.63 - - - - -
Age 3 (65+) 0.29 - - - - -
Higher education 0.47 - - - - -
Number of children 0.61 0 1.03 0.24 0 6
Number of child. out 1.18 1 1.39 0.48 0 8
Partner 0.79 - - - - -
Risk aversion 5.23 6 1.65 0.96 1 7
NMG 0.30 - - - - -
NHE 0.06 - - - - -
Looking for a house 0.05 - - - - -
Self-reported 1 1.23 0 12.49 10.64 -57.14 96.31
Self-reported 2 0.56 0 4.50 3.35 -10.55 22.50
Expected 1 -0.08 0 3.18 2.36 -10 15
Expected 2 -0.31 0 3.26 2.48 -12 15
Longexp 3.34 2 4.45 3.50 -40 90
CBS provincial -0.24 -1.28 4.440 3.39 -7.30 7.74
NVM regional -0.23 0.40 5.24 4.47 -19.33 12.58
Unexpected 1 1.24 0 12.20 10.28 -57.14 81
Unexpected 2 0.57 0 4.36 3.46 -13.55 22.50
Unexpected 3 -0.23 -0.59 4.53 3.42 -14.28 14.58
Unexpected 4 -0.16 0.29 5.56 4.70 -14.68 14.92
Unexpected 5 -0.50 -1.05 4.39 3.39 -13.21 14.80
Unexpected 6 -0.37 -0.32 5.73 4.92 -14.68 14.92
Notes: Money put aside and Income are coded in intervals. In both cases I take the midpoint of
each interval to compute summary statistics. All monetary variables are given in thousands of
Euros. For all variables the sample employed is the estimation sample in Table 2.1. W. St. Dev.
stands for Within Standard Deviation.
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Table 2.A.3 Summary Statistics (Renters)
Variable Mean Median St. Dev. W. St. Dev. Min. Max.
Money put aside 23.20 0.75 4.82 3.14 0 75
∆LTFA 0.46 0 13.60 11.90 -106 109
Income 24.46 18 11.42 5.09 12 75
Wealth 23.03 7.98 43.36 20.04 -50.48 374.93
Age 1 (0-35) 0.10 - - - - -
Age 2 (35-65) 0.55 - - - - -
Age 3 (65+) 0.33 - - - - -
Higher education 0.30 - - - - -
Number of children 0.26 0 0.679 0.15 0 4
Number of child. out 1.01 0 1.415 0.45 0 12
Partner 0.43 - - - - -
Risk aversion 4.90 6 2.009 1.24 1 7
Rent 0.54 0.45 1.45 1.25 0 44.39
Saving for a house 0.08 - - - - -
CBS provincial -0.07 0.46 4.56 3.30 -7.30 7.74
NVM regional 0.05 0.78 5.01 4.14 -18.40 12.58
Notes: Money put aside and Income are coded in intervals. In both cases I take the midpoint
of each interval to compute summary statistics. All monetary variables (except for the saving
measures and for rent) are given in thousands of Euros. For all variables the sample employed
is the estimation sample in Table 2.3. W. Std. Dev. stands for Within Standard Deviation.
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2.B Likelihood Function
Consider the dependent variable in Equation (2.7), ∆Sit, as a latent continu-
ous variable that captures saving and that is not observed. Instead, I observe
an ordinal variable, which I call here int ∆Sit, that takes values from zero
to seven indicating different intervals for values of the latent variable. Table
2.B.1 shows how values of int ∆Sit correspond to each interval.









Substituting (2.8) into (2.7) and rewriting it as
∆Sit = Z
′
itξ + ui + εit,
where Zit is a vector with a column for each variable in the model and ξ
is the corresponding parameter vector, and assuming that ui + εit follows
a normal distribution, I can write the probability that int ∆Sit equals zero
conditional on Zit as
P{int ∆Sit = 0|Zit} = P{∆Sit ≤ 0|Zit}









where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution,
and σ =
√
V ar(ui + εit). Similarly, the probability that ∆Sit falls within a
bounded interval, e.g. interval 1, can be written as
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P{int ∆Sit = 1|Zit} = P{0 < ∆Sit ≤ 1500|Zit}




























































where N is the total number of households observed, Ti is the number of pe-
riods a particular household i is observed, wk is a dummy indicating whether
an observation falls within the interval k, and intuk and intlk are the upper
and lower bounds of interval k respectively. The first summation term in the
log likelihood function indicates the probability that saving is zero or nega-
tive. The second term indicates the probability that saving falls within one
of the bounded intervals, while the last term indicates the probability that
saving is above 75 thousand Euro.
Chapter 2 57
2.C Measurement Error
Figure 2.C.1 Distributions with Rounding
(a) House Value (b) Self-Reported 2
(c) Expected 1 (d) Expected 2
Notes: In Panel (a) house prices are given in thousands. For the ease of exposition, in Panels
(b), (c), and (d) only values between -10% and and 10 % are reported. For variable definitions
and summary statistics, see Appendix 2.A.
Panels (a) to (d) in Figure 2.C.1 show clear signs of rounding towards par-
ticular values. In this appendix I provide a derivation of the bias this mea-
surement error implies. For the sake of simplicity in the derivation I assume
the data have a cross-sectional structure. Let
y = ια0 + x
∗α1 + u∗,



















, and ι is an n× 1 vector
of ones. x∗ is unobserved. Instead,
x = x∗ + 
is observed. I assume u∗ ∼ (0, σ2uIn) and  ∼ (0, σ2 In). Furthermore, I
assume that Cov(u∗,x∗) = O, Cov(u∗, ) = O and Cov(x∗, ) = Γ. In terms
of the observations, the model can be formulated as
y = ια0 + xα1 + u ,
where
u = u∗ − α1.
In this model, the elements in u are correlated with the elements in x because
Cov(u,x) = Cov(u∗ − α1,x∗ + )
= Cov(u∗,x∗) + Cov(u∗, )− Cov(α1,x∗)− Cov(α1, )
= −α1(Γ + σ2 In),
which implies that the OLS estimate of α1 will be biased. In case Γ = O, then
Cov(u,x) = −α1σ2 In. This would imply that the correlation between any
pairwise elements of u and x would be of the opposite sign of α1, leading to
what is usually known as attenuation bias. In case Γ 6= O, then the direction
of the bias will be determined by the sign and size of the correlation between
the elements of x ∗ and the elements of .
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2.D Model Derivations and Extensions
2.D.1 Closed Form Solution
As mentioned in Section 2.2, the purchase of a home in the Netherlands does
not require a down payment since households can borrow up to 100% of the
value. However, a certain level of previous income is required. Therefore I
assume the house is purchased at the beginning of the second period. Since
there is no bequest motive, the house is sold at the beginning of the last
period, the proceeds are used for consumption, and the household dies with
zero savings. Therefore, the household is a renter in the first and fourth
periods. Taking this into account, the period-specific budget constraints for
each of the four periods can be written as
S1 = Y1 − C1 −K1,
S2 = Y2 + S1(1 + r) +M(1− rM )− C2 − α2H,
S3 = Y3 + S2(1 + r)− C3 −M(1 + rM ),
S4 = Y4 + S3(1 + r) + α4H(1− φ)− C4 −K4 = 0.
The amount borrowed in period two, M , is used to afford 100% of the house
value, hence M = α2H. Therefore, M and α2H will cancel each other out in
the budget constraint corresponding to the second period. The mortgage is
repaid at period three, while mortgage interests are paid both in period two
and period three. In periods one and four the household pays the rental price
Kt = δαtH, where δ determines how the house value affects the rental price.
I assume there is uncertainty regarding future values of αt. At period
one, this implies uncertainty in future mortgage payments and future rental
prices. Taking this into account, at period one the a household that sets
optimal values for non-durable consumption, housing and savings such as to
















The left hand side of (2.D.1) includes the present value of lifetime labour
income Ω plus the amount the household is expecting to receive when the
house is sold at period four. The right hand side includes the present value of
lifetime consumption Θ plus lifetime expected housing related expenditures.
K1 is excluded from the expectation since it is already known at period one.
The first order conditions of the maximization problem yield the con-
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The assumption of separability between housing and consumption implies
that housing does not feature in Equation (2.D.2). This simplifies the model
and allows studying changes in the value of housing solely as an income effect.
Combining Equation (2.D.2) with the budget constraint (2.D.1), I find the
























where Λt is a factor that depends on ρ and r and determines how lifetime
income is distributed across periods, and Ξ is what I call the owning fac-
tor, which represents the share of lifetime income derived from housing as
evaluated in period one. Optimal savings for each period are determined by
substituting optimal consumption levels in each corresponding period-specific
budget constraint.
2.D.2 The Case of a Renter
For a household that rents throughout the hole life-cycle, the period-specific
budget constraints can be written as
St−1(1 + r) + Yt = Ct + St +Kt,
where S0 = S4 = 0. Given uncertainty in house prices, at period one the
household chooses non-durable consumption, housing and savings such as to
maximize utility subject to the consolidated budget constraint






The first order conditions yield the same consumption growth equation as in
















where Ψ is the renting factor which includes lifetime rental payments as
evaluated in period one. The solution for savings in every period can be
found by substituting optimal consumption in the non-consolidated budget
constraint for every period.
Just as explained in Section 2.2, if house price expectations are satisfied
at each period, actual consumption will be equal to the plan set at period
one. However, if at a given period the expectation about the house price
level is not satisfied, the household will re-optimize its choices taking into
account the new information. In the case of a renter, Equation (2.D.4) shows
that house prices affect consumption negatively. That is because rental prices,
Kt = δαtH, are linked to house prices through the parameter δ. A permanent
positive (negative) shock to house prices implies a higher (lower) rent in the
current period and in future periods. The renter will react by decreasing
consumption and increasing savings to afford present and future higher rents.
Therefore, in contrast with the case of a homeowner, a positive (negative)
and permanent shock in house prices shock have a negative (positive) effect
on consumption and a positive (negative) effect on savings.





The standard version of the life cycle model (without uncertainty and with-
out bequest motive) predicts that households accumulate wealth throughout
working life and they decumulate it during retirement to support consump-
tion (Ando and Modigliani, 1963). However, there is a large body of evidence,
extensively reviewed by De Nardi et al. (2016), pointing at the fact that older
adults usually decumulate wealth at a slower pace than predicted by this ba-
sic version of the life cycle model. This phenomenon is usually known as the
retirement-savings puzzle (RSP).1 It is very relevant to study the underly-
ing motives behind the RSP since it is a key aspect of individuals’ economic
and financial behaviour during retirement. Especially in the present context
of economic uncertainty and population ageing, studying the RSP becomes
very relevant, so as to understand how prepared individuals are to face a
decrease in the generosity of pension systems. In this chapter, I review the
RSP literature and, following on the topic and the results of Chapter 2, I
focus specially on highlighting the role of housing as an asset that plays a
major role in the portfolios of retirees, and which, I argue, is an important
element to understand the RSP.
The chapter starts by briefly reviewing the general literature on the RSP,
which can be classified according to the explanation given to solve the puz-
*This chapter is based on Suari-Andreu et al. (2017).
1Banks et al. (1998) use the same terminology to refer to the consumption drop that
individuals seem to experience upon entering retirement but this is not what I study in
this chapter.
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zle. I distinguish three main explanations: lifetime uncertainty, bequests, and
precautionary saving. Even though the evidence on the motives I discuss is
rather mixed, depending on the context, and after controlling for the relevant
factors, they all appear as relevant enough to be considered as meaningful
additions to the basic life cycle model. In parallel to the RSP literature,
there is a stream of literature that studies the evolution of housing equity
during retirement (HER). Since housing equity is usually a very important
component in households portfolios, I pay special attention to this literature
by reviewing it more in depth. The general conclusion of the HER literature
is that homeowners are in most cases reluctant to draw down their housing
equity during retirement, pointing at illiquidity and high transaction costs
as the main reasons behind this phenomenon (Yang, 2009). However, most
studies conducted so far are rather descriptive and the link with the RSP
literature is generally missing. Therefore, the present chapter aims at em-
phasizing the connection between these two streams of the literature.
The RSP literature and the HER literature come together in the work
by Nakajima and Telyukova (2013a), who introduce a model of retirement
savings with housing. The model constitutes an extension to the previous
work by De Nardi et al. (2010), who consider a model for single retirees
which includes lifetime uncertainty, bequests and uncertain medical expendi-
tures. The addition by Nakajima and Telyukova (NT) consists of extending
the model to couples and analysing the housing asset separate from the rest
of the assets in the portfolio, which turns out to have crucial consequences
for the understanding of the RSP. The main conclusion of their work is that
homeownership interacts with factors that explain the RSP, notably with the
bequest motive. I review the NT model and, furthermore, I review additional
literature on three related topics, i.e. altruistic bequests, strategic bequests,
and housing as a commitment device. These streams of literature contribute
towards the understanding of the link between homeownership, bequests and
the RSP, and, in turn, provide potential extensions of the NT theoretical
framework.
I complement the review of the literature with descriptive evidence, using
the Netherlands as a case study. For this reason, I give some special attention
to studies based on Dutch data when reviewing the literature. The Dutch case
is particularly interesting since according to van Ooijen et al. (2015) in the
Netherlands there is large and substantial evidence of low withdrawals rates
of net worth (specially of housing) among older households. To document
the case study, I rely as in Chapter 2 on data from the Dutch National Bank
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Household Survey (DHS), which is an internet based panel survey run by
CentERdata (a data collection institute based at Tilburg University) that
provides data on economic, financial, and psychological aspects of household
behaviour. It collects data for around two thousand Dutch households every
year between 1993 and 2016. I use the last ten waves, which provide a recent
and large enough sample for our purposes. In line with the main takeaways
of the NT model, the evidence I present mostly supports the idea that, in
the Netherlands, housing as a bequeathable asset is potentially an important
factor to take into account to have a better grasp of the underlying causes
of the RSP. Since I rely on correlative evidence, I cannot entirely elucidate
whether the causality runs from the bequest motive to homeownership or
vice versa. Nevertheless, it can be said that housing is an asset that should
not be neglected when studying bequests in the RSP context, and examining
its role along the lines of the NT model more deeply is a fruitful venue for
future research.
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 reviews the RSP litera-
ture which I classify according to the explanation given for the puzzle; Section
3.3 reviews the HER literature which I classify according to the origin of the
data, i.e. US studies, international studies and Dutch studies; Section 3.4
summarizes the NT model; Section 3.5 reviews the literature on alternative
bequest motives, i.e. altruistic bequests and strategic bequests; Section 3.6 re-
views the literature on housing as a commitment device; Section 3.7 contrasts
the main takeaways of the literature reviewed in this chapter with descriptive
evidence coming from the DHS data; Section 3.8 closes the chapter by giving
a short conclusion and some general policy recommendations.
3.2 The Retirement-Savings Puzzle
The literature on the retirement savings puzzle (RSP) shows that, in general,
households do not decumulate their wealth during retirement in the way the
basic life cycle model suggests. Additionally, it attempts to determine the
reasons behind this phenomenon. Poterba et al. (2011), van Ooijen et al.
(2015) and De Nardi et al. (2016) provide thorough reviews of this literature.
In this section I just provide a brief summary that I use as a stepping stone
for rest of the chapter.
Most of the literature on the RSP can be classified into three branches
according to the explanation given as a key to solve puzzle. First, there is a
branch of the literature, initiated by Yaari (1965), which investigates the role
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of lifetime uncertainty as an explanation for the RSP. Recent contributions
to this literature are De Nardi et al. (2009), Cocco and Gomes (2012) and
Post and Hanewald (2013). A life cycle model without lifetime uncertainty
implies that households are perfectly aware of their time of death. Therefore,
they can plan with full accuracy to gradually draw down their wealth and
deplete it completely just before they die. With lifetime uncertainty in the
model households do not have full certainty about their time of death, and
thus they generate an expectation about it. If households die earlier than
expected, their wealth will not be totally depleted and involuntary bequests
will result. On the other hand, the risk of outliving their net worth induces
households to deplete their wealth more slowly compared to the case without
lifetime uncertainty.
Second, there is a branch of the literature, initiated by Becker (1974),
Bernheim et al. (1985) and Hurd (1989), which explores the role of volun-
tary bequests as an explanation for the RSP. More recent contributions are
Laitner (2002), Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) and De Nardi and Yang (2014).
In the basic life cycle model, households aim at dying with zero wealth. In-
troducing a bequest motive implies that they derive utility from dying with
positive net worth, which flattens the wealth trajectory during retirement.
Kopczuk and Lupton (2007) classify the literature according to three different
types of bequest motive: the egoistic motive (Hurd, 1989; and De Nardi and
Yang, 2014), in which households leave a bequest simply to increase their own
utility; the altruistic motive (Becker, 1974; and Laitner, 2002), in which the
effect of the bequest on the utility of the recipient plays a role in determin-
ing the transferred amount; and the strategic motive (Bernheim et al., 1985;
and Perozek, 1998), in which, besides being altruistic, older adults use the
bequest to strategically influence the quantity of services provided to them
by the recipients. In addition to the literature on intentional bequests, there
is a related branch of the literature that focuses on inter-vivos transfers (e.g.
Cox, 1987; Norton and van Houtven, 2006; and Alessie et al., 2014), which
are expected to have an effect on the saving behaviour of older adults similar
to the bequest motive.
Third, there is a more recent branch of the literature (e.g. Palumbo, 1999;
Coile and Milligan, 2009; De Nardi et al., 2010; and Dobrescu, 2015) that con-
siders the role of uncertain out of pocket medical expenditures (OPME), i.e.
non-insured medical expenses, as an explanation for the RSP. The basic life
cycle model does not include health as a determinant of saving and consump-
tion. The introduction of the health status allows for considering the role of
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uncertainty regarding OPME. If individuals are risk-averse and are not able
to attain insurance against health risk, they will engage in precautionary sav-
ing and, as a result, they will retain a buffer-stock of savings that will flatten
the wealth trajectory during retirement.
Even though the empirical evidence on the different explanations dis-
cussed in this section is rather mixed, depending on the context, and after
controlling for the relevant factors, they all appear as relevant enough to be
considered as meaningful additions to the basic life cycle model. However,
note that the different explanations need not be incompatible. It can well
be that households rank them according to their preferences. In this case,
the unfolding of exogenous events will crucially determine which purpose is
eventually given to the savings of a retired household.
3.3 Home Equity in Retirement
Parallel to the literature on the RSP, there is a stream of literature that
studies the evolution of housing equity during retirement (HER). Housing is
an asset that deserves special attention due to its dual role as consumption
and investment good, and due to its associated transaction costs which make
adjustments in housing rather infrequent. Furthermore, it is very often the
most important asset in household portfolios.2 In general, the HER litera-
ture aims at answering the question of whether retirees regard housing equity
as a source of funds for general consumption. According to Venti and Wise
(2004), answering this question is important for two reasons. First, it can
help assess the potential demand for releasing the wealth locked in illiquid
housing, which has implications for the development of financial products
such as reverse mortgages. Second, it contributes to understanding the ad-
equacy of saving for retirement. If financial wealth and housing wealth are
used interchangeably to finance consumption, then housing wealth might as
well be given the same treatment as financial wealth when evaluating whether
households save enough for retirement.
3.3.1 US Studies
One of the first to tackle the question of whether retirees use housing equity
to fund general consumption were Venti and Wise (1990), who using the Re-
2Rodriguez-Palenzuela and De´es (2016) report using the Household Finance and Con-
sumption Survey that as of 2011 main residences accounted from 40% up to 70% of total
household assets among the Euro Area countries.
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tirement History Survey find that on average older adults who move do not
downsize their housing equity. They conclude that older adults are in general
not willing to use housing equity for consumption. On the contrary, Sheiner
and Weil (1992) find, using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), that
average levels of homeownership among the older adults decline significantly
with age and conclude that housing wealth is used for consumption. However,
even though the results are statistically significant, their economic signifi-
cance is questionable since the observed decline in homeownership is rather
small. Hurd (2002) confirms, by exploiting a panel data set derived from
the Asset and Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old (AHEAD), a modest
decline in housing wealth and homeownership rates among older adults. In
addition, he points out that households experiencing a health shock or a wid-
owhood event display larger declines in housing equity and are more likely
to terminate homeownership.
Following on the work by Hurd (2002), Venti and Wise (2004) perform a
comprehensive analysis of the evolution of housing equity during retirement,
paying special attention to the effect of precipitating events, i.e. widowhood
and nursing home entry. They combine the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS) with the AHEAD survey and consider two ways by which homeown-
ers can change their housing equity: by discontinuing homeownership or by
selling and moving to a newly purchased residence. By means of cohort spe-
cific analysis, they find that households who experience a widowhood event
or nursing home entry display considerable declines in homeownership and
in housing equity; while for households who do not experience any of these
events housing equity remains almost intact throughout retirement. Over-
all, they find that older adults are rather unlikely to move or to terminate
homeownership.3 They conclude that housing equity is generally not used
for consumption, which has two implications: first, the demand for reverse
mortgages is low, and, second, housing wealth should not be counted when
assessing retirement savings, since it is not interchangeable with financial
wealth. Instead, it might be suited to think of housing equity as a consump-
tion good that, at the same time, provides a preventive buffer for adverse
shocks.
In contrast to Venti and Wise (2004), Sinai and Souleles (2007) study the
3Venti and Wise (2004) do find a very slight decrease in the housing equity among the
oldest households (75+) that do not experience any precipitating event. However, they
attribute it to depreciation of the housing asset, which can actually be considered as a
form of housing equity withdrawal.
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evolution of housing equity in retirement but do not consider homeowners
that move. Instead, they look at homeowners that stay in the same residence
and study how they react to the remarkable increase in house prices experi-
enced in the US market between 1983 and 2004. Using the Survey of Con-
sumer Finances, they report that households, especially the youngest among
the older adults, have offset the rise in housing equity by increasing their
housing debt through housing equity loans. However, they point out that
the offset effect is rather small and that it could be larger were there less
restrictions to borrow against housing wealth. Contrary to Venti and Wise
(2004), Sinai and Souleles conclude that households are potentially willing to
liquidate housing wealth to finance consumption. Therefore, only the share
of housing wealth that cannot be borrowed against should be considered as
not interchangeable with financial wealth.
3.3.2 International Studies
Moving away from only US based studies, Banks et al. (2012) compare down-
sizing among retirees in Britain and in the US. Similarly to Venti and Wise
(2004), they focus on households that move to a new location, for which
they use PSID data for the US, and British Household Panel Survey data for
Britain. They find that there is more downsizing in the US than in Britain
even though in both countries the vast majority of older households do not
actually move. These comparative results hold when controlling for marital
status, family size and employment transitions. Additionally, Banks et al.
argue that it is a mix of geographical − in the US there is more climate di-
versity and variation in environmental amenities − and institutional factors
− in Britain there are more transaction costs due to taxation of home sales −
that explains the higher share of moving households in the US. These results
suggest that, in Europe in general, moving house during retirement might be
even less popular than in the US due to higher institutional restrictions and
less within country variation in geographical amenities.
The results in Banks et al. (2012) have been recently confirmed by Blun-
dell et al. (2016), who compare wealth trajectories for retirees in England
and in the US using the HRS and the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing.
They find that assets are drown down more slowly in England than in the US.
In addition, and in line with the results by Banks et al. (2012) they observe
that the lack of housing equity drawdown is a crucial element in explaining
differences in wealth decumulation between the two countries. They suggest
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that this phenomenon is likely to be explained by a combination of factors
such as the consumption value of housing, the financial and emotional trans-
action costs involved in releasing housing wealth, and the risk-return mix
provided by housing.
In some of the few fully international studies, Chiuri and Jappelli (2010)
use data on 15 OECD countries, while Angelini et al. (2014) use data on 13
European countries. The former employ data from different country specific
surveys which allow them to construct a dataset of repeated cross-sections
over time. They look at the cross-sectional relationship between homeowner-
ship and age, and find that homeownership rates decline considerably after
age 60. However, after controlling for cohort effects, the decline becomes much
more moderate and it does not start until after age 75. In addition, they find
that cross-country variation in terms of institutions, such as tax regimes and
mortgage market regulations, have an impact on the degree to which housing
wealth is withdrawn during retirement. On the other hand, Angelini et al.
(2014) use life history data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement
in Europe and, similarly to Venti and Wise (2004) and Banks et al. (2012),
study the behaviour of homeowners and renters that move. Even though they
assert that moves are rare all over Europe, they are likely to happen when
there is a precipitating event, i.e. divorce, widowhood and nest-leaving by
children. In addition, they also find that economic reasons can play a role,
since, after controlling for country characteristics and family transitions, re-
tirees that are cash-poor and house-rich are the most likely to downsize their
housing asset. These findings are also reflected in the study by Nakajima and
Telyukova (2013b), who also conduct a European-level cross-country empiri-
cal comparison of the evolution of housing equity during retirement, and link
it with the literature on the retirement-savings puzzle.
3.3.3 Dutch Studies
Narrowing the focus to the Dutch case, van der Schors et al. (2007) employ
data from the Dutch Social Economic Panel for the period 1990-2002 and
find a strong negative cross-sectional relation between age and homeowner-
ship among Dutch households around and above retirement age. However,
a more detailed analysis indicates that this age gradient is mostly due to
cohort effects, through which younger generations of older adults are more
exposed to housing. They find that higher life time income due to long-term
productivity growth is the main factor explaining this generational effects in
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homeownership. In addition, they find that changes in the supply of housing
and relaxation of the requirements to obtain a mortgage also play a role in
explaining this phenomena. This evidence has been recently confirmed by
van Ooijen et al. (2015) who describe the saving behaviour and the portfolio
choice of Dutch retirees by exploiting high quality administrative data for the
period 2005-2010. Like van der Schors et al. (2007), they find strong differ-
ences between cohorts. However, within cohorts, both homeownership rates
and the amount of housing equity held by older households do not appear to
decline significantly with age.
In a different study, de Graaf and Rouwendal (2012) investigate whether
older Dutch households liquidate housing wealth by increasing their mortgage
debt or taking a second mortgage. Using data from the Dwelling Research
Netherlands survey for the period 1985-2009 they find that older adults, al-
though often they have not completely redeemed their mortgage yet, do not
increase their mortgage debt, not even when house prices increase at con-
siderably high rates. In consequence, they conclude that the vast majority
of older homeowners do not use mortgage debt as a means to decumulate
housing equity. More recently, Dillingh et al. (2015), investigate a similar
issue by conducting a survey on the psychological and economic aspects of
reverse mortgage attitudes of homeowners in the Netherlands. They explain
to respondents what a reverse mortgage is and then ask to what extent such
a product would interest them.4 Even though they are optimistic about the
potential demand for reverse mortgages, only 6% of respondents show a clear
interest, while 21% show moderate interest.
3.4 Models of Retirement Savings with Housing
Even though the evidence provided by the HER literature surveyed in Section
3.3 appears to be somewhat mixed, it comes forth as a general conclusion
that older households are reluctant to withdraw housing equity during re-
tirement. The most recurrent explanation behind this phenomenon given in
the HER literature relates to the illiquidity of housing, and the high trans-
action costs that derive from that. However, the HER literature is mostly
descriptive and the link with the RSP literature is rather limited. While I
do not deny the importance of illiquidity and transactions costs, this chapter
highlights the benefits of applying the lessons of the RSP literature to the
4A striking fact about this survey is that only 9% of respondents declare to know what
a reverse mortgage is.
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question of why housing equity is not withdrawn late in life. Is it because of
lifetime uncertainty? Is it because housing wealth is used as precautionary
savings against unforeseen medical expenditures and long-term care? Or is
it because housing is regarded as an asset to be bequeathed? In this section
I start by reviewing the model by Yang (2009), which emphasizes the role of
transaction costs in housing purchases and sales. I then pay special attention
to the model by Nakajima and Telyukova (2013a, 2017), which adds different
features coming from the RSP literature and up to date represents the most
state-of the-art contribution when it comes to models of retirement saving
with housing.
3.4.1 Yang (2009)
A relevant contribution to the modelling of retirement savings with housing,
and which a represents a good starting point for this section, is given by Yang
(2009). Using US data from the Survey of Consumer Finances and the Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey, she shows that non-housing consumption tends
to be hump-shaped over the life cycle, while housing consumption increases
and then flattens during the retirement phase. A stripped-down version of the
life cycle model would predict that housing consumption will follow a path
similar to non-housing consumption. Therefore, to explain the facts observed
in the data, Yang builds a life cycle model that explicitly models housing and
its features. In her model, owner-occupied housing has a dual role: it directly
provides utility, and it can be used as collateral. Furthermore, households face
labour income risk, borrowing constraints, uncertain lifetime, and transac-
tion costs for trading houses. Yang follows the work by Fernandez-Villaverde
and Krueger (2002),5 who build a life cycle model to explain the expenditure
patterns for durable and non-durable goods. However, their model abstracts
from housing transaction costs and cannot generate the slow decline of the
housing stock in old age observed in the data. In addition, Yang’s model is
related to the work by Dı´az and Luengo-Prado (2010), who, even though
they do not include a life cycle component, model the housing asset in a very
similar way as in Yang (2009).
In Yang’s model, the individual’s within-period utility function is of the
constant relative risk aversion class, and it is given by
U(c, h) =
g (c, h)1−σ − 1
1− σ , (3.1)
5This working paper was later published as Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011).
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where c is non-housing consumption, h is housing consumption,6 and σ is
the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The two kinds of consumption are
aggregated as g(c, h) = (ωcθ + (1 − ω)hθ) 1θ , where ω captures the relative
weight of housing versus non-housing consumption, and θ determines the
degree of substitutability between c and h. Households take into account
the probability of dying in every period, and the probability of receiving
an earnings shock. In addition, they discount future streams of utility by a
constant factor β. Intertemporal utility is maximized by choosing c, h, and
whether to rent or to own the house used as a residence.
If a household chooses to own, utility is maximized subject to
c+ a′ + h′ + τ(h, h′) = Y (i, y) + (1 + r)a+ (1− δh)h+ b,
where a is the net asset position, τ(·) is a transaction cost incurred in the
case of moving and depends on the value of the old (h) and of the new house
(h′), Y (·) denotes labour earnings, which depend on age i and a stochastic
productivity shock y, r is the interest rate, δh is the depreciation rate of
housing, and b are received bequests. A prime indicates the value of a variable
in the next period. The specification of the transaction cost is
τ(h, h′) =
{
0 if h′ ∈ [(1− ν1)h, (1 + ν2)h] ,
ρ1h+ ρ2h
′ otherwise,
which implies that households can change their level of housing consumption
without moving by undertaking housing renovation up to a fraction ν2 of
the value of the house, or by allowing depreciation up to a fraction ν1. If h
′
exceeds one of these two boundaries, Yang assumes the house has been sold,
and the household must pay a transaction cost consisting of a fraction ρ1
of the selling value and a fraction ρ2 of the buying value. The house can be
used as a collateral, and borrowing without a collateral is not allowed. Thus
a homeowner’s financial assets must satisfy
a ≥ −(1− λ)h, (3.2)
where λ determines the fraction of the value of the house that can be bor-
rowed against, which is equal to the down payment requirement a household
must satisfy upon the purchase of a house. For a renter, the borrowing con-
straint is simply a ≥ 0.
6This is a slight simplification of Yang’s model as I assume that the service flow from
housing is equal to the value of the housing stock. In her model, they are allowed to differ.
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To capture factors other than age, income, and wealth that affect house-
holds’ renting/owning decision, Yang assumes households face renting shocks
with a certain probability. A household who receives a renting shock is not
allowed to own and can only rent. The shock is exogenous and independent
of household characteristics. If a homeowner chooses to be a renter, or faces
a renting shock, utility is maximized subject to
c+ a′ + phh′ + τ(h, h′) = Y (i, y) + (1 + r)a+ (1− δh)h+ b, (3.3)
where ph is the rental rate on housing. In case the household is already a
renter and stays that way, (1− δh)h drops from Equation (3.3). Renters can
change the quantity of their housing services without incurring a transaction
cost, as long as they keep renting. Therefore, the transaction cost τ(·) will
only be relevant if the household transits from owning to renting, in which
case ρ2 = 0, or from renting to owning, in which case ρ1 = 0.
Yang parametrizes the model mostly using estimates given by previous
studies, and investigates the implications of the model for average homeown-
ership rates by age, and for average life cycle (housing and non-housing) con-
sumption and wealth profiles for both homeowners and renters. In the model,
young agents rent while accumulating financial assets. As time progresses,
more households have accumulated sufficient funds for down payments to be-
come homeowners. Because of the presence of a borrowing constraint and the
role of housing as a collateral, they build housing stock quickly. Home-owners
build up their highest housing stock at age 65, which remains flat thereafter,
only slightly declining very late in life. Regarding non-housing consumption,
it increases early in life and through adulthood, and at some point around
age 65 starts decreasing due to the increasing mortality rate. Since there is no
insurance against mortality risk, households discount their future consump-
tion at an increasing rate as they age, and thus the non-housing consumption
profile is hump-shaped.
Yang’s model is thus able to match the evolution of housing and non-
housing consumption throughout the life cycle. The key element of the model
that makes a difference is the introduction of transaction costs for trading
houses, which play a an essential role in explaining the slow decline of housing
consumption later in life. By setting transaction costs to zero, Yang shows
that the model generates a much faster decline of housing stock later in life,
and thus the profile resembles the one of non-housing consumption. Yang’s
model represents a substantial improvement with respect to the standard
life cycle model, and is able to accommodate the most basic insights of the
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HER literature. However, it leaves out most of the aspects considered to be
important by the RSP literature, which could compete with housing trans-
action costs in generating a flat profile for housing wealth towards the end
of life. Out of the three explanations for the RSP surveyed in Section 3.2,
the model only includes lifetime uncertainty, and thus leaves out uncertain
medical expenditures and the bequest motive.
3.4.2 Nakajima and Telyukova (2013a, 2017)
Arguing that the RSP cannot be explained without emphasizing the role of
the housing asset, Nakajima and Telyukova (NT) provide what up to date
is the most state-of-the-art contribution in the domain of models of retire-
ment savings with housing. Using HRS data, NT (2013a) find that the post-
retirement evolution of assets shows a very different picture for homeowners
compared to renters; while the former do not withdraw their wealth during
retirement, the latter do, which suggests that homeownership interacts with
factors that explain the RSP. To investigate these issues, NT (2013a) study
housing equity during retirement in the context of a structural life cycle model
of retirement savings. They do so taking into account the main takeaways
from the RSP and the HER literatures, and incorporating the elements in-
troduced by Yang (2009).7 Furthermore, in a more recent contribution (NT,
2017), they extend their model by introducing reverse mortgages to gauge
what is the potential demand for such a product. NT’s work is actually based
on the De Nardi et al. (2010), who consider a model for single retirees which
includes lifetime uncertainty, bequests, and uncertain medical expenditures.
The addition by NT with respect to De Nardi et al. (2010) consists of ex-
tending the model to couples and analysing the housing asset separate from
the rest of the portfolio.
In the NT model only retired households are considered and the within-
period utility function has the form








where c, h, ω, and σ play the same role as in Equation (3.1), while s is
the number of adults in the household, the subscript o is the tenure status,
7Their model is also introduced in Nakajima and Telyukova (2013b), where, in addi-
tion to exposing the model, they also conduct a European-level cross-country empirical
comparison of the retirement-savings puzzle and the evolution of housing equity during
retirement.
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with o = 1 indicating owner and o = 0 indicating renter, µs is the effective
household size, and ηo captures the extra utility from owning a house.
8 As
in De Nardi et al. (2010), when all members in a household have died, any
remaining assets go to the heirs. The utility that the household derives from




where b is posthumous wealth, γ captures the strength of the bequest motive,
and ζ is a parameter determining the extent to which bequests are luxury
goods. Notice that bequests follow an egoistic motive, since the utility de-
rived from leaving a bequest does not depend on the utility of the recipient.
Regarding Equation (3.4), there are two relevant features worth men-
tioning. The first is that, similar to Yang (2009), utility is non-separable in
consumption and housing, which allows for the marginal utility of consump-
tion to depend on housing and vice versa. The second relevant feature is that
NT differentiate between couples and singles in their utility function. To that
end, they follow a unitary assumption, implying that if s = 2 both members
in a couple have the same utility function and consumption is split equally
between the two. However, each member enjoys more than half of the con-
sumption flow because of the returns to scale within couples, captured by
what NT call the household size multiplier, expressed as s/µ1−σs .9
As in Yang (2009), households discount future streams of utility by a
constant factor β, and take into account the probability of dying at every
period. In addition, they take into account the probability of entering a bad
health state and incurring medical expenditures, for which there is no insur-
ance.10 The health status of a household is denoted by m and it follows a
first-order Markov process in which transition probabilities are dependent on
the present health state and on the age of the household, i. The inclusion of
the health status allows defining the probability of incurring out of pocket
medical expenditures, which are denoted by x. The probability that a given
x is drawn depends on age and health status of the household. In addition,
8NT set η0 = 1, while η1 is estimated to be larger than one.
9NT assume that µ1 = 1 and µ2 ∈ {1, 2}, which implies that the household size multiplier
for a single is 1/µ1−σ1 = 1; while for a couple it is 2/µ
1−σ
2 , which is equal to 2 if µ2 = 1 and
it is equal to 2σ if µ2 = 2.
10Davidoff (2010) investigates the role of home equity as a substitute for long-term in-
surance. He claims that households are reluctant to withdraw housing wealth in old age
because they view it as an insurance against medical expenditures derived from long term
care needs.
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with a given probability at any period a two person household can transit
from s = 2 to s = 1, which captures the death of a spouse. One spouse can
die first via a stochastic shock to s, or both spouses can die at the same
time via the household-wide mortality shock. NT assume away divorces and
remarriages due to their low frequency in HRS.
For a homeowner, the housing decision consists of two options: staying
in the present residence or becoming a renter. For a renter the only housing
choice is the size of the rental property. Differently from Yang (2009), own-
to-own and rent-to-own moves are assumed away by NT due to their low
frequency in the HRS. A homeowner maximizes utility subject to
c+ a′ + x+ δh = (1 + r)a+ ψsy,
where a denotes again financial assets, x are medical expenditures, δ is a pro-
portional maintenance cost, r is the interest rate, and y is pension income,
which is adjusted according to the number of adults in the household by the
parameter ψs. Similarly to Yang (2009), the house can be used as a collat-
eral and borrowing without a collateral is not allowed. Thus a homeowner’s
financial assets must satisfy
a ≥ −(1− λi,y,s,m)h, (3.5)
which is the same as (3.2), but now the fraction of the house that can be
borrowed depends on age i, income y, household size s, and health status
m. In that way, NT capture the idea that the household’s ability to borrow
depends on its ability to service its debt. In every period the household can
decide to sell the house and become a renter, in which case a proportional
transaction cost τ must be paid.
If the household is a renter, utility is then maximized subject to
c+ a′ + phh+ x = (1 + r)a+ ψsy,
c =
{
max{sc, c˜} if a′ = 0 and h = h1
c˜ otherwise,
where ph is again the rental rate, c is the publicly provided consumption floor,
c˜ denotes consumption if the consumption floor is not enforced, and h1 is the
smallest rental property available. The consumption floor is enforced if, after
selling all its assets and moving to the smallest rental property available, the
household cannot meet the minimum established consumption threshold.
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NT estimate the model in two steps. First they calibrate a few param-
eters using estimates available from previous studies or that can be easily
computed from the data, which are µ2, ψ2, δ, τ , and r. In addition, in the
first step they compute the health status and household structure transition
probabilities, as well as the probability of incurring medical expenditures. In
the second step, they use the method of simulated moments to estimate the
rest of the parameters in the model, i.e. β, ω, σ, η1, γ, ζ, c, and λ. These
parameters are estimated such as to provide the best match between the
model and several moments in a sample of three HRS cohorts (those of age
65, 75 and 85 in 1996), which are followed over time between 1996 and 2006.
The targets are homeownership rate profiles, life cycle profiles of median fi-
nancial assets, median housing assets, and median total assets, proportion of
households in debt, median debt of debtors, and median net worth profiles
for homeowners and renters separately.
Once the model is estimated, NT investigate the role of several model
features on the saving behaviour of retirees. They do so by shutting down
each mechanism one at a time and comparing the outcome with the bench-
mark model. The mechanisms they consider are the bequest motive, medical
expenses, extra utility from homeownership, collateral constraints, and the
house price boom of the years 1996 to 2006. The results differ with the previ-
ous literature, and show that leading motivators for homeownership and net
worth levels in retirement are the utility benefits of homeownership and the
bequest motive. Upon shutting down the bequest motive, i.e. setting γ = 0,
NT observe considerably faster declines in homeownership and net worth of
homeowners compared to the benchmark. The net worth withdrawal rate of
renters is also increased, however, less so than the one of homeowners. Similar
results are found for homeowners when the utility benefits of homeownership
are shut off, i.e. η1 = η0 = 1.
11 In contrast, they find that borrowing con-
straints and out of pocket medical expenditures play a rather small role in
explaining the evolution of housing and of net worth in general during re-
tirement. They do find that house price growth during the sample period
partially explains low wealth withdrawal rates. However, the results regard-
ing the bequest motive and the utility benefits of homeownership still hold
after controlling for house price growth.
11The utility benefits of homeownership capture factors such as attachment to one’s
house and neighbourhood and the ability to adapt the house to one’s tastes. Furthermore,
they capture financial benefits of ownership that are not explicit in the model, e.g. tax
exemption of imputed rents, mortgage interest payment deduction, and insurance against
rental rate fluctuation.
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In the extension of their initial model, NT (2017) include the possibility
for the household to take out a reverse mortgage. Using data from the US de-
partment of Housing and Urban Development, they show that average yearly
fraction between 1997 and 2013 of homeowners above 65 years that have a
reverse mortgage is around 1%. NT model reverse mortgages by allowing
households to borrow with a constraint that only depends on age, and thus
is much less strict than the one given by Equation (3.5). Upon the payment
of an initial fee, households can get access to a line of credit which depends
on the age of the household and the value of the house. In exchange, the
house is transferred to the bank once the household dies or decides to move.
Their model is able to mimic the low demand for reverse mortgages observed
in the data. They find that eliminating the initial fees, triples the take up
of reverse mortgages. In addition, a very interesting result is that shutting
down the bequest motive multiplies by 17 the amount of homeowners that
take out a reverse mortgage. This result holds even when households are not
pushed to liquidate housing due to a possible medical expense shock. This
indicates that, absent a bequest motive, households are willing to liquidate
housing equity for non-medical consumption.
In summary, NT find that the bequest motive and the utility benefits
of homeownership are the most relevant factors determining the low with-
drawal rates of housing wealth during retirement. On the other hand, out of
pocket medical expenditures do not seem to play a major role in explaining
homeownership late in life. These results differ importantly from those in
De Nardi et al. (2010), who find an insignificant bequest motive and a larger
role for medical expenditures. There are two main potential explanations for
these differences. First, De Nardi et al. (2010) do not consider housing as a
separate element of the portfolio and thus they do not match the evolution
of homeownership and housing wealth when estimating their parameters. In
the work of NT, matching these profiles clearly seems to emphasize the role
of bequests and of the utility benefits of homeownership. Second, De Nardi
et al. (2010) employ data only on singles who, arguably, are less prone to
have a bequest motive than couples. Couples are more likely to have children
and they are also likely to be richer, both of which are facts that potentially
lead to a stronger bequest motive.
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3.5 Alternative Bequest Motives
The literature surveyed in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 puts through several reasons
why housing wealth is generally not spent during retirement, namely trans-
action costs, utility benefits of homeownership, precautionary saving against
unforeseen medical expenditures and long-term care, and the bequest motive.
Out of these reasons, the literature has paid attention, up to the present mo-
ment, specially to transaction costs to justify why housing should be modelled
separately from the rest of the portfolio. In this chapter, I want to pay spe-
cial attention to one of the least considered reasons, i.e. the bequest motive.
To that end, I review additional streams of literature that may help further
understand the association between homeownership and bequests that comes
out of the model by NT. By doing this, I do not intend to propose formal
extensions of the NT model. Instead, I propose new directions for future re-
search, as well as connections between different streams of existing literature.
There are several reasons why households might prefer to leave a bequest
in the form of a house rather than in a more liquid form. NT suggest that,
since homeownership provides utility benefits, households who want to accu-
mulate assets in retirement due to a bequest motive prefer to do so in housing.
Furthermore, they point at the fact that due to the transaction costs associ-
ated with liquidating housing equity, it is convenient for older homeowners to
stick to housing when saving for a bequest rather than opting for more liquid
alternatives.12 Alternatively, it can be that, regardless of utility benefits and
transaction costs, households choose to include housing in their portfolio al-
ready with the idea to use it as a bequest in the future, or that there are third
factors that explain homeownership and bequests simultaneously. In addition
to these ideas, there are alternative ways of modelling bequests that provide
further insights on the connection between homeownership and bequests.
3.5.1 Altruistic Bequests
Following previous work such as Hurd (1989) and Kopczuk and Lupton
(2007), NT model the bequest motive as an egoistic motive, which implies
that bequests are generated purely by the desire of individuals to have pos-
itive net worth upon death. The egoistic motive is thus independent of the
economic situation of the heirs, unless one interprets the utility from bequests
12This idea is in line with the conclusions by Blundell et al. (2016), who argue that the
utility value of housing, its illiquidity, and the mix of risk and returns it provides are likely
to be important factors in explaining the trajectory of wealth in retirement.
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as utility of heirs. As an alternative to this model, Laitner (2002) proposes
a model in which the bequest function depends on the consumption possi-
bilities of the heirs. This idea originated from earlier work by Barro (1974)
and Becker (1974), and, in its simplest form, it would consist of rewriting the
within period utility in the NT model as
UP = u(c, h, o) + αUK(b), (3.6)
where UP (·) is the utility function of the parents and UK(·) is the utility
function of the heirs. The first element in (3.6) is the same as in Equation
(3.4), whereas the second element substitutes the bequest motive in the NT
model by αUK(b), where α indicates to what extent a household cares about
leaving a bequest b to its heirs. Receiving a bequest increases life time income
of the recipient and thus has a positive effect on her utility through increased
consumption possibilities, i.e. ∂UK(b)/∂b > 0. However, the higher the pre-
bequest life time income of the recipient, the lower is the marginal utility of
additional bequeathed wealth. Therefore, if the heirs have already high life
time income, the amount bequeathed is likely to be comparatively small.
Employing a survey of US pension holders, Laitner and Juster (1996) find
that willingness to leave a bequest is higher for households with the lowest as-
sessments of their children’s likely earnings. In addition, Laitner and Ohlsson
(2001) find evidence of parental altruism in Sweden and the US. However,
this evidence contradicts with the work by Altonji et al. (1997) and Poterba
(2001), who find that in the US parents do not modify inter-vivos transfers in
response to changes in their children’s lifetime income. In addition, Kopczuk
and Lupton (2007), who employ panel data on singles from the AHEAD
survey, make a case against the altruistic model by showing that there are
households who save for a bequest without having children, and thus argue
that children and bequests are independent of each other. However, it must
be noted that altruism is not necessarily only towards children. There can be
as well altruism towards other family members and/or towards non-family
members.
Even though in general the evidence appears to be mixed, the altruis-
tic model should not be dismissed since it has important implications for
understanding the rationale behind the bequest motive. Additionally, it has
important implications as well for understanding how income and wealth
inequality is transferred from one generation to the next. Furthermore, the
altruistic model, in combination with other branches of the literature dis-
cussed below, may provide additional insights on the association between
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homeownership and the bequest motive that stems from the NT model.
3.5.2 Strategic Bequests
A different approach to the bequest motive was introduced by the early work
of Bernheim et al. (1985), who suggest that bequests are generated in a con-
text of intergenerational exchange. In this context, parents are still altruistic
in that they care about the utility of their descendants. However, at the same
time, they also care about services provided to them by their children. In con-
sequence, they try to strategically influence the descendants’ actions in their
favour by using the bequest as an incentive. In the strategic model, it makes
sense to separate housing from the other elements of the household portfolio,
since it is an asset that parents can easily use to signal a reward to their chil-
dren’s services. In that way, the strategic model provides additional insights
on the association between homeownership and the RSP that go beyond the
ones suggested by NT.
In a very stylized way, strategic bequests could be introduced in the NT
model by rewriting the within-period utility function of the altruistic version
of the model as
UP = u(c, h, o, κ) + αUK(b, κ),
where κ denotes the services provided by the children to their parents, which
increase parental utility, i.e. ∂u(·)/∂τ > 0, but affect the utility of the chil-
dren negatively, i.e. ∂UK(b, κ)/∂κ < 0. In Bernheim et al.’s model, the house-
hold commits herself to a bequest rule. This rule specifies the fraction of the
bequest given to each recipient for each amount of services provided, and
establishes that a descendant will be disinherited in favour of other recipi-
ents if she does not contribute with a minimum amount of services. For the
rule to be convincing, parents must be credibly committed to retain enough
wealth as a bequest. This can be done by holding wealth in illiquid form
such as housing equity. If transactions costs are high and financial products
to liquidate housing are hardly available, holding a house can be a way for
older adults to signal a future bequest to the heirs.
The empirical literature on the strategic model generally follows an ap-
proach that consists of regressing the number of visits by the heirs to the
parents on parental wealth. The main challenge is to take into account the
endogeneity of parental wealth, since, if strategic behaviour applies, parents
will increase their wealth holdings in response to increased attention. Fur-
thermore, there may be unobserved factors affecting both parental wealth
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and the number of contacts. The literature generally tackles this issue by
instrumenting for wealth. Bernheim et al. (1985) instrument wealth with life-
time earnings and, based on US data, find evidence supporting the altruistic
model. Perozek (1998) instruments with an index that maps occupations into
a socio-economic ranking and controls for additional individual and family
characteristics. Using a different US dataset, she claims that the results by
Bernheim et al. are not entirely robust. On the other hand, Angelini (2007)
uses the educational level and the number of rooms in the parental house as
instruments. Using data on several European countries she finds empirical
support for the strategic model. The effect appears to be the strongest when
using illiquid forms of wealth, such as housing, as explanatory variable. This
finding suggests that housing is used as a strategic bequest. It brings thus
a new insight on the association between homeownership and bequests ob-
served by NT.
The above-mentioned literature uses parental wealth as a proxy for be-
quests. In a more recent contribution, instead of using a proxy, Groneck
(2017) uses information on the actual inheritance given to each child as well
as on hours of help with activities of daily living provided by each child. The
information on inheritances comes from the HRS exit interviews, which are
conducted after the respondent’s death with a close relative or a friend. With
this information at hand, Groneck regresses inheritances on informal services
provided and, using gender of the child as an instrument for children’s help,
finds that children who provide help have a higher probability of receiving
positive bequests. In addition, he finds that increasing the amount of care
with respect to one’s siblings increases the share received of the total bequest
transferred within the family. Interestingly, Groneck identifies the presence of
a written will as an important determinant of the correlation between care-
giving and bequests. He interprets the will as a contract between parents and
children that is necessary for the exchange motive to work.
3.6 Housing as a Commitment Device
An additional branch of the literature that may shed additional light on hous-
ing equity during retirement and how it may relate to the bequest motive is
the literature on temptation and self-control. In two seminal contributions to
this literature, Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2004) develop a model in which
an agent chooses between different sets of alternatives for consumption, some
of which contain a tempting good. The latter is a good that the agent may
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crave for, however, consuming it represents a sub-optimal choice. If the agent
chooses the set of alternatives that contains the tempting good, she will ei-
ther consume it or exert self-control in order not to do so, which comes at a
utility cost. A different option consists of choosing a set of alternatives that
excludes the temptation good and thus commits the agent to not choosing
it. This option saves the cost of self-control.
The model by Gul and Pesendorfer has been applied to several fields
within economics. There is a recently emerging literature (e.g. Angelini et al.,
2013; Ghent, 2015; and Kovacs, 2016) that applies it to the study of housing
demand over the life cycle. This literature points out the role of housing as a
commitment device. The idea is that if immediate consumption is a tempta-
tion good, households will suboptimally choose to consume too much in the
present and will not save enough for retirement. In this context, households
can commit themselves to save by investing their wealth in housing.13 In the
NT framework, this feature can be potentially incorporated by rewriting the
utility function as
U = u(c, h, o)− ρ(v(c∗, h, 0)− u(c, h, o)),
where for simplicity I have excluded the bequest motive. The second element
in (14) is the temptation term, which is weighted by ρ, and where v(·) is
the level of utility attained when all wealth is liquidated, the household is a
renter (o = 0), and consumption is set to its maximum immediate level, c∗.
If the household chooses this utility level, the temptation term cancels out.
Otherwise, the temptation term is assumed to be positive, i.e. u(·) < v(·) if
c < c∗, and it can be seen as the utility cost of self-control, since it provides
the utility difference between the tempting alternative and the actual choice.
To increase lifetime utility, a household should save for the future, but
at the same time reduce the cost of self-control. This is possible by invest-
ing in illiquid assets, which will reduce the wealth disposable for immediate
consumption and, in turn, will reduce the cost of self-control. Housing can
play this role, since its liquidation usually implies high transaction costs and
housing equity lines are not always readily available. If, in the presence of
immediate consumption as a tempting alternative, one wants to make sure
that a bequest is left for the following generation, housing can act as a com-
mitment device. That is especially the case if one wants to strategically signal
that a bequest will come. Therefore, the temptation motive has the potential
13This idea was already present in the work by Laibson (1997) in a context of preferences
with hyperbolic discounting.
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to explain to some extent the slow downsizing in housing and, in turn, the
association between homeownership and bequests.
To test the temptation motive for housing, Angelini et al. (2013) use Eu-
ropean life history data and regress the hazard rate of homeownership, i.e.
the probability for a renter to transit to homeownership, on the value of liquid
and illiquid financial assets in the household portfolio. They find a consider-
able effect of holding illiquid financial assets, which is especially strong for
individuals above forty years of age. As the authors argue, these are the most
expected to transit into homeownership for commitment purposes, since ear-
lier in life the purchase of a house is more likely related to family formation.
On the other hand, Kovacs (2016) follows a different approach consisting
of estimating a structural life cycle model with temptation preferences. Her
model predicts that the interaction between housing services in the utility
function and temptation preferences induces a high demand for housing as
a commitment device. Housing demand appears to be about significantly
higher at its peak over the life cycle when housing plays a commitment role
compared to when it does not.
3.7 The Netherlands as an Empirical Case Study
The main takeaways from the literature surveyed in this chapter translate
into empirical questions that can be analysed by looking at the data. This
section provides descriptive evidence for the Netherlands. The Netherlands
provides an interesting case study since, according to van Ooijen et al. (2015),
there is substantial evidence of low withdrawal rates of net worth (specially of
housing) during retirement. Furthermore, in the last decades the Netherlands
has experienced an important increase in homeownership,14 which appears to
remain high as households enter retirement (see, for example, van der Schors
et al., 2007; de Graaf and Rouwendal, 2012; and van Ooijen et al., 2015). Even
more interesting is the fact that in the Netherlands medical expenditure risk
is less likely to play a role as long term care is publicly provided. This leaves
other explanations such as transaction costs, and the bequest motive as more
likely to apply in the Netherlands.
The case study relies on the same data source employed in Chapter 2,
i.e. the Dutch National Bank Household Survey (DHS), which collects data
14According to the OECD, the Netherlands experienced during the 1990’s and early
2000’s the largest increase in homeownership among OECD countries (Andrews and
Caldera-Sanchez, 2011).
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for around two thousand Dutch households every year since 1993. I use the
last ten available waves (i.e. since 2007 until 2016), which provide a recent
and large enough sample for our purposes. It should be noted that our sam-
ple period includes the years of the crisis (as well as the pre-crisis and the
recovery period), when house price expectations are likely to play an impor-
tant role. On the contrary, NT estimate their structural model on US data
from the period 1996-2006, which was characterized by a housing boom,
and do not consider the role of house price uncertainty. Out of 4819 house-
holds interviewed between 2007 and 2016 (both included), 1263 are excluded
from the sample due to missing data on wealth, which leaves me with 3556
households.15 Only about 15% of these households are observed for the full
ten waves and every household is observed on average for about four waves,
resulting in an unbalanced panel with a total of 14296 household-year obser-
vations. Attrition in the DHS is dealth with through biannual refreshment
of the sample with new households to keep the panel representative of the
Dutch population.
3.7.1 The Retirement-Savings Puzzle
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of several portfolio components and home-
ownership for three cohorts of Dutch households. These are 50-59, 60-69, and
70-79 years old in 2007 respectively. For all monetary variables, Figure 3.1
shows the evolution of percentiles 25, 50, 75 and 90 for each cohort. Panels
(a) and (b) show that net worth and net financial assets do not significantly
decrease over time neither between nor within cohorts. Even though the up-
per percentiles of the distribution show more volatility, there is no pattern
indicating that households aim at depleting their wealth before death. Panel
(c) shows that homeownership does not significantly decrease within cohorts
and over time. However, there are differences between cohorts. Panels (d)
and (f) show that households do not generally decumulate neither gross nor
net housing wealth. There do seem to be a decreasing pattern in net housing
wealth for the 75th and 50th percentiles among the oldest cohort. However,
all values do not decrease below 200 thousand Euros for those percentiles.
Panel (e) shows an inter- and intra-cohort decrease of mortgage debt over
time, which suggests that, while households do not decumulate their housing
wealth, they reduce their mortgage debt over time.
15Households with missing wealth data do not appear to be significantly different from
the rest in terms of age, household structure, income, and employment status. Therefore, I
assume that missing wealth data does not imply a selection problem for this study.
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Figure 3.1 Wealth and Home Ownership among Older Adults by Cohort
(a) Net Worth (b) Net Financial Assets
(c) Homeownership (d) Gross Housing Assets
(e) Mortgage Debt (f) Net Housing Wealth
Notes: All panels show data on three cohorts. These are 50-59, 60-69, and 70-79 years old in 2007
respectively. All monetary values are given in thousands. For all panels except for (c) four different
percentiles (p25, p50, p75, and p90) are shown for each cohort.
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The findings discussed in the literature review generally agree with the
evidence in Figure 3.1, which shows low wealth withdrawal rates and cohort
effects in homeownership. This evidence suggests that the RSP is present in
the Netherlands and that housing might play an important role in under-
standing it. An important caveat to take into account here is that the low
withdrawal rates shown in Figure 3.1 might be the result of survival bias, i.e.
the fact wealthier individuals live longer and thus tend to stay in the sample
longer. However, in Figure 3.1 this issue is partially overcome by splitting the
sample into wealth percentiles, since the upper percentiles are likely to have
lower mortality rates at a given age. Furthermore, Figure 3.B.1 in Appendix
3.B shows that if the sample is restricted to households who are observed for
the full ten years the bottom line of the results does not change. Note that
households who are observed for the full ten years represent only about 15%
of the total, thus the sample in Figure 3.B.1 becomes rather small especially
for the older cohorts.
Table 3.1 takes the analysis a step further by showing that, according
to DHS data, most Dutch older households do not move. Among the 3556
households interviewed between 2007 and 2016, 1383 had a household head
that was at least 60 years old when interviewed. Out of these 1383 house-
holds, 297 (21.48%) reported to have moved at some point in time while the
household head was already at least 60. The average age of the household
head when these households moved is 67.40, while the median is 66. Out of
these 297 households, 100 (7.23% of the 1383 older households interviewed)
moved during the period in which they were interviewed, which implies that
it is possible to know what type of move it was. Table 3.1 shows that out of
these 100 moves, most (42%) were rent-to-rent moves, while only a little more
than one third (38%) were clear downsizing moves, i.e. either own-to-rent or
own-to-own with a downsizing of the housing asset.
Additionally, Table 3.2 shows that Dutch homeowners are generally not
planning to liquidate housing equity contained in the main residence, which
could be done by either moving, taking out an extra mortgage or increasing
the amount of the present mortgage. About two thirds of all homeowners in
all three age categories displayed in Table 3.2 (i.e. less than 60 years, more
or equal to 60 and less than 75 years, and equal or more than 75 years) re-
spond that they are definitely not planning to use their housing equity, while
almost the whole other one third replies that they are probably not going to
do it. The results in Table 3.2 are in accordance with the findings in Chapter
2, which show that Dutch households of all ages do not compensate house
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Table 3.1 Housing Moves among Older Adults
Total older households interviewed 1383 100%
Total moved at 60+ 297 21.48%







Notes: Older households are defined as households with a household head
who is 60 or older. Total moves at 60+ refer to the total number of
households who report to have moved while being 60 or older. Within-
sample moves at 60+, refer to the total number of households who report
to have moved while being 60 or older and during the years in which they
were interviewed. The survey does not capture nursing home entries.
Table 3.2 Willingness to Use Equity Contained in the Main Residence
Certainly Probably Probably Definitely Do not N of
yes yes not not know obs.
Age<60 1.91% 3.08% 31.10% 60.89% 3.01% 5422
60<=Age<75 1.61% 3.75% 31.34% 61.43% 1.87% 3429
Age=>75 2.19% 3.25% 25.81% 65.84% 2.92% 1087
Notes: Households are asked: “Are you planning on using the surplus value of your property in
the next two years (by taking out an extra mortgage, by increasing your mortgage amount or by
moving)?”. Older households are defined as households with a household head who is 60 or older.
price increases (declines) by decreasing (increasing) their stock of savings.
This type of behaviour suggests that Dutch households do not plan to tap
housing wealth to finance regular consumption, which further indicates that
housing plays an important role in explaining the RSP.
3.7.2 Home-Ownership and the Bequest Motive
The association between homeownership and the bequest motive pointed out
by NT has potentially relevant implications for the understanding of the
RSP. Bringing our analysis a little further, Table 3.3 shows how in my DHS
sample homeownership is clearly associated with the bequest motive, which
I measure by means of a stated preference approach. Households are asked
both about the importance to save for leaving a house and/or other illiquid
assets and about the importance to save to leave a bequest in the form of
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money. In both cases the degree of importance is ranked on a scale which
goes from one (very unimportant) to seven (very important). Additionally,
households are asked what is the chance that they leave a bequest, on a scale
from zero to one hundred. In all cases, homeowners seem more inclined than
renters to leave a bequest, which, as Table 3.3 shows, holds when considering
both the mean and median of the responses’ distribution. Furthermore, the
relationship between homeownership and the bequest motive becomes more
clear the older the age category considered.
The results of the work by NT, as well as the evidence for the Nether-
lands shown in Table 3.3, indicate the presence of an association between
homeownership and the bequest motive. However, relying only on this ev-
idence one cannot exactly say in which way does the causality run: either
from homeownership to the bequest motive or vice versa. On the one hand,
it can be that homeowners do not initially save due to a bequest motive,
but due to issues such as high transaction costs and the utility benefits of
homeownership, they remain attached to their house until the last stages of
life and then rationalize it as an asset to be bequeathed. Conversely, it can be
that, regardless of transaction costs and utility benefits, households with a
strong bequest motive decide to become homeowners already with the initial
intention to leave their house as a bequest. Furthermore, it can be that there
is a third variable, for instance lifetime income, that explains both homeown-
ership and bequests simultaneously.
To briefly check for the role of lifetime income as a confounding factor,
Table 3.4 provides, next to the bivariate correlation between homeownership
and the different measures of the bequest motive, the corresponding partial
correlations keeping fixed the time-average of household income, which I use
as a proxy for lifetime income. The latter are the correlations that would be
observed if average income did not vary across households. The last column
provides the p-values of the partial correlations. A comparison of the first
and second columns illustrates that keeping average income constant slightly
decreases the correlation between homeownership and the bequest motive.
However, the correlation coefficients remain positive and, as the last column
in Table 3.4 shows, all partial correlations are highly significant.16 These
results suggest that income is not the explanation, or at least not the only
16Partial correlations do not make an assumption about the direction of causality: the
outcome would be the same if in the regressions homeownership was used as dependent
variable and the bequest motive as explanatory variable. For more information on partial
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Table 3.4 Correlation between Home Ownership and Bequests
Correlation Partial p-value
correlation
Importance of saving Age<60 0.180 0.127 0.000
for a bequest (house 60<=Age<75 0.284 0.256 0.000
or other assets) Age=>75 0.300 0.261 0.000
Importance of saving Age<60 0.130 0.086 0.000
for a bequest (money) 60<=Age<75 0.221 0.185 0.000
Age=>75 0.221 0.191 0.000
Chance of leaving Age<60 0.335 0.269 0.000
a bequest 60<=Age<75 0.513 0.470 0.000
Age=>75 0.531 0.495 0.000
Notes: Importance of saving for a bequest is measured on a scale from one (very unimpor-
tant) to seven (very important). In the first row, households rank the importance of saving
“to leave a house and/or other illiquid assets to your children (or other relatives)”. In the
second row, they rank the importance of saving “to leave money to your children (or other
relatives)”. Chance of leaving a bequest is measured on a scale from zero (no chance) to a
hundred (absolute certainty). The first column provides bivariate correlations. The second
column provides partial correlations, which keep the influence of average household income
constant. The third column provides the significance of the partial correlations. Partial
correlations are obtained by fitting regressions of each of the measures of the bequest mo-
tive on homeownership and average household income. The coefficient is then computed as
t/
√
t2 + n− k, where t is the t-statistic associated with the estimate of the homeownership
effect, n is the number of observations and k is the number of explanatory variables in the
regression. The p-values are given by 2Pr(tn−k > |t|), where tn−k follows a Student’s t
distribution with n− k degrees of freedom.
explanation, for the associations observed in Table 3.3. Once again, the in-
tensity of the correlation grows the higher the age category considered. Note
that for the older categories, average household income is a better proxy for
lifetime income, since, compared to labour income, pension income is consid-
ered to be a better proxy for lifetime income.17
Additionally, using all the data available for the 2007-2016 period, I run
several panel data regressions of the different measures of the bequest mo-
tive on homeownership controlling for demographic variables (age, gender,
presence and number of children in the household, presence of a partner,
subjective survival probabilities, and health status), economic variables (uni-
versity education, retirement status, income and net worth) and psychological
variables (risk aversion and happiness). Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show the results of
17Using Dutch data, Knoef et al. (2013) find that pension income represents a major
share of the income of retirees, that the variance of income shocks is smaller for retirees
than for working people, and that income shocks are more persistent for retirees. For all
these reasons, they argue that pension income is a specially good proxy for lifetime income.
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the regression analysis, while Tables 3.A.1 and 3.A.2 in Appendix 3.A provide
variable definitions and summary statistics respectively. Table 3.5 shows that,
when using pooled OLS with cluster-robust standard errors, homeownership
has a positive and statistically significant (always at the 1% level) relation
with all measures of the bequest motive. The impact is always higher when
restricting the sample to households with a household head above 60 years
of age.
The data do not show many ownership transitions, especially when con-
sidering older households (see Table 3.1). Which implies that our main ex-
planatory variable displays very low time variation. Therefore, it is not ap-
propriate to include household fixed effects in my panel regressions. In doing
so, almost all of the variation in the homeownership variable would be simply
captured by the household fixed effect, and thus the homeownership effect
could not be estimated. Nevertheless, in Table 3.6 I apply the same estima-
tion method employed in Chapter 2, i.e. the method by Mundlak (1978),
and report the results of the same regressions as in Table 3.5, but including
the household specific time averages for those control variables that display
enough within-household variation.18 That is the case for all variables ex-
cept for owner, gender and university.19 For the rest of the variables, the
coefficients displayed in Table 3.6 rely only on within household variation.
In this case, the coefficients on the ownership variable are sensibly smaller.
However, they still reflect a strong and highly significant correlation between
homeownership and the measures of the bequest motive employed, which still
stands even after controlling for a host of potentially relevant demographic,
economic, and psychological variables.20
The results of the work by NT, as well as the evidence for the Nether-
lands shown in Tables 3.3 to 3.6 show that there is a significant association
between housing and preference towards leaving a bequest, which suggests
that housing usually represents an important share of all bequeathed wealth.
Even though definitive assertions about causality or about a structural re-
lationship between homeownership and bequests cannot be made, it is clear
18Mundlak (1978) shows that including time averages of all variables yields the same
result as including a household-specific fixed effect. Since I include the time averages only
for some variables, i.e. those that display enough variation over time, the method I apply
in Table 3.6 can be seen as a hybrid between pooled OLS and fixed effects.
19Table 3.A.2 in Appendix 3.A shows that the within standard deviation of these three
variables is very low. The average of the children variables (i.e. children, n. of children, and
n. of child. out) is as well not included in the regressions using the 60+ sample.
20The results do not change when employing ordered probit to estimate our regression
models. The results of the ordered probit analysis are available on request.
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Table 3.5 Results: Pooled OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Illiquid Illiquid Liquid Liquid Chance Chance
(60+) (60+) (60+)
Owner 0.460*** 0.757*** 0.257*** 0.466*** 27.490*** 34.94***
(0.075) (0.116) (0.083) (0.130) (1.721) (2.564)
Children 1.266*** -0.129 1.252*** -0.331 2.629 0.933
(0.148) (0.431) (0.161) (0.462) (2.388) (5.954)
N. of -0.017 0.648** -0.019 0.794*** -1.602 -1.560
children (0.066) (0.260) (0.072) (0.275) (1.138) (3.846)
N. of 0.239*** 0.203*** 0.218*** 0.188*** 0.354 0.443
child. out (0.032) (0.035) (0.032) (0.034) (0.428) (0.459)
Partner 0.021 -0.059 -0.048 -0.103 -5.128*** -6.743***
(0.080) (0.132) (0.085) (0.143) (1.455) (2.346)
Gender 0.102 0.154 -0.010 -0.020 2.731 4.458
(0.077) (0.142) (0.085) (0.157) (1.502) (2.723)
Age -0.096*** 0.163 -0.120*** 0.169 -1.436*** -2.962
(0.016) (0.131) (0.017) (0.151) (0.255) (2.076)
Age sq. 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** -0.001 0.009*** 0.020
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.014)
University -0.288*** -0.527 -0.245** -0.482*** 10.261*** 8.048***
(0.089) (0.149) (0.095) (0.157) (1.258) (1.979)
Survival -0.014 -0.001 0.005
prob. (0.021) (0.023) (0.340)
Risk 0.021 0.030 0.038** 0.0458** 2.542*** 2.603***
aversion (0.014) (0.020) (0.015) (0.021) (0.262) (0.345)
Happiness 0.001 -0.032 0.018 -0.022 -1.698* -3.160**
(0.046) (0.072) (0.050) (0.080) (0.869) (1.251)
Health 0.017 0.045 0.033 0.048 -2.834*** -2.668 ***
(0.044) (0.067) (0.047) (0.071) (0.734) (1.023)
Retired 0.371*** 0.098 0.272** 0.047 8.376*** 7.625***
(0.103) (0.122) (0.111) (0.130) (1.631) (1.753)
Income 0.000 0.001 0.002* 0.003* 0.055*** 0.066**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.019) (0.030)
Net worth 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.015*** 0.011***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003)
Constant 3.723*** -5.227 4.399*** -5.649 94.726*** 143.449*
(0.427) (5.022) (0.459) (5.323) (6.993) (74.189)
R2 0.155 0.125 0.134 0.112 0.263 0.327
Obs. 10432 5183 10442 5192 10458 5195
Households 2630 1183 2631 1184 2635 1184
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by household, are reported in parentheses. All regressions in-
clude year dummies. Columns (2), (4) and (6) are based on a subsample including only household
heads above 60 years of age. The variable survival prob. is only available for household heads
above 60 years of age. Income and net worth are given in thousands of Euros. *** significant at
the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. For variable definitions,
refer to Table 3.A.1 in Appendix 3.A.
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Table 3.6 Results: Pooled OLS with Mundlak Terms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Illiquid Illiquid Liquid Liquid Chance Chance
(60+) (60+) (60+)
Owner 0.411*** 0.663*** 0.203** 0.374*** 26.034*** 33.160***
(0.078) (0.121) (0.086) (0.133) (1.717) (2.564)
Children 0.282** -0.123 0.427*** -0.322 -2.479 1.373
(0.156) (0.432) (0.159) (0.463) (2.406) (5.784)
N. of 0.154* 0.656** 0.087 0.801*** 1.323 -1.444
children (0.083) (0.259) (0.078) (0.274) (1.376) (3.618)
N. of 0.052** 0.205*** 0.025 0.189*** 0.527 0.423
child. out (0.024) (0.035) (0.022) (0.034) (0.461) (0.451)
Partner -0.062 -0.146 0.000 -0.119 -2.955 -7.941***
(0.136) (0.163) (0.141) (0.164) (1.928) (2.915)
Gender 0.116 0.169 0.000 -0.023 2.905* 4.446
(0.077) (0.144) (0.085) (0.160) (1.512) (2.734)
Age -0.136*** -0.148 -0.157*** -0.199* -1.352** -3.747*
(0.033) (0.113) (0.031) (0.102) (0.578) (2.186)
Age sq. 0.001** 0.000 0.000*** 0.001* 0.004 0.020
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.015)
University -0.301*** -0.569*** -0.267*** -0.529*** 9.202*** 6.836***
(0.090) (0.153) (0.096) (0.159) (1.286) (2.002)
Survival 0.021 0.010 -0.064
prob. (0.017) (0.015) (0.291)
Risk 0.002 -0.009 0.024** 0.024* 0.545** 0.396
aversion (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.213) (0.260)
Happiness -0.064* -0.0560 -0.002 0.022* -1.960*** -1.010
(0.037) (0.054) (0.034) (0.054) (0.648) (1.000)
Health 0.025 0.077 0.066 0.042 -0.111 -1.015
(0.040) (0.052) (0.041) (0.049) (0.652) (0.950)
Retired 0.145* 0.104 0.048 0.051 1.936 7.671
(0.081) (0.123) (0.071) (0.131) (1.630) (1.715)
Income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.031
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.023)
Net worth -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 3.442*** -10.934 4.192*** -12.204* 88.000 89.894
(0.467) (6.741) (0.504) (7.26) (7.760) (96.836)
R2 0.170 0.134 0.148 0.123 0.278 0.342
Obs. 10432 5183 10442 5192 10458 5195
Households 2630 1183 2631 1184 2635 1184
Notes: Regressions are exactly the same as in Table 3.5, but include household specific time
averages (i.e. the Mundlak terms) for variables children, n. of children, n. of child. out, partner,
age, age sq., risk aversion, happiness, health, retired, income and net worth. For regressions based
on the 60+ sample (i.e., columns (2), (4) and (6)), the averages of children, n. of children, n. of
child out and retired are not included, while the average of survival prob. is included. For more
information, see note under Table 3.5. *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5%
level, * significant at the 10% level. For variable definitions, refer to Table 3.A.1 in Appendix
3.A.
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that, in any case, the reduced-form analysis suggests that homeownership is
an element to take into account when studying bequests. This insight has rel-
evant implications for understanding the RSP, especially in the Netherlands,
where due to public coverage of long-term expenses, precautionary saving
is unlikely to play a role, which opens the door to consider bequests as an
important factor.
3.7.3 Alternative Bequest Motives
Section 5.1 shows that, in a model with altruistic bequests, the size of the
bequest is determined by the gain it implies for the recipients. Corroborating
this implication, albeit in a very superficial and preliminary way, Table 3.7
shows that, among Dutch older households, those who have children give
higher importance to saving for a bequest. This difference is the most clear
when only homeowners are considered. Considering only altruism towards
children, i.e. leaving out altruism towards other (non)family members, this
descriptive result suggests that the altruistic model is likely to apply in the
Dutch case. However, regarding the chances of leaving a bequest, having
children does not seem to play such an important role.21 In fact, among
renters, those with children report a lower chance of leaving a bequest
compared to those without children, and, among homeowners, there does
not seem to be a clear difference between households with and without
children. Nevertheless, note that the importance to save for a bequest is not
the same as the chance to actually leave a bequest. Someone might consider
very important to save for a bequest but not actually have the chance to do
so.
Conditional on having children, Table 3.8 shows whether DHS respon-
dents identify themselves with the altruistic or the strategic bequest motive.
In case they do not identify with any of the two, they can also say whether
they still have not made plans about leaving a bequest, or whether their
plan is to leave no bequest. The first row in Table 3.8 shows that the
strategic motive is apparently not very popular among Dutch households.
Home-owners who are above 75 years of age appear to be the most prone to
use bequests strategically. However, only 4.48% of them report a strategic
21This is something that can be clearly seen as well in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. Both tables
show that the presence of children has a significant impact on the importance of saving for
a bequest, but not on the chance of actually leaving a bequest.
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Table 3.7 Importance of the Bequest Motive by Presence of Children
With Children No Children
Home Owners Mean Med. Obs. Mean Med. Obs.
Imp. of saving for Age<60 3.40 3 3616 1.61 1 1745
a bequest (house 60<=Age<75 3.42 3 2971 1.28 1 519
or other assets) Age=>75 3.75 4 1026 1.52 1 123
Imp. of saving for Age<60 3.47 3 3617 1.80 1 1746
a bequest (money) 60<=Age<75 3.44 3 2975 1.43 1 520
Age=>75 3.93 4 1028 2.28 1 123
Chance of leaving Age<60 79.10 99 3684 78.88 95 1791
a bequest 60<=Age<75 81.54 100 3003 79.51 100 523
Age=>75 83.30 100 1031 79.08 100 123
With Children No Children
Renters Mean Med. Obs. Mean Med. Obs.
Imp. of saving for Age<60 2.96 3 868 1.62 1 1277
a bequest (house 60<=Age<75 2.27 2 1019 1.27 1 278
or other assets) Age=>75 2.49 2 468 1.28 1 82
Imp. of saving for Age<60 3.29 3 868 1.86 1 1277
a bequest (money) 60<=Age<75 2.58 2 1020 1.30 1 278
Age=>75 3.10 3 469 1.52 1 82
Chance of leaving Age<60 44.90 50 893 60.48 70 1309
a bequest 60<=Age<75 35.72 15 1027 49.93 50 280
Age=>75 37.99 20 470 42.03 25 83
Notes: Importance of saving for a bequest is measured on a scale from one (very unimportant)
to seven (very important). In the first row (of both the homeowners and the renters respective
panels), households rank the importance of saving “to leave a house and/or other illiquid assets
to your children (or other relatives)”. In the second row, they rank the importance of saving
“to leave money to your children (or other relatives)”. Chance of leaving a bequest is measured
on a scale from zero (no chance) to a hundred (absolute certainty).
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Table 3.8 Presence of Strategic and Altruistic Bequests Motives
Age<60 60<=Age<75 Age=>75
Home Renters Home Renters Home Renters
owners owners owners
(1) Strategic bequest 2.94% 1.31% 3.79% 0.62% 4.48% 2.55%
(2) Altruistic bequest 16.61% 12.62% 25.67% 4.68% 36.90% 10.04%
(3) Not planned yet 71.04% 56.12% 62.50% 51.98% 52.11% 51.93%
(4) No bequest 1.83% 4.88% 1.50% 7.24% 0.98% 5.86%
(5) None of the above 7.58% 25.08% 6.55% 35.48% 5.53% 29.61%
Observations 3684 893 3003 1027 1031 470
Notes: Conditional on having children, respondents are asked which statement is closest to
their opinion: (1) Leaving a bequest if children provide services; (2) Leaving a bequest re-
gardless of services provided; (3) No explicit plans about leaving a bequest; (4) No intention
to leave a bequest; (5) None of the above. Older households are defined as households with a
household head who is 60 or older.
bequest motive.22. The second row shows that households of all ages, and
specially homeowners, are more prone to report an altruistic bequest motive
rather than a strategic one. In addition, the third and fourth row show that
many households have not yet made any plans regarding bequests, while
very few of them plan to leave no bequest.
However, there are several caveats to keep in mind when looking at Table
3.8. First, households may be inclined towards reporting altruistic bequests
to avoid disclosing any kind of egocentricity; and, second, those willing
to leave a bequest regardless of the services provided, might be willing to
increase it if services are actually provided. These are arguments suggesting
that strategic bequests might be more important than reflected in Table
3.8. In any case, Table 3.8 shows that both strategic and altruistic bequest
motives are present, and that they are more popular among homeowners
than among renters. Note that there is a considerable share of renters that
identify themselves with the fifth option, i.e. none of the above. Since rows
one to four seem to cover all possible options, I interpret the fifth row as
an option more for those who are unsure or do not know with which of the
others they identify.
22Note that the higher share of homeowners above 75 reporting a strategic bequest motive
compared to the rest might be simply due to the fact that older households are more likely
to have plans about the use of their net worth. In any case, for all ages the share of
respondents reporting a strategic bequest motive is always rather low.
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Table 3.9 Rent-to-own Moves and Remaining Mortgage Deb by Age
Below 40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70+ Total
Rent-to-own Number 82 46 10 6 6 150
moves % 54.66% 30.66% 6.66% 4.00% 4.00% 100%
RMD % with RMD 37.61% 46.41% 41.31% 35.30% 27.57% 37.40%
Average 74.94 87.84 62.03 45.25 29.19 59.21
Notes: Average remaining mortgage debt (RMD) is provided in thousands. The last colum of
the RMD panel provides the % of households with RMD and the average RMD when all ages
are pooled together. Renters are included when computing statistics regarding RMD.
3.7.4 Housing as a Commitment Device
Section 3.6 briefly outlines how the literature attempts to check empirically
for the use of housing as a commitment device. This is actually a very chal-
lenging endeavour, and thus a promising venue for research in the future.
In one of the very few existing examples, Angelini et al. (2013) look at the
probability of renters to become homeowners when they are above forty years
of age, since at earlier ages the purchase of a house is more likely to be linked
to family formation. Table 3.9 shows that about 45% of the rent-to-own
transitions registered in the DHS dataset correspond to households with a
household head that is forty years of age or more. Even though these moves
could be linked to events like marriage, divorce or increase in family size,
Angelini et al. (2013) point out that rent-to-own transitions that take place
above forty are more likely to be for commitment purposes than those that
take place below that age. In addition, the lower panel of Table 3.9 shows
that remaining mortgage debt is still relatively high for households at older
ages, which suggests that a reasonable share of households are likely to have
become homeowners (or have increased the size of their property) late in life.
Even though Table 3.9 indicates that commitment demand for housing
is a possibility that could be relevant in the Netherlands, a note of caution
has to be made here since the evidence is very descriptive and a more in
depth study is needed to elucidate the true relevance of the use of housing as
a commitment device.23 For example, the fact that even older homeowners
still hold mortgage debt could be explained as well by the tax deduction of
mortgage interest rates, and/or by the popularity of interest-only mortgages
23To bring the analysis a step further, I have checked whether answers to the DHS
question ”Do you find it easy or difficult to control your expenditures?” correlate with
housing tenure. I find that the correlation coefficient is very close to zero. However, the
reliability of the answers to such a question is not entirely clear.
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in the Netherlands. Therefore, any future study should take into account
this factors as well. The literature on this topic is still very incipient, which
implies that, albeit difficult, the identification of the commitment demand
for housing is a very fruitful challenge. In any case, the evidence reported
here does not rule out the fact that, combined with the previous descriptive
evidence on the relationship between homeownership and bequests, the com-
mitment demand for housing potentially adds to the understanding of the
RSP in the Netherlands.
3.8 Conclusions
The full understanding of the underlying causes behind the retirement-
savings puzzle (RSP) is crucial for the assessment of the adequacy of re-
tirement savings in a context of pension system reforms. To that end, I
complement the RSP literature by reviewing the literature on housing eq-
uity during retirement (HER). The HER literature indicates that retirees
are generally reluctant to withdraw their housing equity, which has clear im-
plications for the understanding of the RSP. This insight is picked up by
Nakajima and Telyukova (2013a, 2017), who develop a model of retirement
savings with housing. One of their main conclusions is that there is an as-
sociation between homeownership and bequests, suggesting that housing as
a bequeathable asset plays an important role in explaining the RSP. Fur-
ther literature on altruistic and strategic bequests, as well as on housing as a
commitment device, provide additional insights to understand the connection
between bequests, homeownership and the RSP.
The descriptive evidence drawn from the Dutch National Bank Household
Survey (DHS) shows that a vast majority of Dutch homeowners do not sell
their house to finance retirement, and that it is likely that homeownership
among retirees will increase in the near future due to cohort effects. More
interestingly, the evidence shows that, controlling for a host of economic (in-
cluding permanent income), demographic and psychological variables there
is a strong correlation between homeownership and the importance given to
leave a bequest, as well as between homeownership and the self-perceived
chance that a bequest will be left. Even though the evidence does not allow
taking a stand on the direction in which the causality runs, i.e. either from
the bequest motive to homeownership or vice versa, it does seem to be the
case that homeowners have a tendency to use their home as a bequest. On
the one hand, it can be that due to high transaction costs and the utility
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benefits of homeownership, homeowners remain attached to their home and
then rationalize it as an asset to be bequeathed. Conversely, it can be that,
regardless of transaction costs and utility benefits, households with a strong
bequest motive become homeowners in the first place with the original in-
tention to leave the house as a bequest. Regardless of how the correlation is
interpreted, it is clear that any future study on bequests has to consider the
relevance of housing. Leaving housing out of the picture may seriously un-
derestimate the bequest motive for those households that view their housing
equity as the main element to be bequeathed.
This chapter provides a glimpse of a vast field of literature. However,
the RSP literature is still a fertile ground for new contributions. Structural
models in the line of De Nardi et al. (2010) and Nakajima and Telyukova
(2013a), as well as reduced form type of analysis, can bring on a better
understanding of the connection between homeownership, bequests and the
RSP. In addition, the literature on strategic bequests as well as the literature
on temptation and commitment provide potentially fruitful lines of research
for the further understanding of the stylized facts laid out in this chapter.
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Appendices
3.A Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics
Table 3.A.1 Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Illiquid Importance given to save for a bequest in the form of a house and/or
other illiquid assets. Takes values from 1 (very unimportant) to 7
(very important).
Liquid Importance given to save for a bequest in the form of cash. Takes
values from 1 (very unimportant) to 7 (very important).
Chance Chance of leaving a bequest. Takes values from 0 (no chance) to 100
(absolute certainty).
Owner Dummy indicating homeownership.
Children Dummy indicating whether the household head has any children.
N. of children Number of children living in the household.
N. of child. out Number of children living outside of the household.
Partner Dummy indicating the presence of a partner.
Gender Dummy indicating whether the household head is a man.
Age Age of the household head.
Age sq. Age of the household head squared.
University Dummy indicating whether the household head has university studies.
Survival prob. Self-reported probability to survive for the next 11-15 years. This
variable is only available for household heads above 60 years of age.
Risk aversion Index variable indicating how much household heads agree with hav-
ing save investments with guaranteed returns. Takes values from 1
(totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree).
Happiness Self-reported level of happiness. Takes values from 1 (very happy) to
5 (very unhappy).
Health Self-reported health level. Takes values from 1 (excellent) to 5 (poor).
Retired Dummy indicating whether a household head is retired.
Income Total household income.
Net worth Total household assets minus total household liabilitie.
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Table 3.A.2 Summary Statistics
Between Within
Variable Mean Median std. dev. std. dev. Min. Max.
Illiquid 2.78 2 1.71 0.96 1 7
Liquid 2.85 2 1.75 0.91 1 7
Chance 69.37 90 31.69 17.98 0 100
Owner 0.58 1 0.44 0.08 0 1
Children 0.71 1 0.43 0.18 0 1
N. of children 0.53 0 1.00 0.27 0 6
N. of child. out 1.14 0 1.31 0.49 0 12
Partner 0.66 1 0.45 0.12 0 1
Gender 0.75 1 0.43 0.02 0 1
Age 56.47 58 15.40 2.21 18 94
University 0.15 0 0.36 0.05 0 1
Survival prob. 5.99 6 2.15 1.18 0 10
Risk aversion 4.99 5 1.49 1.15 1 7
Happiness 2.01 2 0.57 0.35 1 5
Health 2.19 2 0.64 0.35 1 5
Retired 0.39 0 0.45 0.15 0 1
Income 32.06 27.64 18.57 27.83 0.35 2197.46
Net worth 161.06 93.14 190.27 63.92 -1491.38 999.86
Notes: All summary statistics are computed based on the estimation sample in the first column
of Table 3.5. Except for the variable survival prob. in which case the summary statistics are
based on the estimation sample in the second column of Table 3.5. Income and net worth are
given in thousands of Euros.
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3.B Wealth and Homeownership (Balanced Sample)
Figure 3.B.1 Wealth and Home Ownership among Older Adults by Cohort
- Balanced Sample -
(a) Net Worth (b) Net Financial Assets
(c) Home Ownership (d) Gross Housing Assets
(e) Mortgage Debt (f) Net Housing Wealth
Notes: All panels in this figure are the same as in Figure 3.1 but using only households that are
present in all years of the sample period. These represent about 15% of the households used in
Figure 3.1 in the main text. For more information see note under Figure 3.1.
Chapter 4
Estate Planning and the
Bequest Motive for Saving∗
4.1 Introduction
It is widely recognized in the literature on retirement savings that retirees,
especially those with a high lifetime income, tend to hold on to their pre-
viously accumulated wealth even though they are in the last phase of their
lifetime.1 As I explain in Chapter 3, the economic literature has proposed
three main explanations for this stylized fact: precautionary saving related
to longevity risk (e.g. De Nardi et al., 2009; and Post and Hanewald, 2013),
precautionary saving related to uncertain out of pocket medical expenditures
(e.g. Coile and Milligan, 2009; and De Nardi et al., 2010), and the bequest
motive (e.g. Kopczuk, 2007 and De Nardi and Yang, 2014). In the present
chapter I contribute to this body of literature by empirically studying the
bequest motive using Dutch administrative micro data.
The Dutch context is especially interesting since in the Netherlands out
of pocket medical expenditures do not play a major role due to widespread
insurance coverage.2 Furthermore, longevity risk is covered to a large extent
by mandatory annuitization of fully funded occupational pensions.3 However,
in this context there is still not a relevant decrease in wealth levels during
*This chapter is based on Suari-Andreu et al. (2018).
1For a larger literature review on this stylized fact, see Section 3.2. Thorough reviews
are provided in van Ooijen et al. (2015), and De Nardi et al. (2016).
2In the Netherlands there is universal coverage of both curative and long-term care. For
a detailed description of the Dutch health care system, see Bakx et al. (2016).
3Fully funded occupational pensions form the main pillar of the Dutch pension system.
For a thorough description of the Dutch pension system, see Bovenberg and Meijdam
(2001). For how it compares to other countries, see OECD (2017a).
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retirement, as I point out in Chapter 3 using survey data and as pointed
out by van Ooijen et al. (2015) using administrative data. This suggests the
bequest motive as a suitable alternative to explain the wealth holdings of re-
tirees. Investigating the bequest motive is especially relevant nowadays since,
as reported by Alvaredo et al. (2013) and Piketty and Zucman (2014) among
others, the share of inherited to aggregate wealth has been increasing in the
past decades in developed countries, and is expected to keep doing so in the
future.
To study the bequest motive I build on and expand the previous work
by Kopczuk (2007). The latter attempts to identify the bequest motive by
studying whether terminally ill individuals start transferring part of their
estate in the expectation of a near death. To do so, Kopczuk employs US ad-
ministrative data on a sample of deaths occurred between 1976 and 1977. He
classifies these deaths as expected or unexpected according to whether they
are caused or not by a previously diagnosed illness. Controlling for gender,
marital status, age, and lifetime income, he compares wealth at time of death
for expected and unexpected deaths. He argues that if expected deaths are
associated with lower wealth at the moment of death, it is due to individuals
transferring part of their estate in the expectation of a near death.
The assumption underpinning Kopczuk’s strategy is that transfers to
heirs resulting from deathbed estate planning reflect the presence of a be-
quest motive for saving. Given a bequest motive, there are two reasons for
individuals to engage in early bequest giving in the expectation of a near
death. First, as proposed by Kopczuk (2010) and McGarry (2013), the pur-
pose may be inheritance tax avoidance.4 Second, as proposed by McGarry
(2000, 2013), the purpose may be to exert control over recipiency and use of
the assets transferred. In contrast to these two reasons, these transfers may
have a cost if they imply relinquishing control over assets that individuals
could need were they to live longer than expected, or encountered unexpected
expenditures (McGarry, 2000).
Due to missing data on income, Kopczuk focuses most of his analysis on
married males, for whom he indeed finds a negative effect of expected death
on wealth at death. However, his analysis suffers from several shortcomings
that I address, thereby expanding his work in a number of ways. First, since
4In some countries regulations ensure that transfers made in the years before death are
considered as part of the estate for tax purposes. In the Netherlands only transfers within
the last half a year of life are considered. For more details on the Dutch inheritance tax
system, see Appendix 4.E. For how it compares to other countries, see the Worlwide Estate
and Inheritance Tax Guide by EY (2017).
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Kopczuk uses estate tax data, he only observes individuals above the mini-
mum estate tax threshold. I have access to the whole wealth distribution and
thus I am able to investigate whether the effect has a wealth gradient. Second,
I refine the definition of expected death by accounting for the time between
diagnosis of an illness and the time of death. I assume that the longer the
illness, the more likely is the individual to engage in estate planning. Third,
I generate a more accurate measure of lifetime income. Fourth, a novel fea-
ture of the data is that it allows connecting deceased individuals to their
children, for whom I have access to demographic variables as well as income
and wealth. Fifth, I expand Kopczuk’s analysis to demographic groups other
than married males.
An additional and very relevant aspect is that the Dutch healthcare sys-
tem shields the effect of medical expenditures, which could otherwise inter-
fere in the effect of expected death on wealth at the end of life. This issue is
specially problematic in the American context, where several studies find sig-
nificant wealth drops related to medical expenditures during the last years of
life (e.g. French et al., 2006; and Poterba et al., 2015), while van Ooijen et al.
(2015) show that this is not the case in the Netherlands.5 Furthermore, the
Dutch disability insurance system prevents any major identification problem
caused by the presence of income shocks. Income shocks may pose an iden-
tification problem if individuals are working when their illness is diagnosed,
since that may cause an income shock resulting in lower wealth at time of
death. In the Netherlands, when an individual becomes disabled, the em-
ployer must guarantee two years of full salary, after which a disability benefit
comes into place with a minimum replacement rate of 70%.6 These features
make the Dutch context especially interesting for answering the question at
hand.
In the present study I employ about ten thousand deaths occurred in the
Netherlands between 2006 and 2010. Using administrative data on causes
of death, hospital visits and medical diagnoses, I distinguish whether a par-
ticular death was caused by a previously diagnosed illness. If so, I measure
the time length between diagnosis and death. Using tax register data and
5Bakx et al. (2016) show that between 1998 and 2014 out of pocket medical expenditures
in the Netherlands constituted only 5% of yearly healthcare expenditures, which is the
lowest proportion among OECD countries (OECD, 2017b).
6For a detailed description of the Dutch disability insurance system, see Koning and
Lindeboom (2015) and Koning and van Sonsbeek (2017). The latter show how the Dutch
system prevents large drops in income caused by disability. For how the Dutch disability
insurance system compares to other countries, see OECD (2010).
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municipal administration records, I follow Kopczuk and investigate whether,
controlling for the same variables as he does, expected death has an effect
on wealth at death. The present study has two shortcomings compared to
Kopczuk’s. First, the data on income and wealth are given at the household
level instead of at the individual level. I overcome this issue by stratifying
the sample by gender and marital status and thus controlling for household
structure. Second, the wealth measurement is not given at the exact time of
death but on the 31st of December of the year before death. However, I know
the exact date of every death in the sample, thus I measure this delay and
control for it in all regressions.
Applying quantile regression, the results show that indeed expected death
has a negative impact on net financial wealth at the end of life. However, the
effect is only statistically significant and large for married males who’s death
is preceded by a very long illness (ten years or more). I estimate significant
effects around the median and at the top of the net financial wealth distri-
bution. At the top of the distribution, I find that the effect is stronger for
younger individuals (below 65), for those with children, and for those with
children who are below the 75th percentile of the income distribution. It is
reasonable to find an effect only for married individuals since most singles in
the sample have experienced widowhood or divorce.7 It is reasonable as well
to find an effect only for males since, due to their lower life expectancy, most
individuals who die while married are males. Furthermore, finding strong ef-
fects at the top of the wealth distribution coincides with a recurrent view in
the literature that classifies bequests as a luxury good (e.g., Alessie et al.,
1999; Kopczuk and Lupton, 2007; and De Nardi and Yang, 2014).
Following Kopczuk, I interpret my results as early bequests that result
from estate planning in the expectation of a near death. This suggest that
wealth holdings among retired individuals reported in Chapter 3 and in van
Ooijen et al. (2015) respond, at least partially, to a bequest motive for saving.
This interpretation relies on out of pocket medical expenditures not being a
mediator in the relation between expected death and wealth at death. Even
though the institutional context in the Netherlands prevents any major role
of out of pocket medical expenditures, the results could be driven by wealthy
individuals incurring additional expenses to receive especial treatment. There
is also the chance that, given an increase in the probability of death, indi-
7Sevak et al. (2003) and Poterba et al. (2015) for the US, and van Ooijen et al. (2015)
for the Netherlands show that widowhood and divorce are associated with considerable
drops in wealth.
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viduals adjust their rate of time preference and thus increase non-medical
consumption. However, there is a large debate in the economic literature on
whether bad health increases or decreases non-medical consumption. The ef-
fect could go both ways since, as argued by Finkelstein et al. (2013) among
others, bad health may decrease the marginal utility of consumption.8 In
fact van Ooijen et al. (2016) find using Dutch survey data that bad health
decreases non-medical consumption. Therefore, it can be argued that I find
a negative effect of expected death on wealth at death despite the negative
effect of bad health on non-medical consumption.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the
data sources and explains the sample I employ in the analysis. Section 4.3
provides descriptive statistics for the most important variables and some pre-
liminary evidence. Section 4.4 explains the econometric model employed to
estimate the effect of interest. Section 4.5 provides the results of the analysis.
Section 4.6 rounds up the chapter with a conclusion.
4.2 Data Sources and Sample Selection
To conduct the present study I use Dutch data from different administrative
sources which I merge into one single dataset. All the data are provided by
Statistics Netherlands. I use the death register to randomly select a sample of
9670 deaths out of all the deaths occurred in the Netherlands between 2006
and 2010, both included, which is about 1.5% of all deaths occurred during
that period. Through an encrypted social security number, I merge the data
from the death register with individual demographic characteristics available
from municipal administration records. In addition, I merge the sample with
household level data on income and wealth available from the tax register,
and with data on hospital visits available from the hospital discharge register.
After merging, the resulting data set contains the following information
for each decedent: date of death, cause of death, age, gender, marital sta-
tus, household net worth on the 31st of December of the year previous to
death, yearly household disposable income from 2003 until the year previ-
ous to death, and hospital visits.9 The data on hospital visits contain date
and diagnosis for each hospital visit taking place between 1995 and time of
8For a thorough review of the debate on the link between health status and non-medical
consumption, see Finkelstein et al. (2009).
9Household net worth data are available for all years between 2005 and the year previous
to death. However, to follow Kopczuk’s strategy, only need the observation closest to death
for each individual is needed.
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death.10 Causes of death and hospital diagnoses are classified according to
the 10th revision of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and
Related Health Problems (ICD-10), which is assembled by the World Health
Organization (WHO). Net worth equals total assets minus total liabilities.11
Assets can be disaggregated into financial and non-financial assets. The for-
mer can be disaggregated into deposits, saving accounts, stocks and bonds,
while the latter can be disaggregated into housing (primary residence) and
other non-financial assets (housing wealth other than the primary residence
plus business wealth). Liabilities can be disaggregated into mortgage debt
and non-mortgage debt. Due to income and wealth data, after the merging
process the number of observations is reduced from 9670 to 9625.
A very interesting and novel feature of the data employed in this chapter
is that all individuals in the sample can be linked to their children, and I
have access to exactly the same variables for the children as I do for their
parents. Therefore I can generate variables indicating the number of chil-
dren at death, as well as age, gender, marital status, household income, and
household wealth for each child. For practical reasons, I set the maximum
number of children equal to seven, which implies the additional loss of five
observations. After this selection, the sample is composed by a total of 9620
parental observations and 23127 children observations.
4.3 Summary Statistics and Descriptive Evidence
4.3.1 Length of Illness
Kopczuk classifies deaths as expected or unexpected according to where
caused or not by a previously diagnosed illness. Among expected deaths,
he is able to distinguish between short and long illnesses. He thus comes
up with three categories for death: instantaneous (not caused by a previous
illness), short illness (caused by an illness diagnosed hours, days or weeks be-
fore death), and long illness (caused by an illness diagnosed months or years
before death). I follow his approach and further refine the measurement of
the time between diagnosis of an illness and the eventual death that it leads
to. It is important to take this into account since the longer the illness, the
more time has the individual to engage in deathbed estate planning.
10For every hospital visit I know whether there is an associated diagnosis or whether it
is related to a previous diagnosis.
11For additional description and applications of the wealth data employed in this chapter,
see de Bresser and Knoef (2015) or Knoef et al. (2016).
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To measure length of illness I combine data from the death register with
data from the hospital discharge register. I classify each individual death into
one of the 22 general cause of death (COD) categories given in ICD-10.12 For
this purpose, I use the main underlying cause of death, which according to
the WHO is defined as the disease or injury that initiated the chain of events
leading to death. I then use the same 22 categories to classify the diagnoses
associated to each hospital visit in the sample. I am thus able to know whether
someone who died due to a particular COD category, previously had a hos-
pital visit for a reason within that same category, as long as that visit took
place not earlier than the year 1995.
With this information, I generate a measure consisting of the difference in
days between the 31st of December of the year previous to death and the first
COD-related hospital visit. I take the 31st of December of the year previous
to death, and not the date of death itself, because the former is the date
of the household wealth measurement available. Due to this delay between
date of death and date of the wealth measurement, the measure of length of
illness is not totally accurate. However, since for each deceased individual in
the sample I know the exact date of death, I am able to generate a delay-in-
measurement variable. This variable essentially indicates the day in the year
that a particular individual died, and thus takes values between one and 365.
Controlling for it in all regressions makes the analysis more meaningful, since
then I compare always individuals with the same time gap between wealth
measurement and death.
Since the awareness of an illness may actually start before the first hos-
pital visit, my length of illness measure may be systematically understating
actual length of illness. To deal with this, I transform the variable to express
it in years, instead of in days. In that way, those whose first COD-related
hospital intake took place within a year before the wealth measurement get
assigned one year in length of illness, those whose first COD-related intake
took place between one and two years before the measurement get assigned
two years, and so on until a maximum in the sample of 15 years.13 For obser-
vations with illnesses from 11 to 15 years long, is likely that the first intake
took place before 1995, and thus I might be understating length of illness in
those cases. To deal with this inaccuracy, I place all terminal illnesses longer
12For a list of all COD categories in the ICD-10 and their frequency in the sample, see
Appendix 4.B.
13This transformation also allows a better interpretation of the effect of length of illness
on wealth at time of death.
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Figure 4.1 Histogram Length of Illness in Years
Notes: Observations with a zero in length of terminal illness are excluded from the
figure. Their frequency in the sample is 5719.
than ten years under one same category.
Figure 4.1 shows a histogram of the resulting variable conditional on be-
ing larger than zero.14 Out of a sample of 9620 deaths, 5719 (59%) have a zero
in length of terminal illness. These are the deaths classified as unexpected.
Out of the deaths classified as expected, Figure 4.1 shows a distribution of
length of illness that is positively skewed. The frequencies go from 916 for one
year gradually down to 197 for ten years in length of illness. There is then
a spike of 586 observations (6%) for the category capturing length of illness
above ten years. Out of the 5719 observations with zero in length of illness,
there are 1752 observations that correspond to individuals who had at least
one non-COD-related hospital visit during the same year of death, or during
the year previous to death. I consider these individuals to be potentially frail
during the last years of life, which does not allow to classify their death as
purely unexpected. For that reason, I generate for them a frailty dummy that
I include in all regressions.
In addition to Figure 4.1, Table 4.1 shows average length of illness clas-
sified by age, gender and marital status. The table shows that most deaths
occur after the age of 70, and that, as expected, females tend to live longer
than males. Length of illness is relatively low for individuals in the younger
age categories, specially among males, indicating that deaths in this cate-
14For the distribution of length of illness by gender and marital status groups, see Ap-
pendix 4.C.
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gory are more likely to be unexpected. Among all groups, length of illness
increases with age up to the age of 80, and then decline slightly for the older
categories. Pooling all ages together, length of illness is in general higher for
married individuals compared to single individuals, which is essentially be-
cause there are few married individuals who pass away within the oldest age
category.
Table 4.1 Average Length of Illness by Age, Gender and Marital Status
Single Married
Females Males Females Males
Age Length Obs. Length Obs. Length Obs. Length Obs.
<50 1.80 1.8% 0.80 5.3% 2.36 5.4% 1.26 2.7%
50-60 2.17 2.6% 1.21 7.6% 2.24 14.4% 1.52 7.1%
60-70 2.35 5.8% 1.73 12.0% 2.43 23.5% 1.85 18.5%
70-80 2.27 13.9% 2.08 22.5% 2.13 26.4% 2.40 33.7%
80-90 1.87 43.8% 2.18 35.9% 2.05 26.7% 2.65 32.1%
>90 1.40 32.1% 1.68 16.8% 2.19 3.4% 2.03 6.0%
All 1.81 2658 1.87 1402 2.21 1717 2.27 3843
Notes: To compute averages, individuals above ten years in length of terminal illness are as-
signed a value of eleven.
The patterns in Table 4.1 seem reasonable and generally in line with
the evidence reported by Kopczuk (2007). They are thus consistent with my
measure containing information about actual length of illness. My measure
is however rather different from that one used by Kopczuk. Due to the time
delay in the data between wealth measurement and date of death, I am not
able to fine-tune as much as Kopczuk does among illnesses with a short
span. However, I am able to better classify the span of illnesses deemed as
long by Kopczuk. According to his own results, long-term illnesses are the
only ones that actually matter when it comes to triggering estate planning
type of behaviour.That may be because individuals will only engage in estate
planning if they have enough time to do so, which is why it makes sense to
measure length of illness more accurately.
4.3.2 Wealth at the End of Life
As mentioned in Section 4.2, through the tax register I have access to data
on assets and liabilities at the household level, which are given on the 31st
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of December of the year previous to death. For the analysis, I focus on net
financial wealth (NFW) since liquid wealth is arguably the most likely to
be passed on as early bequests. I compute this variable by subtracting non-
mortgage debt from the sum of all financial assets (deposits, saving accounts,
stocks and bonds). Table 4.2 shows how NFW is distributed by gender and
marital status of the decedent. The first thing to note is that, as pointed
out by the literature on retirement savings, individuals still hold considerable
amounts of wealth at the very end of their life (De Nardi et al., 2016). Looking
at singles, both males and females have on average a net financial wealth
position of about 70 thousand Euros at the end of life. Looking at married
individuals, married males have on average about 108 thousand Euros of
household net financial wealth at the end of life, a notably higher position in
comparison to married females, whose average is about 75 thousand Euros.
Table 4.2 Net Financial Wealth at the End of Life (thousands of Euros)
Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 Obs
Single Females 70 0 5 18 48 157 263 856 2658
Single Males 66 0 3 18 50 152 289 768 1402
Married Females 75 1 7 24 75 193 320 687 1717
Married Males 108 1 9 27 80 205 338 1026 3843
All 85 1 6 23 66 183 308 876 9620
The second aspect to note about Table 4.2 is that, as expected, net worth
at the end of life shows a high degree of positive skewness. For both single
females and males, the average is between three and four times larger than
the median, while the p75/p25 ratios are 9.6 and 16.66 for females and males
respectively. For married individuals, the average is for both genders as well
between three and four times the median, while the p75/p25 ratios are 10.71
and 8.88 for females and males respectively. Looking at the values in the 99th
percentile column, there very high values for all demographic groups. Espe-
cially for married males, which explains the relatively high average for this
group. The possibility to capture this percentile accurately is a strong ad-
vantage of administrative data, since the top 1% is usually underrepresented
in survey data. Furthermore, observing the whole distribution allows investi-
gating to what extent the bequest motive has a wealth gradient. This implies
an advantage vis-a`-vis Kopczuk’s study since he only observes individuals
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above the minimum estate tax threshold.15
4.3.3 Lifetime Income
There are two crucial variables to control for in the present study: age and
lifetime income. That is because both are very likely related to health status
and wealth simultaneously.16 To measure lifetime income, Kopczuk uses as a
proxy personal labour income observed for one period between five and ten
years before death. In the present study I observe yearly total income at the
household level for the period between 2003 and the year previous to death.
Additionally, for every year I know which is the main source of income of the
household. With this information, I generate a proxy for lifetime income by
applying the following rule: if the main source of income in the year previous
to death is not pension income, I take the average of equivalized household
income between 2003 and the year previous to death; if the main source of
income in the year previous to death is pension income, then I just take
equivalized household income corresponding to that particular year.17 This
strategy is based on Knoef et al. (2013), who using data for the Netherlands
argue that pension income is a particularly good proxy for lifetime income.18
To account for the two different methodologies employed to measure lifetime
income, I generate a dummy variable indicating which methodology is used
for each decedent and include it in all regressions.
4.4 Econometric Model
Following Kopczuk (2007) I estimate the effect of length of illness on wealth
using a cross-section of deaths occured between 2006 and 2010. The regression
15This threshold corresponded in 1977 to 360 thousand 2007 US Dollars. Kopczuk’s sam-
ple includes 29407 individuals who’s estate tax returns were filled in 1977, which represents
6% of all adult decedents in the period covered by his sample.
16It has been well documented in the economic literature that there is a link between
wealth and health (e.g. Attanasio and Emmerson, 2003). However, as argued by Kopczuk
(2007), properly controlling for lifetime income should allow to clear the direct effect of
wealth on health status at the end of life.
17I equivalize household income by dividing yearly income by the square root of the
number of members in the household in that year. I apply this transformation because in
many cases household structure experiences changes during the years previous to death.
18Knoef et al. (2013) show that the variance of income shocks is smaller for retirees than
for working individuals, and that income shocks are more persistent for retirees. For these
reasons they argue that pension income is a specially good proxy for lifetime income.
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equation I estimate is the following








iβ4 + εi, (4.1)
where NFWi is household net financial wealth at the end of life for individual
i; D i is a vector including variables that distinguish between expected and
unexpected deaths and measure length of illness; X 1i is a vector of controls
including age dummies (the age groups are: younger than 65, between 65
and 80, and older than 80), the proxy for lifetime income, and the delay-in-
measurement variable described in Section 4.3.1; X 2i is a vector containing
children variables; t i contains a set of dummies controlling for the year of
death, and εi is the individual-specific error term. Since both age and year of
death are both controlled for, I are indirectly controlling as well for cohort
effects. I estimate Equation (4.1) for each age and marital status group as
defined in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.19 Appendix 4.A provides variable definitions
and summary statistics by demographic group for all variables used in the
analysis.
The vector D i is composed of three elements, i.e. D i = (D1i, D2i, D3i),
where D1i is a discrete length of illness variable that takes values from zero to
ten years (see Figure 4.1); D2i is a dummy variable taking value one for ob-
servations with more than ten years in length of illness (if D2i = 1, D1i = 0);
and D3i is a a frailty dummy (described in Section 4.3.1). D3i takes value one
for those for whom D1i = 0 but had at least one non-COD-related hospital
visit during the year of death or the year previous to death. The control group
(unexpected deaths) is thus composed by those with D1i = D2i = D3i = 0,
while the treatment group (expected deaths) is composed by those with ei-
ther D1i > 0 or D2i = 1. I am interested in estimating the coefficients for D1i
and D2i, for which I expect to find negative signs indicating the presence of
deathbed estate planning triggered by the expectation of a near death.
The vector with children variables, X 2i, is one of the main additions
with respect to Kopczuk’s model. It contains the number of children of the
decedent, as well as the average lifetime income of the children, and their av-
erage age. To compute the lifetime income of the children I follow the same
methodology described in Section 4.3.3.20 First of all, I estimate Equation
(4.1) assuming β3 = 0 and thus excluding X 2i. In that way, I start with a
19In the singles regressions, the vector X 1i also contains a set of dummy variables con-
trolling for marital status within singlehood, i.e. never married, divorced/separated, or
widowed.
20I compute life time income only for children that live outside of the parental household.
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model the most similar possible to Kopczuk’s. Upon including the children
variables, I do not expect the estimates of β1 to change substantially.
21 Be-
sides controlling for X 2 I check for its interactions with Di to study whether
the presence, the number of children, and their economic situation are factors
that trigger early bequests.
Since the sample is composed by random draws from the Dutch popu-
lation, I assume that the error term εi is independent across observations.
However, since the net worth distribution is highly skewed, I do not assume
homoskedasticity of εi. To deal with the skewness of the dependent variable
and the heteroskedasticity of εi, I apply quantile regression with bootstrapped
standard errors to estimate the coefficients in Equation (4.1). In that aspect,
the analysis in the present study substantially differs from Kopczuk’s. Since
he only observes individuals above the minimum estate tax threshold, he re-
lies on truncated regression techniques to estimate average effects. Compared
to OLS, quantile regression has the advantage that is not sensitive to out-
liers. More interestingly, it allows focusing on particular segments of the net
worth distribution when estimating the effect of interest.22 This last aspect
is specially relevant since I expect the extent of estate planning to increase




Table 4.3 shows the baseline results of the analysis. The first two rows pro-
vide the OLS estimates of the impact of variables D1 and D2.
23 Column (4)
shows that OLS estimates yield a significant effect only of D2 for married
males. The estimated effect is -30.10 thousand Euros (about 27% of the aver-
age net financial wealth at death for married males as reported in Table 4.2),
indicating that a length of terminal illness of more than ten years decreases
average net financial wealth at death by that amount. However, as explained
21The only reason to think the addition of X 2i in the set of control variables could change
the estimate of β1 is a potential relationship between fertility and health outcomes later in
life
22For more on the motivations behind the use of quantile regression in a context of
skewness and heteroskedasticity, see Koenker (2005) and Angrist and Pischke (2009).
23Appendix 4.D provides full estimation results for the median regression. Results for
OLS estimation and for other quantiles do not differ substantially from those reported in
Appendix 4.D. The only remarkable feature is that the pseudo-R2 increases for the higher
quantiles of the distribution. Full results are available upon request.
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in Section 4.4, due to skewness of the dependent variable, quantile effects are
more interesting than average effects. I estimate the effects at the 10th, 25th,
50th, 75th, 90th, 95th and 99th percentiles of the distribution. The estimates
are reported in Table 4.3.24 I estimate these quantile effects simultaneously
for each demographic group and test for differences in coefficient estimates
across quantiles. Only D2 appears to have significantly different effects across
quantiles and only for married males. Therefore, in what follows I focus on
the results for that particular demographic group.
Quantile regression results in Table 4.3 show that only the effect of D2 is
statistically significant, indicating that length of illness has to be larger than
ten years to have an impact.25 Figures 4.2 and 4.3 complement Table 4.3
showing the estimates for D1 and D2 across the hole net financial wealth dis-
tribution. Column (4) in Table 4.3 and Panel (d) in Figure 4.3 show that the
estimated effect of D2 becomes increasingly large with net financial wealth.
From the 10th up to the 90th percentile the effect increases moderately but
persistently. Above the 90th percentile there is a smooth but sharp increase
leading to an estimate for the 99th percentile of -255.81 thousand Euros.
That estimate means that for the richest 1% having a terminal illness longer
than ten years implies a decrease in net financial wealth of around 25% of
the 99th percentile cut-off value in Table 4.2.
Note that I find clear statistical significance only around the median and
at the top of the distribution. That is because quantile regression requires
sufficient observations around the percentile of interest. The median effect is
significantly estimated since many observations cluster around the median.
Towards the top of the distribution observations are more dispersed and thus
I obtain larger standard errors. That is why at the 90th percentile there is no
statistical significance even though the point estimate is substantially larger
compared to the median. Nevertheless, at the top of the distribution, the ef-
fect is large enough so that statistical significance can be obtained even when
observations are highly dispersed.
Following Kopczuk, I interpret these results as early bequests that re-
sult from estate planning triggered by the onset of a terminal illness. Since
24For Economy of space, the 10th and the 25th percentiles are excluded from Table
4.3. For those percentiles the estimated effects are not statistically significant. Results are
available upon request.
25The results show that D1 has a significant impact in a few regressions for some of the
demographic groups. For example, p50 for singles females and at p90 for married females
Table 4.3 shows significant effects. However, these effects are usually very small and are not
significantly different across quantiles. Therefore, they do not lead to a clear conclusion.
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Table 4.3 Results: Baseline
Dependent Variable: Net Financial Wealth at the End of Life
Single Single Married Married
Females Males Females Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS D1 1.51 -1.28 -1.70 -0.37
(1.84) (1.61) (1.48) (2.81)
D2 -6.51 -23.34 -18.07 -30.10*
(10.80) (15.29) (13.42) (17.38)
p50 D1 -0.63*** -0.23 -0.08 -0.20
(0.170) (0.23) (0.52) (0.29)
D2 -0.12 -3.88 -0.95 -6.60***
(2.12) (2.72) (3.24) (2.20)
p75 D1 -0.90 -0.90 -1.09 -0.68
(0.56) (0.76) (0.92) (0.83)
D2 -6.45 -5.30 -10.96 -13.30**
(4.87) (8.93) (10.90) (6.09)
p90 D1 -0.19 -2.00 -5.19** 0.42
(1.49) (2.52) (2.66) (1.17)
D2 -9.36 -18.99 -19.67 -23.57
(10.19) (35.76) (29.23) (21.33)
p95 D1 1.10 -3.94 0.49 -3.16
(2.47) (5.97) (5.31) (4.22)
D2 -26.10 -7.94 -38.56 -53.21**
(16.42) (53.90) (39.69) (23.14)
p99 D1 0.27 17.60 -2.51 -11.69
(17.27) (23.45) (15.49) (16.00)
D2 18.74 -77.24 43.93 -255.81***
(61.46) (86.88) (122.53) (106.33)
Obs. 2658 1402 1717 3843
Notes: For the ease of interpretation, the dependent variable is measured in thousands of
Euros. For the OLS estimates, robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. For the
quantile regression estimates, bootstrapped standard errors (with a thousand bootstrap
replications) are reported in parenthesis. *Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the
5% level, ***significant at the 1% level.
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Figure 4.2 Quantile Regression Estimates D1
(a) Single Females (b) Single Males
(c) Married Females (d) Married Males
Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the percentiles of the net financial wealth distribution, while
the vertical axis indicates the size of the coefficient estimate. All coefficients are given in thousands
of Euros. For the sake of exposition, the sign of the coefficients is reversed.
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Figure 4.3 Quantile Regression Estimates D2
(a) Single Females (b) Single Males
(c) Married Females (d) Married Males
Notes: The horizontal axis indicates the percentiles of the net financial wealth distribution, while
the vertical axis indicates the size of the coefficient estimate. All coefficients are given in thousands
of Euros. For the sake of exposition, the sign of the coefficients is reversed.
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I expect to observe estate planning especially among the very rich, this in-
terpretation of the result is strengthened by the fact that I indeed find a
strong and statistically significant effect at the top of the distribution. It is
reasonable that I only find an effect for married individuals if it is considered
that most singles in the sample are either widowed or divorced, which implies
they have been through a shock that may have already reduced their wealth
considerably.26 It is reasonable as well that, within the married category,
I only find an effect for males if it is consider that most individuals dying
while married in the sample are in fact males. That is consequence of the fact
that females have a higher life expectancy than males. These results match
with those in Kopczuk’s study since he also finds a stronger effect among
married males. However, due to missing data on income his results on other
demographic groups do not lead to a clear conclusion.
4.5.2 Age Interaction
Table 4.4 shows the results for married males when interacting D1 and D2
with the three age dummies included in the baseline regression (the age
groups are: younger than 65, between 65 and 80, and older than 80). Kopczuk
(2007) argues that, since younger individuals have a longer expected lifetime
horizon, when contracting a terminal illness they are less likely to have en-
gaged in any previous estate planning. This implies that they may react more
strongly when contracting an illness compared to older individuals. Further-
more, for younger individuals the control group is more meaningful, since
those who die young and unexpectedly are less likely have engaged in any
estate planning compared to older individuals who die unexpectedly.
Table 4.4 shows the same regressions as in Column (4) of Table 4.3, but
decomposed into the three age groups. I interact D1 and D2 with the age
dummies and compute the corresponding effects for each age group.27 Once
again I find only clearly significant effects across the net financial wealth dis-
tribution for D2. Comparing the three columns in Table 4.4 shows that at the
median there is a significant effect only for the middle aged and older groups.
26Table 4.A.2 in Appendix 4.A shows that out of those who die single in the sample,
46% of women are either widowed or divorced, while that is the case for 62% of men. Sevak
et al. (2003) and Poterba et al. (2015) for the US and van Ooijen et al. (2015) for the
Netherlands show that divorce and widowhood are often associated with substantial drops
in wealth. Table 4.D.1 in Appendix 4.D shows that in the sample singles who are divorced
or widowed die with significantly less wealth compared to those who never married.
27This means estimates for each percentile in Table 4.4 correspond to one single regression
with 3843 observations.
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Table 4.4 Results: Age Interaction for Married Males
Dependent Variable: Net Financial Wealth at the End of Life
Age<65 65≤Age<80 Age≥80
(1) (2) (3)
OLS D1 -1.65 2.48 -2.77
(5.55) (4.79) (4.17)
D2 -5.10 -19.26 -45.68*
(55.24) (26.06) (25.46)
p50 D1 0.60 0.03 -0.74*
(0.80) (0.37) (0.45)
D2 -1.37 -6.01* -8.10*
(7.13) (3.22) (4.57)
p75 D1 -1.40 -0.03 -1.40
(1.10) (1.12) (1.25)
D2 -2.47 -16.32** -9.94
(13.81) (7.16) (15.03)
p90 D1 -1.20 2.76 -1.20
(3.96) (3.59) (4.10)
D2 -3.27 -15.88 -35.00
(28.07) (25.21) (28.41)
p95 D1 -0.54 -0.12 -2.55
(6.43) (7.41) (6.26)
D2 -59.68* -22.18 -58.90
(33.81) (41.38) (41.96)
p99 D1 -50.90 1.61 -11.61
(50.49) (40.08) (18.01)
D2 -544.99** -368.27** -244.82
(242.99) (158.31) (162.95)
Obs. 687 1694 1462
Notes: For the ease of interpretation, the dependent variable is measured in thousands of
Euros. For the OLS estimates robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. For the
quantile regression estimates, bootstrapped standard errors (with a thousand bootstrap
replications) are reported in parenthesis. Each row reports one regression in which D1
and D2 are interacted with the three age groups. Marginal effects are provided by net
worth percentile and age group. Each regression includes 3843 observations and the last
row provides the number of observations for each subgroup. *Significant at the 10% level,
**significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level.
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However, at the top of the distribution, the effect of D2 is clearly larger and
more significant for the younger group. More specifically, at the top of the
distribution I find that, for the younger group, having a terminal illness of
more than ten years reduces net financial wealth at death by close to 0.55
million Euros. At the 99th percentile, I find as well a significant effect for the
middle aged group of -368.27 thousand Euros, which is substantially smaller
compared to the effect estimated for the younger group but still large. I find
the effects around the median difficult to interpret. However, the results at
the top of the distribution are consistent with Kopczuk’s argument stating
that the effect will be stronger for younger individuals, and with the idea
that estate planning is specially relevant among the very rich.
4.5.3 Children Interactions
Table 4.5 shows the results obtain for married males when including the chil-
dren variables (i.e. number of children, average age of children, and average
lifetime income of children) as controls in the regression, and when interacting
D1 and D2 with the number of children. The first row in that table shows that
when the children variables are introduced the results change slightly but not
substantially. The coefficient estimates for the effect of D2 become generally
somewhat smaller and less statistically significant compared to those in Col-
umn (4) of Table 4.3. This change may be due to the presence of a relation
between fertility and health outcomes later in life. However, investigating
this issue is beyond the scope of the present study. To interact the number
of children I generate three dummy variables dividing the sample into three
groups: those with no children, those with one child, and those with two or
more children. I interact the dummies with both D1 and D2 and report the
estimated effects for each group.
Table 4.5 shows that the estimated effect is strongest for those individuals
who have one child at time of death. For this group I estimate a significantly
negative effect of D2 at the median and at all other percentiles above it.
At the 99th percentile, I find that a terminal illness of above ten years long
triggers a decline in wealth of about 525.81 Euros. At that same percentile, I
also find an effect for those who have two or more children at the moment of
death. This effect is however less strong and less statistically significant com-
pared to the one for the group with only one child. This results is difficult to
explain. However, it shows that the estimated effect comes solely from those
individuals who die with at least one child.
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Table 4.5 Results: Number of Children Interaction for Married Males
Dependent Variable: Net Financial Wealth at the End of Life
No Interaction N. Children=0 N. Children=1 N. Children≥2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS D1 -0.34 10.21 8.47 -2.27
(2.71) (21.03) (11.78) (2.92)
D2 -28.74 -121.54 -56.40 -17.80
(18.03) (86.96) (43.58) (18.61)
p50 D1 -0.21 0.07 -0.25 -0.27
(0.29) (1.18) (0.81) (0.31)
D2 -5.54*** -15.21 -9.93* -4.48**
(2.11) (21.58) (-4.48) (2.26)
p75 D1 -0.73 2.25 -0.87 -0.88
(0.85) (4.08) (2.66) (0.90)
D2 -14.75*** -8.50 -28.28*** -10.27
(5.42) (50.13) (50.14) (7.25)
p90 D1 -0.633.11 -4.37 1.60 -0.41
(2.64) (6.87) (7.09) (2.97)
D2 -34.29** -47.32 -55.37** -27.78
(16.05) (142.42) (23.01) (20.63)
p95 D1 -2.98 -30.40* -4.88 -0.33
(4.04) (1.68) (8.89) (4.56)
D2 -49.53** -216.04 -107.65** -34.61
(21.96) (140.72) (33.95) (23.26)
p99 D1 -9.37 -16.82 -13.41 -14.35
(14.59) (185.37) (157.46) (16.36)
D2 -206.00* -147.39 -525.81*** -184.44*
(111.00) (99.23) (185.97) (104.94)
Obs. 3843 316 447 3073
Notes: For the ease of interpretation, the dependent variable is measured in thousands of Euros.
For the OLS estimates robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. For the quantile
regression estimates, bootstrapped standard errors (with a thousand bootstrap replications)
are reported in parenthesis. All quantile regressions are estimated simultaneously. Each row in
Columns (2) to (4) reports one regression in which D1 and D2 are interacted with the three
subgroups. Marginal effects are provided by net worth percentile and number-of-children group.
Each regression includes 3843 observations and the last row provides the number of observations
for each subgroup. *Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at
the 1% level.
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Table 4.6 Results: Children’s Income Interaction for Married Males
Dependent Variable: Net Financial Wealth at the End of Life
1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS D1 1.88 3.28 -1.62 2.04
(3.30) (3.54) (3.92) (7.23)
D2 17.56 1.40 -26.98 -26.68
(30.35) (25.84) (26.39) (51.60)
p50 D1 -0.05 0.48 -0.81 0.12
(0.40) (0.47) (0.52) (0.81)
D2 -0.73 -6.01* -4.94 -1.32
(3.50) (3.55) (3.54) (8.91)
p75 D1 -0.50 0.15 -2.56* -0.54
(1.70) (1.13) (1.44) (2.17)
D2 -8.89 -20.50** -24.40** 22.56
(7.60) (9.48) (11.27) (19.61)
p90 D1 2.92 1.66 -0.98 -1.40
(4.42) (4.32) (7.24) (6.16)
D2 -5.08 -32.91 -62.81*** -18.28
(38.99) (30.31) (23.78) (40.53)
p95 D1 -0.75 5.03 6.87 -4.95
(7.20) (9.92) (12.90) (9.99)
D2 -27.17 -65.61 -121.65*** -23.78
(49.92) (49.26) (39.13) (145.58)
p99 D1 -28.31 -8.79 10.54 -8.23
(30.85) (30.67) (54.82) (68.57)
D2 -432.58*** -351.08** -500.98*** -68.10
(137.18) (139.44) (136.80) (126.61)
Obs. 795 795 795 795
Notes: For the ease of interpretation, the dependent variable is measured in thousands of Euros.
For the OLS estimates robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. For the quantile
regression estimates, bootstrapped standard errors (with a thousand bootstrap replications) are
reported in parenthesis. Each row reports one regression in which D1 and D2 are interacted with
the each quantile group. Marginal effects are thus provided by net worth percentile and income
quartile of children. Each regression includes 3843 observations and the last row provides the
number of observations for each subgroup. Results for the group of individuals with no children
outside of the household are not provided. *Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the
5% level, ***significant at the 1% level.
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Table 4.6 shows the results obtained for married males when interacting
D1 and D2 with average lifetime income of children. To that end, I take the
average lifetime income of children at time of death, divide the distribution of
this variable into quartiles, and generate a dummy variable for each quartile.
Average lifetime income of children is only computed for those who have at
least one child outside of the household at time of death. Table 4.6 reports
thus the estimated interaction effects for married males conditional on at
least having one child living outside of the household at time of death.
The results in Table 4. 6 show that D2 has only an effect for individu-
als with children whose average lifetime income is within the three bottom
quartiles of the distribution. Between the median and the 95th percentile of
the net financial wealth distribution I find significant effects only for those
with children in the second and third quartiles of the income distribution.
However, at the 99th percentile, I also find a very strong effect for those with
children at the bottom quartile of the income distribution. In all cases I do
not find an effect for individuals whose children are at the top quartile of the
distribution, i.e. those with children with relatively high incomes. This result
is consistent with individuals caring about the income level of their children
when making decisions about estate planning and early bequests. This is in
line with a branch of the economic literature which indicates that parental
transfers have a strong negative correlation with income of the children (e.g.,
Laitner and Juster, 1996; Laitner, 2002; and McGarry, 2016).
4.6 Conclusions and Discussion
In this chapter I use Dutch administrative data to empirically identify the
presence of a bequest motive for saving. To do so, I follow Kopczuk (2007)
and compare net financial wealth at time of death between expected and
unexpected deaths. Splitting the sample by gender and marital status and
employing quantile regression, I do find a negative effect of expected deaths
on wealth at death. However, the analysis only yields a clear effect for married
males whose death is preceded by an illness above ten years long. I estimate
significant effects around the median and at the top of the net financial wealth
distribution. Since age and lifetime income are controlled for, and the Dutch
setting prevents any major role of medical expenditures and income shocks
interfering in the analysis, I follow Kopczuk (2007) and interpret this result
as early bequests that result from estate planning in the expectation of a
near death. According to Kopczuk’s interpretation, this behaviour reflects
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the presence of a bequest motive for saving.
The estimated effect at the top of the wealth distribution is specially
strong for those who are younger than 65 years at the moment of death.
Following Kopczuk’s interpretation, since younger individuals have a longer
expected remaining lifetime horizon compared to older individuals, upon con-
tracting a terminal illness they are less likely to have engaged in any previous
estate planning. Therefore, finding a stronger effect for that group is consis-
tent with the results responding to estate planning. Furthermore, finding
evidence at the top of the wealth distribution coincides with a recurrent view
in the literature that classifies bequests as a luxury good (e.g., see Kopczuk
and Lupton, 2007; and De Nardi and Yang, 2014).
Regarding the interaction with children and their characteristics, I find
that the effect comes solely from individuals who have at least one child at
time of death. Furthermore, conditional on having children living outside of
the household, the effect is only significant for individuals whose children
are below the 75th percentile of the lifetime income distribution. This result
suggests that individuals do care about the economic situation of their chil-
dren when making decisions about saving and bequests. This is in line with
a branch of the economic literature (e.g. Laitner and Juster, 1996; Laitner,
2002; and McGarry, 2016) which finds that income negatively correlates with
recipiency of parental transfers.
It is reasonable that I only find an effect for married individuals if it is
considered that more than 50% of singles in the sample are either widowed
or divorced, implying that they have been through a shock that is likely
to have already reduced their wealth considerably.28 An additional possible
explanation for finding an effect only for married individuals is that, in the
Netherlands, intestacy implies that all wealth is left to the spouse. Therefore,
if individuals want to make sure that part of the wealth is left to the chil-
dren, they might start transferring that wealth in the expectation of a near
death. It is reasonable as well that, within the married category, I only find
an effect for males considering that most individuals dying while married in
the sample are males, which is a consequence of their lower life expectancy
compared to females.
Given a bequest motive for saving, there are two reasons to think why
individuals would start transferring part of the estate in the expectation of a
near death. The first is tax avoidance, while the second is exertion of control
28Several studies (e.g. Sevak et al., 2003; Poterba et al., 2015; and van Ooijen et al.,
2015) find a negative effect of divorce and widowhood on wealth.
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over recipiency and use of transfers. As shown in Appendix 4.E, in the Nether-
lands, there is a progressive inheritance tax system that allows avoiding taxes
if the estate is split into parts and transferred over time. This suggests tax
avoidance may play an important role in explaining the estimated results.
However, investigating whether tax avoidance plays a role or not is beyond
the scope of the present study. Regardless of the set of conditions necessary to
trigger bequest planning, I follow Kopczuk and interpret that this behaviour
responds in any case to a bequest motive for saving. The Dutch inheritance
tax code described in Appendix 4.E experienced a significant reform in 2010
which made it less progressive. Exploiting this reform to investigate the ex-
tent of inheritance tax avoidance is an interesting venue for future research.
The interpretation of the results relies on out of pocket medical expen-
ditures, as well as non-medical consumption, not playing a mediating role
in the relation between expected death and wealth at the end of life. Even
though the Dutch health care system prevents any major role of out of pocket
medical expenditures, Bakx et al. (2016) show that in a given year the lat-
ter represent around 5% of total medical expenditures. Even though this
is a very low proportion, it still could imply that the results are partially
driven by wealthy individuals incurring additional medical expenditures to
receive treatment in special conditions. Furthermore, the results can also be
explained by individuals adjusting their rate of time preference and thus in-
creasing non-medical consumption at the end of life. However, there is a large
stream of literature, surveyed by Finkelstein et al. (2009), which argues that
bad health has actually a negative effect on non-medical consumption since it
reduces it’s marginal utility. In fact, van Ooijen et al. (2016) show using data
on Dutch retirees that sickness diminishes non-medical consumption. There-
fore, it can be argued that a negative effect of expected death on wealth at
death is estimated despite the negative effect of bad health on non-medical
consumption.
In future work, I intend to further clarify these issues by enlarging the
sample to the whole universe of deaths occurred between 2006 and 2010, and
by expanding the study in the present chapter in two ways. First, by refining
the distinction between expected and unexpected deaths taking into account
causes of death and types of disease. This will allow applying the definition
of sudden death employed by Andersen and Nielsen (2010),29 as well as iden-
tifying certain illnesses that are more or less likely to cause death in the short
29Based on medical literature Andersen and Nielsen (2010) define a set of causes of death
that they classify as sudden deaths.
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term. Second, I will expand the present study by investigating how the wealth
of decedents evolves during the last years of life. The wealth data go back
only to 2005. However, they can at least be exploited to study whether the
observed decline in wealth takes place between 2005 and the year of death.
I will investigate whether such declines coincide with increases in children’s
wealth, which would potentially allow separating the role of transfers and
consumption in explaining the estimated results.
In addition, future work is required to further clarify the role of length of
illness. The results of the analysis conducted in this chapter show that only
deaths preceded by a very long term illness (above ten years) are associated
with lower wealth at time of death. However, the way I codify length of ill-
ness does not rule out an effect when length of illness is slightly shorter than
ten years. Therefore, in future work I will examine in further detail what is
the exact length of illness above which a significant effect is estimated. Re-
gardless of all the alternative explanations that require further investigation,
the present study represents a meaningful expansion of the work by Kopczuk




4.A Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics




Sum of deposits, saving accounts, stocks and bonds, minus
non-mortgage debt. Measured at the 31st of December of
the year previous to death.
D1 Discrete variable measuring length of illness in years.
Length of illness is defined as the time between diagno-
sis and death. Takes values from zero to ten and years are
rounded upwards.
D2 Dummy variable taking value one for decedents with more
than ten years in length of illness.
D3 Dummy variable taking value one if D1 = 0 but the dece-
dent had at least one non-cause-of-death-related hospital
visit during the year of death or the year previous to death
Marital status Marital status of single decedents. 1: Never Married; 2: Di-
vorced or Separated; 3: Widowed.
Age 1: age<65; 2: 5≤age<80; 3:age≥80.
Permanent income If main source of income the year previous of death is not
pension income: average of yearly equivalized household in-
come between 2003 and the year previous to death. If main
source of income the year previous to death is pension in-
come: equivalized household income at the year previous to
death. Income is equivalized by taking by diving it by the
square root of the number of members in the household.
Delay Measure in days of the delay between wealth measurement
and time of death. Wealth measurement corresponds to the
31st of December of the year previous to death.
N of children Number of children at time of death.
Avg. age of
children
Average age of the children of the decedent.
Avg. permanent
income of children
Average permanent income of the children of the decedent.
Permanent income is comupted using the same method as
for the permanent income of the decendent.
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Table 4.A.2 Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median St. dev. Min. Max.
Single Females (2658 observations)
Net financial wealth 69.52 17.63 283.35 -3009.72 6493.24
D1 1.19 0 2.49 0 10
D2 0.06 - - - -
D3 0.21 - - - -
Marital status
Never married 0.54 - - - -
Divorced or separated 0.07 - - - -
Widowed 0.39 - - - -
Age
Age<65 0.07 - - - -
65≤Age<80 0.17 - - - -
Age≥80 0.76 - - - -
Permanent income 18.61 15.77 10.35 -6.51 190.95
Delay 177.74 178 107.90 0 365
Number of children 2.46 2 1.96 0 7
Avg. age of children 53.29 54.50 9.50 2 76
Avg. p. income of children 16.20 147.77 7.63 -0.45 116.68
Single Males (1402 observations)
Net financial wealth 65.75 17.714 215.84 -460.75 3951.64
D1 1.31 0 2.55 0 10
D2 0.05 - - - -
D3 0.19 - - - -
Marital status
Never married 0.38 - - - -
Divorced or separated 0.19 - - - -
Widowed 0.43 - - - -
Age
Age<65 0.19 - - - -
65≤Age<80 0.29 - - - -
Age≥80 0.53 - - - -
Permanent income 20.21 17.40 11.27 0 187.19
Delay 177.17 176 108.42 0 365
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Table 4.A.2 Summary Statistics (Continuation)
Variable Mean Median St. dev. Min. Max.
Number of children 1.91 2 1.82 0 7
Avg. age of children 47.54 48.90 11.11 2 73
Avg. p. income of children 15.12 13.77 7.47 0.28 71.10
Married females (1717 observations)
Net Financial wealth 74.84 24.24 209.72 -2257.79 3782.06
D1 1.62 0 2.70 0 10
D2 0.05 - - - -
D3 0.17 - - - -
Age
Age<65 0.30 - - - -
65≤Age<80 0.40 - - - -
Age≥80 0.30 - - - -
Permanent income 20.83 18.10 9.93 -5.41 93.82
Delay 183.56 187 107.35 0 365
Number of children 2.39 2 1.49 0 7
Avg. age of children 41.19 43.20 11.94 0 68
Avg. p. income of children 14.33 13.54 6.71 -69.85 62.40
Married Males (3843 observations)
Net Financial wealth 107.53 27.18 686.82 -1646.26 10357.90
D1 1.49 0 2.60 0 10
D2 0.07 - - - -
D3 0.16 - - - -
Age
Age<65 0.18 - - - -
65≤Age<80 0.44 - - - -
Age≥80 0.38 - - - -
Permanent income 21.12 18.22 12.25 -1.58 378.40
Delay 181.74 180 109.21 0 365
Number of children 2.53 2 1.53 0 7
Avg. age of children 42.15 43.50 10.68 0 71.33
Avg. p. income of children 14.85 13.50 7.81 -5.65 201.29
Notes: All summary statistics are based on the number of observations reported in Table 4.2.
Except for the variables avg. age of children and avg. permanent income of children, which are
given conditional on having children, and conditional on having children outside of the household
respectively.
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4.B Cause of Death Classification
Table 4.B.1 Cause of Death Categories ICD-10
Category Frequency Percentage
Infectious diseases 129 1.3%
Neoplasms 3430 35.7%
Blood diseases 24 0.3%
Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases 276 2.9%
Mental and behavioural disorders 423 4.4%
Diseases of the nervous system 272 2.8%
Diseases of the circulatory system 2816 29.3%
Diseases of the respiratory system 916 9.5%
Diseases of the digestive system 370 3.9%
Diseases of the skin 25 0.3%
Diseases of the musculoskeletal system 55 0.6%
Diseases of the genitourinary system 231 2.4%
Congenital malformations 6 0.1%
Ill-defined conditions 328 3.4%
External causes of morbidity and mortality 318 3.3%
Notes: Causes of death are classified according to the 10th revision of the International Classi-
fication of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD-10), put together by the World Health
Organization. For more information, see WHO (2016).
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4.C Length of Illness by Gender and Marital Status
Figure 4.C.1 Histogram Length of Illness in Years
(a) Single Females (b) Single Males
(c) Married Females (d) Married Males
Notes: Zeros are excluded from all figures. Their frequency is 1784 in Panel (a), 890 in Panel (b),
932 in Panel (c), and 2113 in Panel (d).
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4.D Full Regression Results
Table 4.D.1 Full Results: Median Regression
Dependent Variable: Net Financial Wealth at the End of Life
Single Single Married Married
Females Males Females Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D1 0.63*** -0.23 0.42 -0.21
(0.16) (0.28) (0.41) (0.26)
D2 0.12 -3.88 2.31 -6.70***
(2.08) (3.14) (2.83) (2.25)
D3 -0.12 -1.20 -4.13 0.23





Age2 0.53 4.12*** 11.78*** 16.68***
(2.15) (1.56) (2.23) (1.96)
Age3 8.34*** 11.40*** 29.49*** 31.73***
(2.11) (2.38) (2.84) (2.31)
P.income 3.87*** 1.93*** 3.24*** 3.66***
(0.51) (0.27) (0.36) (0.23)
Delay 0.01* -0.03 -0.04 -9.39*
(0.00) (0.06) (0.08) (5.53)
2007 -3.78** 0.31 -2.10 0.23
(1.46) (2.17) (2.79) (2.03)
2008 -5.73*** -3.39* 4.36 1.24
(1.53) (1.76) (2.66) (2.24)
2009 -4.52** -1.16 -2.70 -5.12***
(2.01) (2.14) (2.84) (1.90)
2010 -4.79** -0.25 1.99 -2.79
(2.01) (2.44) (3.30) (1.81)
Ps.-R2 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.06
Obs. 2658 1402 1717 3843
Notes: For the ease of interpretation, the dependent variable is measured in thousands of Eu-
ros. Permanent Income is rescaled to thousands of Euros. Bootstrapped standard errors (with
a thousand bootstrap replications) are reported in parenthesis. *Significant at the 10% level,
**significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level.
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4.E Inheritance and Gift Taxation in the Netherlands
The inheritance and gift tax schedule described here was in place in the
Netherlands until 1st of January 2010, a new less progressive schedule was
put in place. For more details on the current tax schedule, see EY (2017).
Table 4.E.1 Gift and Inheritance Tax Rates
Brackets Partners Grandchildren Siblings Non-relatives
(thousands of BC) and children and parents
0-22 5% 8% 26% 41%
22-45 8% 13% 30% 45%
45-90 12% 19% 35% 50%
90-180 15% 24% 39% 54%
180-360 19% 30% 44% 59%
365-900 23% 37% 48% 63%
Above 900 27% 43% 53% 68%
Exemptions for gifts (thousands of Euros):
Children: 4.5
Children from 18 to 35 years (one-time): 23
Others: 3
Exemptions for inheritances (thousands of Euros):
Partners (married): 530
Partners (not married): 100-530 depending on the length of cohabitation
Children ≥ 23 years: 10 provided that inheritance < 27
Children < 23 years: 4.5 per year below 23, with a minimum of 10
Handicapped children ≥ 23 years: 10
Handicapped children < 23 years: 4.5 per year below 23, with a
minimum of 14
Parents: 45
Grandchildren: 10 provided that inheritance < 10
Others: 2
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In this chapter I keep paying attention to bequests and inheritances but shift
the perspective from the donor to the receiver. The aim of the study in this
chapter is to analyse how individuals react to inheritance receipt in terms of
their consumption, labour supply and retirement choices. Studying this issue
is relevant for two main reasons. First, it has potential implications for any
public policy that induces changes in wealth such as pension and tax reforms.
There is a large literature that exploits diverse sources of variation in wealth
to assess the effect of such policy reforms (e.g. Imbens et al., 2001; Coile
and Levine, 2006; and Cesarini et al., 2015). The case of inheritances is par-
ticularly interesting since taking into account how they affect labour supply
and/or consumption can help optimally calibrate estate taxation. Second, it
has implications for the literature estimating the contribution of inheritances
to wealth accumulation and wealth inequality (e.g. Wolff, 2002; Brown and
Weisbenner, 2004; and Boserup et al., 2016). This literature largely assumes
that individuals fully save inheritances and transfers. To the extent that in-
heritances are spent by increasing consumption and/or reducing work effort,
ignoring these effects may bias both the estimate of their share of total wealth
and of their effect on wealth inequality.
Most literature studying the effects of inheritance receipt has so far fo-
cused on labour supply responses (e.g. Joulfaian and Wilhelm, 1994; Sila and
Sousa, 2014; and Bø et al., 2018). In the present study, I take a more holistic
*This chapter is based on Suari-Andreu (2018).
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approach and focus on how individuals trade off between multiple possible
responses to inheritance receipt. To that end, I construct a formal life cycle
model based on Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) in which a representative indi-
vidual makes decisions about consumption, leisure and retirement. Following
Joulfaian (2006) and Eder (2016), I introduce an inheritance as a transitory
shock to lifetime income and study how the individual responds.1 I show
that if the inheritance is unexpected and large enough it will have an effect
upon receipt. According to her preference for consumption vis-a`-vis leisure
and retirement, the individual will trade off the different possible responses
the model considers.
To test the implications of the model I employ data from the Survey on
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), which follows Euro-
pean individuals aged 50 plus over six biennial waves taking place between
2004 and 2015. I exploit the panel structure of the survey by using waves
one to six and I include only the ten countries that are present in all the
waves I use.2 The SHARE contains information on a variety of aspects of
household’s behaviour. Most importantly, it contains information on inheri-
tances. Respondents are asked whether they (or their spouse) have received
an inheritance or transfer of five thousand Euros or more in the past, from
whom they received it and when.3 Furthermore, the SHARE provides infor-
mation on labour market status, hours worked, and consumption, which al-
lows generating the dependent variables of interest. Regarding consumption,
the SHARE provides consistently over all waves only information on food
consumption. Given this limitation, I follow Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994)
and assume that food expenditures provide a reasonable representation of
the total level of consumption of non-durables of a household.
My empirical strategy closely relies on the work by Brown et al. (2010).
The latter use the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and apply a reduced
form approach to investigate whether individuals respond to inheritance re-
ceipt by retiring earlier than expected. In general, the literature investigating
the effect of inheritances is not able to clearly distinguish between expected
1Joulfaian (2006) considers a very simple framework assuming exogenous labour supply,
while Eder (2016) constructs a model in which individuals can only react to inheritance
receipt by changing their retirement age.
2The third wave is excluded since it focuses on people’s life histories and does not contain
information on most of the variables used in the analysis.
3A question on the monetary amount of the inheritances or transfers received is present
in waves one and two but has been dropped since. For that reason, I do not use this
information in this study.
Chapter 5 141
and unexpected inheritances, which is a crucial aspect to take into account
when identifying their effect on life cycle choices. Using a question in HRS
about inheritance expectation, Brown et al. (2010) classify an inheritance as
unexpected if the receiver previously reported a zero chance of receiving an
inheritance in the near future. On the contrary, they classify it as expected
if the previously reported change of receiving an inheritance is above zero.4
The SHARE provides information on inheritance expectations, which allows
me to follow this same strategy. Furthermore, I introduce a new measure that
takes into account the continuous nature of inheritance expectations.
To study the effect of inheritances on retirement, I derive a reduced form
equation from the theoretical model which I estimate using a binary choice
model. Taking into account retirement expectations is a key element in this
analysis. That is because if inheritance receipt correlates with taste for retire-
ment, individuals may chose early retirement after inheriting simply because
they already planned it regardless of the inheritance. To solve this issue, I fol-
low Brown et al. (2010) and study whether unexpected inheritance receipt has
an effect not only on retiring, but on retiring earlier than expected as of wave
one. This approach hinges on the assumption that unobserved heterogeneity
in preference for early retirement is fully captured by the expected retirement
age. Closely relying on the theoretical model, I set up two additional spec-
ifications to estimate the effect of inheritance receipt on the wave-to-wave
changes in consumption and the intensive margin of labour supply. In this
case individual unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account by taking first
differences.
The present study contributes to the literature in two major ways. First,
this is the first study to thoroughly examine inheritance receipt in the context
of a formal life cycle model with three choice variables: consumption, leisure
and retirement. This approach allows a theoretical mapping of the trade-offs
individuals face when experimenting a transitory shock to their lifetime in-
come. Within this framework I study at the theoretical level how individuals
solve these trade-offs according to their preferences, which provides a solid
background for the empirical analysis. Second, this is the first study to em-
pirically investigate responses to inheritance receipt using a large European
panel. Eder (2016) has previously studied the effect of inheritance receipt on
4Two recent studies, i.e. Andersen and Nielsen (2010) and Elinder et al. (2016), pursue
an alternative strategy to identify unexpected inheritances: by employing administrative
data on cause of death they classify as unexpected those inheritances that result from
unexpected deaths.
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retirement using SHARE data. However, he only uses waves one to four and
does not take into account that individuals can also respond by lowering their
working hours and/or increasing consumption. In his study, Eder examines
the effect inheriting between waves one and four on the probability of being
retired at wave four. In doing that, he does not exploit information provided
in wave two. Therefore, he does not take into account that individuals might
receive the inheritance between waves two and four while already having re-
tired by wave two. If that is the case, one cannot claim a causal effect of
inheritance receipt on retirement. In this chapter, I show that taking retire-
ment at wave two into account and adding waves five and six in the analysis
changes Eder’s results substantially.
The results in this chapter show that estimated effects of inheritance re-
ceipt are in all cases not significantly different from zero. The precision of
the estimates allows ruling out any substantially large effects on retirement
and on the intensive margin of labour supply. For consumption the estimates
are less precise and thus it is more difficult to reach a conclusion. These
results imply that the findings by Brown et al. (2010), who conclude that
inheritance receipt increases chances of retiring by around 5%, cannot be
rejected using the SHARE. However, they are compatible with most of the
literature on labour supply effects of inheritance receipt. This literature usu-
ally reports effects that are either small or not significantly different from
zero (e.g. Joulfaian and Wilhelm, 1994; Sila and Sousa, 2014; and Bø et al.,
2018). Regarding the consumption analysis, more research needs to be done
since I cannot rule out large responses that could be relevant. Intuitively,
it makes sense to think of larger responses in terms of consumption, since
labour supply and retirement decisions are usually restricted by labour mar-
ket and social security regulations, while consumption is more discretionary.
The reminder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 reviews
the related literature and gives a broader motivation for the study. Section
5.3 presents the theoretical model and studies the introduction of a fully
expected and a fully unexpected inheritance. Section 5.4 describes the em-
pirical strategy that derives from the model. Section 5.5 describes de data.
Section 5.6 presents de results. Section 5.7 concludes and discusses different
possible explanations for the results that I find and the venues for future re-
search. The appendices provide variable definitions, summary statistics, full
regression results and extensions of the theoretical model.
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5.2 Related Literature
Studying behavioural responses to inheritance receipt has relevant implica-
tions for several strands of the economic literature. First of all, it is of rel-
evance for the literature estimating wealth effects. This literature aims at
finding evidence that can be used to asses policies that induce changes in
wealth such as pension and tax reforms. The main challenge is that changes
in wealth will generally be in some way or another endogenously related to
the behavioural response of interest. Therefore, this literature tends to ex-
ploit exogenous sources of wealth variation. For instance: unanticipated policy
changes that affect Social Security wealth (Krueger and Pischke, 1992), stock
market fluctuations (Coile and Levine, 2006; and McFall, 2011), lottery win-
nings (Imbens et al., 2001; and Cesarini et al., 2015) and tax rebates (Parker
et al., 2013). Next to this sources of variation in wealth, inheritances, as long
as they are unexpected, provide an additional possibility to study responses
to exogenous wealth shocks. The case of inheritances is in particular interest-
ing since, besides providing information to assess policies affecting household
wealth, understanding their effect can help optimally calibrate estate taxa-
tion.
In addition, behavioural responses to inheritance receipt are of relevance
for the literature studying the contribution of inheritances and inter-vivos
transfers to wealth accumulation (Modigliani, 1988; Kotlikoff, 1988; Gale
and Scholz, 1994; Brown and Weisbenner, 2004; and Piketty and Zucman,
2014) and wealth inequality (Wolff, 2002; Elinder et al., 2016; Boserup et al.,
2016; and Karagiannaki, 2017). These strands of literature largely assume
that individuals fully save inheritances and transfers, thus the share of trans-
fer wealth is typically estimated as the capitalized total value of inheritances
and transfers received in the past divided by total wealth. In case inheri-
tances increase consumption and/or reduce work effort, ignoring this effect
may bias upwards the estimates of their share of total wealth (Blinder, 1988).
Furthermore, if the effect is conditional on pre-inheritance wealth it will also
determine how inheritances affect wealth inequality (Elinder et al., 2016).
Previous literature investigating responses to inheriting has mostly fo-
cused on labour supply effects.5 In two early contributions, Holtz-Eakin et al.
(1993) and Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994) use US administrative data and
find a strong negative effect of receiving a large inheritance on labour force
participation and a weaker effect on hours worked. Other studies using ad-
5The literature on inheritances and labour supply is nicely reviewed by Cox (2014).
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ministrative tax data and/or survey data have followed, with a fast growing
literature during the last decade (Elinder et al., 2012; Sila and Sousa, 2014;
and Bø et al., 2018). While most of these studies focus on labour supply
measures such as hours worked and labour force participation, a recent sub-
trend in this literature pays specific attention to the effect of inheritances
on retirement (Brown et al., 2010; and Eder, 2016). Overall, the existing lit-
erature suggests that there is a negative effect, albeit small, of receiving an
inheritance on labour supply.
Parallel to the literature on labour supply responses, there are a few
studies that estimate the effect of inheritances on consumption. Joulfaian
and Wilhelm (1994) use US survey data to estimate the effect of inheritance
receipt on food consumption by families. They find a robust positive effect
that is however rather small. Joulfaian (2006) uses US administrative data on
estate and income tax returns and finds that they year right after inheriting,
wealth of heirs increases (vis-a`-vis pre-inheritance wealth) by substantially
less than the inherited amount. Which suggest that part of the inheritance is
spent right away. Elinder et al. (2016) use Swedish administrative data and
find a similar result. Interestingly, they find that those with the lowest level
of pre-inheritance wealth spend a higher share of the inheritance compared
to those at the top of the wealth distribution. Following a similar strategy,
Karagiannaki (2017) uses UK survey data to follow households over ten years
and finds that, by the end of the period, inheritors tend to have spent on av-
erage about a third of the amount they received.
Besides the literature studying labour supply and consumption responses
to inheriting, there are additional streams of literature studying the effects
on entrepreneurship (Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994; and Hurst and Lusardi, 2004),
stock market participation (Andersen and Nielsen, 2010) and bequest giving
(Cox and Stark, 2005; and Stark and Nicinska, 2015). These are responses
that should also be taken into account to fully understand how individuals
react to the receipt of an inheritance. However, they are beyond the scope of
this chapter’s study.
5.3 Theoretical Framework
The framework I propose is based on the one presented in Blundell and
MaCurdy (1999), the main difference being that I introduce retirement as a
choice variable. The retirement choice is introduced following the tradition of
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the option value models in the spirit of Stock and Wise (1990).6 Within this
setting I study the consequences of the receipt of a fully expected inheritance
and a fully unexpected inheritance. I consider only inheritances received
while individuals are not yet retired and employed in the labour market,
which allows focusing on the trade-offs between consumption, labour supply
and retirement responses.7
By studying inheritance receipt in a formal life cycle framework, I build
on the previous work by Joulfaian (2006), who considers a very stylized set-
ting to study the effect of inheritances on consumption assuming exogenous
labour supply, and Eder (2016), who constructs a model in which individuals
can only react to inheritance receipt by changing their retirement age. My
contribution consists in developing a more elaborated and comprehensive
theoretical framework which allows mapping how individuals react to an
inheritance shock when having multiple responses available.
5.3.1 Optimization Problem
Consider a setting with separability between consumption and leisure, nei-
ther income nor lifetime uncertainty, no liquidity constraints and no bequest
motive. Consider an individual that lives up to age L. Her lifetime utility is
defined as










(θ ln ct + φ) , (5.1)
where ct is consumption at age t = s, ..., L; lt = T − ht is hours of leisure
defined as the difference between T , the total time endowment in a year, and
hours of work ht; R is the retirement age which cannot be larger than the
mandatory retirement age M ; Dt is a factor determining the way in which
demographic variables scale consumption and leisure; ρ ≥ 0 is the rate of
time preference; 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 determines the weight the individuals gives to ct
relative to lt; and φ is the extra utility the individual gets from being retired,
6For applications of the option value model of retirement, see for instance Chan and
Stevens (2004), and Belloni and Alessie (2013).
7In this framework, inheritance receipt at retirement and after retirement can only
have an effect on consumption. Including this possibility would make the problem more
complicated since, as shown by the literature on the retirement-consumption puzzle (e.g.
Banks et al., 1998), retirement has usually substantial effects on consumption that should
be included in the model when studying inheritance receipt at or after retirement.
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which can be expressed as φ = (1− θ) lnT .8 The factor Dt takes the form
Dt = exp(δ0 + δ
′Zt), (5.2)
where δ0 is a an individual fixed effect and Zt is a vector of demographic
variables. Conditional on not being retired yet, at the initial age s the indi-




















where r is the constant interest rate, wt is the hourly wage rate, In is an
inheritance the individual receives at age n < R, y(R) is constant retire-
ment income, and As−1(1 + r) is initial wealth. Retirement income depends
on R in such a way that the present value of full retirement income, i.e.
[(L−R)y(R)] /(1 + r)t−s, increases with R and reaches its maximum level
at the mandatory retirement age M . To solve the model I first derive the
optimal path for ct and lt taking R as given. Then I discuss the trade-off the
individual faces when choosing the optimal R.
5.3.2 Consumption and Leisure Decision
5.3.2.1 Fully Expected Inheritance
If the individual has full awareness of the future inheritance, she sets an
optimal path for ct and lt already taking In into account. Allowing only an
interior solution for the leisure choice, thus discarding the lt<R = T scenario,











where λ is the marginal utility of lifetime income which summarizes all rel-
evant information affecting cs and ls from all periods other than s. For ages
8The elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the elasticity of substitution between ct
and lt are both assumed to be equal to one. Note that allowing the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution to differ from one results in non-separability between ct and lt.
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∀ t ∈ [s, ..., R) . (5.7)
Substituting Equations (5.4) to (5.7) in the budget constraint (5.3), allows
finding an expression for λ which can then be used to find a solution for the
optimal values of cs and ls. The latter are a function of r, ρ, θ, lifetime wages,
full retirement income, the lifetime path of Dt, R, and In.
9 The inheritance
is already taken into account from age s and it does not have an impact
upon receipt. The relative values of the parameters r and ρ determine how
the inheritance (jointly with the other components of lifetime income) is
allocated over time, while the preference parameter θ determines how it is
allocated between consumption and leisure.
5.3.2.2 Fully Unexpected Inheritance
In case the individual considers the chance of receiving an inheritance to
be zero at every age, the path chosen for ct and lt at age s is the same
as in Section 5.3.1.1 but setting In = 0. However, if the individual receives
an unexpected inheritance at age n < R, she then re-optimizes current and
future choices taking into account the new information. The effect of the








10 where the superscripts n and s indicate consumption and
leisure as planned at age n and s respectively.11 Keeping R fixed, the forecast












(1+r)t−n +An−1(1 + r)
+ 1, (5.8)
where λs and λn denote the marginal utility of lifetime income that results
from the optimizations at age s and at age n respectively, and An−1 is wealth
9For the full solution to this part of the model, see Section 5.C.1 in Appendix 5.C.
10The forecast error is the same for consumption and leisure when expressed in relative
terms. In absolute terms, the forecast error differs for consumption and leisure according
to the preference parameter θ.
11In Section 5.3.1, realized and planned choices at age s are always equivalent since there
is no uncertainty, i.e. ct = c
s
t and lt = l
s
t . In Section 5.3.2 this still holds for all t < n.
I assume the individual receives only one inheritance over her lifetime, therefore it holds
that ct = c
n
t and lt = l
n
t for all t ≥ n.
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accumulated up to age n−1.12 Equation (5.8) shows that the forecast error is
conditioned by the size of the inheritance in relation to pre-inheritance wealth
and the discounted sum of future (potential) labour income and retirement
income streams. The sum of the discounted future streams of wtT and y(R) is
lower the older the individual is, which implies that, keeping everything else
fixed, νt increases with age. The positive age dependence of νt is a result of
the usual life cycle model prediction stating that any unexpected transitory
shock will be smoothed across the remaining lifetime horizon.
Using Equations (5.6) and (5.7) to express the yearly change in ct and lt,
substituting in the definitions of νt and Dt, and taking the natural logarithm
on both sides of the expression, allows writing the change in consumption
and leisure as





+ δ′∆Zt + ∆ ln νt ∀ t ∈ [s, ..., L] , (5.9)





−∆ lnwt + δ′∆Zt + ∆ ln νt ∀ t ∈ [s, ..., R) , (5.10)
where ∆ ln νt = ln νt if t = n, and ∆ ln νt = 0 otherwise. That is because
at period n the lifetime profiles of consumption and leisure jump from the
optimal path set at period s to the new optimal path set once the unexpected
inheritance is received. Note that if the elasticity of intertemporal substitu-
tion is allowed to be different from one, then there is non-separability between
consumption and leisure and the wage change would also feature in Equation
(5.9). That is because with non-separability the marginal utility of consump-
tion (leisure) depends on leisure (consumption), and changes in the wage rate
affect consumption through their effect on leisure. For the sake of simplicity,
and without loss of generality with respect to the effect of inheritance receipt,
I ignore here any cross-derivative effects between consumption and leisure.
5.3.3 Retirement Decision
5.3.3.1 Fully expected inheritance
Given the optimal choices for consumption and leisure conditional on R, they
can be substituted into the utility function (5.1) to set up an optimization
problem in which R is the only choice variable. The individual chooses then
the optimal R which can take values from s up to M . Following the modelling
12For a full derivation of the forecast error, see Section 5.C.2 in Appendix 5.C.
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approach of Stock and Wise (1990), I express the value of retiring at age t
conditional on not having retired before as
Gt(R¯) = U(t)− U(R¯) ∀ t ∈ {s, ...,M − 1} , (5.11)
where R¯ is the retirement age that maximizes U(·) out of the set of possible
retirement ages ahead of age t, and Gt(R¯) is the utility difference between
retiring at t and postponing retirement up to R¯. The individual decides to
keep working at age t if Gt(R¯) < 0 and retires if Gt(R¯) ≥ 0. Since there is no
uncertainty, at age s the individual already solves (5.11) for every possible
retirement age and chooses the optimal R.
The trade off between quitting the work force and keeping the option value
of retirement comes from the fact that if φ is large the individual would like
to retire early, however, by doing so she incurs a reduction in lifetime income.
Keeping everything else constant, receiving an inheritance increases lifetime
income thus, if it is large enough, it may compensate for the costs of retiring
early. Therefore, the individual is likely to plan an earlier retirement at age
s when In > 0 vis-a`-vis the In = 0 scenario.
5.3.3.2 Fully Unexpected Inheritance
Besides re-optimizing consumption and leisure, an unexpected inheritance
receipt also leads to a re-optimization of R. If the individual is indifferent
between retirement and continued work, i.e. θ = 1 and φ = 0, then the
inheritance is distributed between consumption before and after retirement
and R remains unchanged. However, if the individual’s taste for leisure is
strong enough and the value of the inheritance compensates for the costs of
retiring earlier, then it pays off to revise the optimal R downwards. In that
case, the forecast error is not defined as in Equation (5.8) since λn and λs
differ not only due In but also due to the fact that R
n 6= Rs.
A decrease in R implies a drop in lifetime income and, in addition, it
implies a drop in lifetime expenditures. If the relative size of these changes
result in a decline in lifetime income that offsets In, then ln νt = ln 1 = 0
and there are no consumption and leisure responses.13 Note however that
the room to change R critically depends on how far ahead the individual is
to the initially set Rs. Therefore, what matters is not whether an individual
who receives an inheritance retires early, but whether she retires earlier than
planned at age s and how far she is from Rs at age n.
13For more details on this, see Section 5.C.2 in Appendix 5.C
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5.4 Empirical Strategy
To test the implications from the model I rely on a mixed approach con-
sisting of an empirical approximation to Equations (5.9) and (5.10) for the
labour supply and consumption response, and a reduced form equation for
the retirement responses. In this section I lay out the specifications that re-
sult from this approach and which I use to produce the results presented in
Section 5.6.
5.4.1 Specification 1: Consumption and Labour Supply
The empirical approximation to Equations (5.9) and (5.10) relies on the pre-
vious work by Banks et al. (1998) and Attanasio et al. (1999) who lay out
the foundations for the empirical estimation of Euler equations.14 To esti-
mate the effect of inheritance receipt on consumption I set up the regression
equation






itβ4 + it, (5.12)
where the constant term captures the average rate of time preference,
inheritit is a dummy that takes value one if the individual receives an un-
expected inheritance between waves t and t − 1, ιit is a vector containing a
set of variables that proxy for the features of the forecast error in Equation
(5.8), i.e. the inverse hyperbolic sine of household net worth at period t− 1,
education, age and subjective survival probabilities, ∆Zit contains changes in
marital status, household structure and health status, ξit is a vector of wave
and country dummies which captures changes in the interest rate over time
and across countries as well as other possible country- and/or time-specific
effects, and it is an error term capturing changes in unobserved taste shifters
and individual-specific deviations from the average rate of time preference.
I assume that, except for the inheritance receipt, all changes between t − 1
and t are expected and thus it does not contain an expectational error.
15
Expressing Equation (5.12) in first differences has the advantage that any in-
dividual fixed effect related to demographics and taste for leisure is cancelled
14For a thorough review of the empirical applications of the life cycle model, see Attanasio
and Weber (2010).
15In practice there can be indeed unexpected changes in other variables that also affect
consumption. However, as long as they are not correlated with inheritance receipt, they do
not interfere with the estimation of β1.
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out.16
Note that the assumption of separability between consumption and leisure
excludes the change in the wage rate from Equation (12). However, as long as
inheritance receipt is not correlated with the change in the wage rate, includ-
ing or excluding the wage rate in Equation (5.12) will not have an effect on
the estimate of β1. Non-separability between consumption and leisure would
also imply an effect on consumption of transitions to unemployment or re-
tirement. However, I abstract from these transitions here and focus only on
the effect of inheritance receipt on employed individuals. As I detail further
in Section 5.5, the data on consumption are given at the household level.
Therefore I estimate Equation (5.12) for singles and couples separately.17
When performing the couples estimation, all individual level variables are
included for both members in the couple.
Regarding the effect of inheritance receipt on the intensive margin of
labour supply, I rely on Equation (5.10) and on the fact that an increase
(decrease) in hours of leisure implies and equal decrease (increase) in hours
of work. Therefore, I use a specification that expresses the change in log
hours worked, i.e. ∆ lnhit, as a function of the same independent variables
as in Equation (5.12). I exclude the change in the hourly wage rate since the
data at hand do not allow to measure this variable. Furthermore, the same
reason to excuse its inclusion in the consumption specification applies to the
hours worked specification. ∆ lnhit captures changes only along the intensive
margin of labour supply and thus excludes transitions to retirement and any
other type of labour market status transitions.
5.4.2 Specification 2: Retirement
The reduced form strategy I employ to estimate the retirement effect closely
follows the approach by Brown et al. (2010). Consider Equation (5.11) from
the theoretical model, which provides an expression for the utility difference
between retirement and continued work denoted as Git, where I add the
individual subscript i, and t indexes here the survey waves included in the
sample. I assume the distribution of Git can be approximated by a linear and
additive function of observable characteristics plus an error term such that





16This become clear by noticing that, in the theoretical model, fixed effects featuring in
Equation (5.2), i.e. δ0, and taste for leisure θ do not feature in Equations (5.9) and (5.10).
17For the predictions of the model to apply to the analysis for couples I adopt the unitary
assumption and thus refrain from writing a model with collective decision making
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where vector Xit contains a set of set of demographic variables: age, gender,
marital status at t − 1, age of the partner, educational level, presence of
children, presence of grandchildren, parental death between t− 1 and t, and
health status at t−1; and economic variables: household income and wealth at
wave t−1, sector of employment at t−1 (public, private or sef-employed), type
of occupation at wave one, and a dummy indicating whether the household
already received an inheritance or transfer before wave one.18
According to the theoretical model, an individual who is employed will
keep on working if Git < 0 and will retire if Git ≥ 0. This decision can thus
be studied using a binary choice model of the type
Pr(retireit = 1|inheritit,Xit, ξit) = F(γ0 + γ1inheritit + X′itγ2 + ξ′itγ3),
where F(·) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of −uit. If the dis-
tribution of −uit is symmetric, F(·) is also the cdf of uit. In this type of
models, the economic literature commonly assumes two alternatives for the
distribution of uit, i.e the standard normal cdf, which results in the probit
model and the standard logistic cdf leading to the logit model. Both provide
essentially the same results in this analysis thus I report only the results of
the probit specification.19
5.5 Data and Descriptive Statistics
To estimate the equations in Section 5.4 I use data from the Survey on Health
Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). The SHARE is a cross-national
panel survey that provides detailed information on respondents’ labour sup-
ply, health, finances, family relations and socio-economic status. It targets
people aged fifty and older and their spouses/partners independent of age.
The survey is conducted every two years on average and I use waves one to
six, which run from 2004 until 2015. The third wave is excluded from the
sample because it focuses on people’s life histories and does not contain in-
formation on most of the variables used in this analysis.
Interviews have been conducted in twenty-one European countries, out
of which I include in the analysis only the ten countries present in all waves,
i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
18The choice of variables to be included in the vector Xit closely follows Brown et al.
(2010). Their reasoning behind th inclusion of a variable capturing parental death between
t and t − 1 is to control for any direct effect of the death of a parent that does not take
place through the receipt of an inheritance.
19The results of the logit model are available upon request.
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Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. Out of all respondents in these countries, I
select those who were employed in wave one and are observed at least until
they retire. This selection leaves me with 3093 individuals who live in 2604
households. There are 599 individuals who, even though they were employed
in wave one, are left out of the analysis due to missing information on job
status at some point in the sample. Since the consumption and hours worked
analyses are conducted conditional on not being retired, I start out this sec-
tion by laying out the empirical definitions of retirement that I employ. These
are followed by a description of the data used to measure consumption, labour
supply and inheritances received. The samples used for each of the analyses
are summarized in Table 5.A.1 of Appendix 5.A. The same appendix provides
definitions for all variables employed in the analyses, and summary statistics
for the most relevant variables.20
5.5.1 Retirement
The initially selected 3093 individuals are employed (or self-employed) in
wave one. From wave two they may transit to any of the other possible
labour market statuses considered by the SHARE: retired, unemployed, dis-
abled, homemaker or other. As a first measure of retirement, I create a dummy
variable that takes value one if since the previous wave an individual transits
from any other labour market status to retired and zero otherwise. There-
fore, on their path from employment to retirement individuals may transit
through any of the other possible labour market statuses. Once an individual
transitions to retirement, she is dropped from the sample in further waves.21
I call this measure narrow retirement since it does not consider any path
towards retirement other than a transition to job status retired. Panel (a) of
Table 5.1 shows the total number and share of individuals who retire in every
wave under this definition. The yearly flow of new retirees results in a total
of 75.85% of all initially selected individuals retiring at some point during
the sample period.
The transition matrix in Table 5.2 shows that individuals follow different
trajectories when transiting from employment to retirement. Even though
20Summary statistics for control variables are not provided for economy of space. They
are available upon request.
21In the theoretical model I assume that retirement is an absorbing state. However, in
the data there are 115 individuals (about 5% of those who retire at some point during
the sample period) who still experience a labour market status transition after they retire.
Out of these, only 65 transit from retired to employed or self-employed. For the sake of
simplicity, I ignore these transitions.
154 Behavioural Responses to Inheritance Receipt
Table 5.1 Retirement by Wave of the SHARE
Wave
One Two Four Five Six Total
(a) Narrow retirement
Not retired 3093 2402 1436 1063 747 747
Retired 0 691 966 373 316 2346
Total 3093 3093 2402 1436 1063
Share retired 0.00% 22.34% 31.23% 12.05% 10.21% 75.85%
(b) Broad retirement
Not retired 3093 2183 1226 847 558 558
Retired 0 910 957 379 289 2535
Total 3093 3093 2183 1226 847
Share retired 0.00% 29.42% 30.94% 12.25% 9.34% 81.96%
(c) Retired before expected
Not retired 2663 2521 1903 1237 956 956
Retired 0 142 228 78 55 503
Total 2663 2663 2131 1315 1011
Share retired 0.00% 5.33% 8.56% 2.93% 2.06% 18.88%
Notes: Individuals are selected conditional on being employed or self-employed in wave one.
Under narrow retirement, individuals may transit through status unemployed, disabled or
homemaker before transiting towards retired. Under broad retirement, transitions from em-
ployment to any other labour market status is considered as retirement. In all cases individuals
exit the sample after having transited to retirement. Retired before expected is based on narrow
retirement. Due to missing or inaccurate information 430 individuals are lost when computing
retired before expected. See main text for more details on the computation of retired before
expected. The share of retired individuals refers in all cases to the share of individuals who
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the most common path consists in transiting directly from employment to re-
tirement, there are a considerable number of individuals that transit through
other labour market statuses before retiring. This evidence suggests that in-
dividuals may use unemployment and disability benefits as alternatives for
early retirement, and that transition to homemaker may imply a definitive
exit from the labour force. Therefore, I generate a broader measure of retire-
ment consisting in a dummy that takes value one if the individual transits
from his/her initial status (either employed or self-employed) to any of the
other possible labour market statuses. Just like with the narrower measure
of retirement, I drop individuals from the sample once they are considered to
be retired.22 Panel (b) of Table 5.1 shows that under this definition 81.96%
of all initially selected individuals end up retiring at some point during the
sample period.
At the end of Section 5.3.3.2 I argue that what matters is not whether in-
dividuals retire after receiving an inheritance, but whether they retire before
they expected previous to the receipt. Not taking this issue into account will
result in a spurious correlation between retirement and inheritance receipt if
the latter is associated with a special taste for retirement. In terms of the
theoretical model, this would be implied by a cross-sectional correlation be-
tween In and φ. If that is the case, inheritors may retire early or later than
non-inheritors simply because of a special taste for retirement that is already
determined before the receipt of an unexpected inheritance. To tackle this
issue I follow the strategy of Brown et al. (2010) who use retirement expec-
tations reported by HRS respondents. They generate a dummy that takes
value one if an individual retires before expected and zero otherwise. The
main assumption of this approach is that taste for retirement is fully cap-
tured by the expected retirement age.
The SHARE offers the possibility to apply the strategy by Brown et al.
(2010) since respondents are asked about the age at which they expect to col-
lect each of the pensions they are entitled to.23 For each individual, I take the
youngest out of all the ages of collection provided, and generate an additional
retirement variable that takes value one if individuals retire at a younger age
than they expected as of wave one, and zero otherwise.24 Out of the 2346
22In that case I incur an additional error since, as shown in Table 5.2, there are a few in-
dividuals who re-enter employment after transiting to unemployed, disabled or homemaker.
23There are six possible types of pension considered: public old age pension, public early
retirement pension, public disability insurance, private/occupational old age pension and
private/occupational early retirement pension.
24To calculate whether someone retired before expected I use the narrow definition of
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individuals who retire during the sample under the narrow definition of re-
tirement, I lose 430 individuals due to four different reasons: because they do
not provide information in wave one on expected age of pension collection,
they report a minimum expected collection age that is lower than their actual
age at wave one, they do not report the age at which they retired, and/or
they report having retired at an age that is below their actual age at the wave
prior to retirement. As shown in Panel (c) of Table 5.1, out of all individuals
selected, 503 (18.88%) retire before they expected, which is a considerably
low number compared to the totals of 2346 and 2535 individuals who retire
under the narrow and broad definitions of retirement respectively.
5.5.2 Consumption
The SHARE provides information on total expenditures, as well as on expen-
ditures in two specific categories, i.e. telephone and food. All expenditures
are given at the household level and refer to a typical month out of the last
twelve months preceding the interview. Total and telephone expenditures
are not provided for all waves thus I use only the information on food con-
sumption. The latter includes food consumption both inside and outside of
the household. Following Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994), I assume that, to a
certain extent, food expenditures are a good representation of total house-
hold expenditures in non-durable goods, and that, as long as inheritances
and transfers are not fully saved or dedicated to the purchase of a particular
item, they will likely affect food consumption along with other expenditure
categories that I cannot capture. Furthermore, for the theoretical model to
apply, I assume that there is separability between food consumption and
other types of consumption and that food is either a normal or a luxury
good, i.e. income elasticity of demand for food is positive.
The 3093 individuals who form my initial sample live in 2604 households.
Since the consumption data are given at the household level, I divide house-
holds between singles and couples, leaving out 67 households who experience
a marital transition during the sample period. I keep households in the sam-
ple as long as they are not retired yet.25 For this selection I use the broad
definition of retirement, which implies dropping 789 households who already
retirement. That is because SHARE respondents provide the age at which they transfer
into retirement, but not the age at which they transfer from employment to other labour
market statuses.
25I consider a household composed by a couple to be retired once one of the two members
in the couple retires.
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Figure 5.1 Sample Distribution of Change in Log Food Consumption
(a) Singles (b) Couples
Notes: Out of the initially selected 2604 households, 789 are dropped because they are retired
by wave two, and 67 are dropped because they experience a marital transition, which results in
a sample of 431 singles and 1317 couples. To construct the histograms, I take the average of the
five imputations for each household-wave unit. All waves are pooled together which results in
935 household-wave observations for singles and 2589 household-wave observations for couples.
retire between wave one and two, but ensures that those households left in
the sample stay employed and do not experience labour market transitions. I
am left with a sample of 431 singles and 1317 couples, out of which, there are
39 singles and 561 couples with missing information on consumption for at
least one wave. To prevent loss of observations, I use the imputed consump-
tion data provided by the SHARE. The SHARE uses a multiple imputation
technique that generates five values for each household-wave unit.26 Figure
5.2 shows distributions of the wave-to-wave change in the logarithm of food
consumption for singles and for couples. All waves are pooled together which
results in 935 household-wave observations for singles and 2589 for couples.
Both distributions are to a large extent symmetric around zero, which is
always the most popular value.
5.5.3 Labour Supply
The SHARE asks individuals how many weekly hours are stipulated in their
working contract and how many hours they actually work in a typical week.
The question on contracted hours is not present in all waves hence I use only
26For details on the multiple imputation technique used by the SHARE, see Christelis
(2011).
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Figure 5.2 Sample Distributions of Level and Change in Log Hours
Worked
(a) Log Hours Worked (b) Change Log Hours Worked
Notes: The sample is composed by the initially selected 3093 individuals minus those who retire
in wave two according to the broad definition (910), those with missing information on hours
worked (48), and those who at some point report zero worked hours in a typical week even
though they report to be employed (53). Both figures include thus observations corresponding to
2082 individuals followed over the six waves of SHARE (third wave excluded) resulting in 6673
wave-individual observations in Panel (a) and 4591 in Panel (b).
the measure based on actual hours.27 For this analysis I take the initially
selected 3093 individuals and compute wave-to-wave changes in the logarithm
of hours worked. Since the focus is here on the intensive margin of labour
supply, I compute wave-to-wave changes as long as individuals are not retired.
For this selection, I follow again the broad definition of retirement, which
ensures individuals who are in the sample I use for this analysis do not
experience labour market transitions.
As Panel (b) of Table 5.1 shows, there are 910 individuals who are already
retired by wave two and thus for whom I cannot compute any wave-to-wave
changes in labour supply. Furthermore, I exclude 48 individuals with missing
information on hours worked at least for one wave, and 53 individuals who at
some point during the sample report to work zero hours a week even though
they declare to be employed. These restrictions leave me with a sample of
2082 individuals who live in 1764 households. Panel (a) of Figure 5.1 provides
the distribution of the logarithm of weekly worked hours. All waves are pooled
together, which results in 6673 wave-individual observations. The distribution
shows a clear peak at the value corresponding to forty hours per week. Panel
27When asked about actually worked hours in a typical week, individuals are requested
to exclude meal breaks but to include any paid or unpaid overtime.
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(b) provides the distribution of the corresponding wave-to-wave change which
appears to be fairly symmetric around zero.
5.5.4 Inheritances and Transfers Received
The SHARE provides information on inheritances and transfers received
larger than five thousand Euros. Due to question design it is not possible to
distinguish inheritances from transfers. However, for the age range targeted
by the SHARE it is very likely that the large majority of cases of receipt
correspond to an inheritance.28 The information provided contains the year
of receipt, the amount, and from whom the inheritance was received. The
amount is only available for inheritances received before wave one and be-
tween waves one and two. For this reason I do not use information on the
amount in this chapter’s analysis. Furthermore, all information on inheri-
tances is given at the household level. It is thus not possible to identify who
is the legal heir within the household if it is formed by more than one per-
son. It is however possible to identify individuals living in a household that
receives an inheritance.
Considering the initial sample of 3093 individuals, 26.32% of them (814
individuals) live in a household that receives at least one inheritance between
wave one and wave six while not being retired.29 I use this information to gen-
erate a variable that takes value one if an individual belongs to a household
that receives an inheritance since the previous wave.30 Out of all inheritances
reported, 66.21% come from parents, 9.79% from partners, 4.77% from sib-
lings, 7.73% from uncles and aunts and 2.42% from children. As explained
in Section 5.3, in a life cycle framework it is crucial to understand whether
inheritances are expected or unexpected. The SHARE offers an interesting
possibility to take this into account since it asks respondents about the chance
of receiving an inheritance within the next ten years. Figure 5.3 reports the
probability of receiving an inheritance in the next ten years as reported in
28For this reason I often refer to inheritances and transfers as just inheritances in the
remaining of the document.
29All summary statistics on inheritances reported in this section refer to the initial sample
of 3093 individuals. The summary statistics for the samples used in the labour supply and
consumption analyses (which are essentially sub-samples of that initial sample) are, to a
very large extent, similar to the ones reported here and are not reported in this document
for economy of space. They are available upon request.
30There are 71 individuals for whom information on inheritance receipt is missing for one
wave and five individuals for whom it is missing for two waves. I keep these individuals in
the sample and generate an additional value for the inheritance receipt dummy indicating
a missing value for a particular wave.
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Figure 5.3 Probability of Inheritance Receipt During the Next Ten Years
Notes: Probabilities are measured in wave one and refer to 3041 out of the 3093
initial selected individuals since 52 observations are lost due to non-response of the
question on inheritance expectations in the SHARE.
wave one by initial sample of 3093 individuals. I lose 52 individuals due to
missing information on expected inheritances, hence Figure 5.3 provides in-
formation on 3041 individuals. The distribution looks very similar to the one
reported by Brown et al. (2010) using the HRS. It shows that about 50% of
individuals report zero chance of receiving an inheritance, with 0.50 and one
being the next most common answers.
Table 5.3 reports the correlation between self-reported probability of re-
ceiving an inheritance in wave one and actual receipt of an inheritance while
being in the sample. Out of those individuals who report zero chance of re-
ceiving an inheritance, 12.48% do receive an inheritance afterwards. These
are the ones that are truly surprised by the receipt. For probabilities above
zero, the share of individuals who receive an inheritance increases with the
self-reported probability. For those who report absolute certainty, 54.98%
receive an inheritance during the sample period. A slightly stronger correla-
tion is observed when considering the probability of receiving an inheritance
larger than fifty thousand Euros.31 Table 5.3 suggests that self-reported prob-
31Note that individuals remain in the sample only as long as they are not reitred. Hence
if inheritances received after retirement were also considered, the correlation would be
stronger.
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Table 5.3 Expected Versus Received Inheritances
Probability of inheritance
Sample distribution Receipt by wave six
receipt during 2004-2014
Any value Above 50 Any value Above 50
thousand thousand
0 49.79% 72.60% 12.48% 19.31%
(1514) (2191) (189) (423)
0.01-0.49 14.53% 11.46% 22.17% 32.95%
(442) (346) (98) (114)
0.50 9.08% 4.80% 40.94% 50.34%
(276) (145) (113) (73)
0.51-0.99 16.38% 7.09% 46.18% 49.07%
(498) (214) (230) (105)
1 10.23% 4.04% 54.98% 57.38%
(311) (122) (171) (70)
All 100% 100% 26.34% 26.01%
(3041) (3018) (801) (785)
Notes: Probability of receiving an inheritance is measured at wave one. Out of the 3093
individuals in the sample reported in Table 5.1, 52 do not report a probability of receiving
an inheritance of any value, and 75 do not report a probability of receiving an inheritance of
more than 50 thousand Euros. Out of the individuals who do not report these probabilities,
13 and 29 receive an inheritance during the sample period respectively.
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abilities of receiving an inheritance are a useful predictor of actual receipt.32
However, there is still enough miss-match between expectation and receipt
to be able to distinguish between expected and unexpected inheritances.
Following Brown et al. (2010), I consider an inheritance received at any
point between waves one and six to be unexpected if at wave one the re-
spondent declared a zero chance of receiving an inheritance in the next ten
years. If the chance reported is above zero, then I consider the inheritance to
be expected. Following this definition, I generate a dummy that takes value
one in case of unexpected inheritance and zero otherwise. In a second ap-
proach, I generate a variable that in case of receipt takes a value equal to one
minus the chance of receiving an inheritance reported in wave one. In that
way, I take into account the continuous nature of reported probabilities. Both
approaches might be problematic if focal answers are an issue when individ-
uals report inheritance probabilities. For instance, individuals may report a
chance of 0.50 when they do not know the answer, or when they believe the
chance is above zero but they cannot think of an exact probability. Further-
more, Figure 5.3 shows some signs of rounding towards 0.50 and one, since
the probabilities reported around these values are specially low.33 However,
given the strong correlation between expected and actual receipt reported
in Table 5.3, I assume that self-reported probabilities contain enough useful
information to identify unexpected inheritances.
5.6 Results
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show the results I find for the consumption and labour sup-
ply analyses.34 For the consumption regressions there are 39 and 561 house-
holds (for couples and singles respectively) that rely for at least one wave
on multiple imputations provided by the SHARE. Each household-wave unit
with a missing value is assigned with five different imputed values, which are
computed following the methodology explained by Christelis (2011). Coef-
32The correlation I find is very similar to the one reported by Brown et al. (2010) using
HRS. In their data, they can distinguish between inheritances and transfers. Therefore,
the fact that I find a similar correlation gives credit to the assumption that most cases of
receipt in SHARE correspond to inheritances.
33For more on focal answers and rounding in probability questions and the problems they
may imply for statistical inference, see de Bresser and van Soest (2013).
34For economy of space, I just provide coefficient estimates for the explanatory variables
of interest. For full regression results, see Tables 5.B.1 and 5.B.2 in Appendix 5.B. The
latter provides full results for regressions in Columns (1) and (4) of Table 5.4, and Column
(1) of Tables 5.5 and 5.6. Results for other columns do not differ significantly. They are
available upon request
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ficient estimates and standard errors take into account all five imputations
using the combination rules described by Rubin (2004). As explained in Sec-
tion 5.4.1, the error term it captures changes in unobserved taste shifters
and individual-specific deviations from the average rate of time preference.
The latter can be treated as a random effect or as a fixed effect. For all re-
gressions I present in this section, the Hausman test fails to reject in all cases
the null hypothesis of a random effect. Therefore, I assume each individual
deviates from the average rate of time preference in a random way. Assuming
as well that changes in taste shifters (observed and unobserved) are fully ex-
pected and uncorrelated with inheritance receipt, I impose strict exogeneity
in Equation (5.12) and apply a random effects estimator.
Both Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 show that the estimates of the inheritance
receipt effect are in all cases not significantly different from zero. For the con-
sumption analysis, the point estimates are positive for singles and negative
for couples. The couples estimates are slightly more precise. However, in all
cases lack of precision does not allow ruling out rather large effects of the
order of 10 to 20 percentage point increases (or decreases) in food consump-
tion growth due to inheritance receipt. Regarding the effect on the intensive
margin of labour supply, Table 5.5 shows that point estimates are very close
to zero regardless of the measure of inheritance receipt that I employ. In this
case the estimates are more precise compared to the consumption results.
Using a 95% confidence level, any effect larger than around a five percentage
points change can be ruled out. This result implies that if there is an effect
of inheritance receipt on the intensive margin of labour supply it is in any
case rather small.
Table 5.6 reports the results of the retirement analysis. Each panel in
Table 5.6 reports results using a different retirement measure, and each of
them provides the short term effect of inheritance receipt, i.e. the effect of
receipt since the previous wave, and the longer term effect, i.e. the effect of
receipt at any point during the sample period on retirement in all subsequent
waves. When estimating the longer term effect, each individual contributes
only one observation to the sample and all control variables are fixed at their
level in wave one. In that way, I allow individuals a few more years to re-
spond to inheritance receipt by retiring at some point between receipt and
the last wave available.35 The point estimates for the short term effect are in
35In calculating both short and longer term effects on retirement I am following the
analysis of Brown et al. (2010). For the consumption and labour supply responses I do not
estimate long term effects in this study. That is because the model predicts an immediate
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Table 5.4 Effect of Inheritance Receipt on Food Consumption
Dependent variable: Change log food consumption
Singles Couples
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inheritance 0.038 -0.017
(0.061) (0.026)
Unexpected inheritance 0.118 -0.031
(dummy) (0.115) (0.060)
Unexpected inheritance 0.017 -0.027
(continuous) (0.117) (0.049)
Number of observations 935 935 935 2589 2589 2589
R2 0.071 0.071 0.070 0.030 0.030 0.031
Notes: All coefficients are estimated using a random effects estimator. Standard errors (clustered
at the household level) are reported in parenthesis. There are 39 and 561 households (for couples
and singles respectively) that rely for at least one wave on multiple imputations provided by
the SHARE. Each unit has five imputed values. Coefficient estimates and standard errors are
computed using the combination rules described by Rubin (2004). All regressions include the
change in the number of children in the household, the change in the number of parents (of the
respondent or her partner) living in the household, the change in health, dummies capturing
parental death, as well as country and time dummies. In addition, the features of the forecast
error in Equation (5.8) are captured by the inclusion of the inverse hyperbolic sine of pre-
inheritance household net worth, education, age, and subjective survival probabilities. For the
couples regressions, all individual level variables are included for both members in the couple.
See main text for further details, Appendix 5.A for variable definitions and summary statistics,
and Appendix 5.B for full regression results. *Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the
5% level, ***significant at the 1% level.
Table 5.5 Effect of Inheritance Receipt on Hours Worked
Dependent variable: Change log hours worked







Number of observations 4591 4591 4591
R2 0.018 0.017 0.018
Notes: All coefficients are estimated using a random effects estimator. Standard errors (clus-
tered at the individual level) are reported in parenthesis. All regressions include changes in
marital status, the change in the number of children in the household, the change in the
number of parents (of the respondent or her partner) living in the household, the change
in health, and dummies capturing parental death as well as country and time dummies. In
addition, the features of the forecast error in Equation (5.8) are captured by the inclusion
of the inverse hyperbolic sine of pre-inheritance household net worth, education, age, and
subjective survival probabilities. See main text for further details, Appendix 5.A for variable
definitions and summary statistics, and Appendix 5.B for full regression results. *Significant
at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level.
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Table 5.6 Effect of Inheritance Receipt on Retirement
(a) Dependent variable: Narrow retirement
Short term effect Longer term effect
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inheritance -0.006 -0.046**
(0.016) (0.016)
Unexpected inheritance 0.015 0.044
(dummy) (0.033) (0.030)
Unexpected inheritance 0.013 -0.045**
(continuous) (0.027) (0.021)
Number of observations 7994 7994 7994 3093 3093 3093
Log Pseudolikelihood -3115 -3115 -3115 -932 -934 -933
Pseudo R2 0.287 0.287 0.287 0.395 0.394 0.395
(b) Dependent variable: Broad retirement
Short term effect Longer term effect
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inheritance 0.003 -0.022*
(0.019) (0.013)
Unexpected inheritance 0.021 -0.028
(dummy) (0.038) (0.024)
Unexpected inheritance 0.028 -0.039**
(continuous) (0.030) (0.017)
Number of observations 7349 7349 7349 3093 3093 3093
Log Pseudolikelihood -3297 -3297 -3297 -888 -880 -881
Pseudo R2 0.228 0.228 0.228 0.335 0.336 0.335
(c) Dependent variable: Retired before expected
Short term effect Longer term effect
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inheritance -0.008 -0.034
(0.008) (0.019)
Unexpected inheritance 0.002 -0.006
(dummy) (0.018) (0.033)
Unexpected inheritance -0.012 -0.033
(continuous) (0.015) (0.027)
Number of observations 7120 7120 7120 2663 2663 2663
Log Pseudolikelihood -1388 -1388 -1389 -1042 -1041 -1040
Pseudo R2 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.064 0.064 0.068
Notes: Marginal effects (evaluated at the sample means) from a probit model are reported with
standard errors (clustered at the household level) in parenthesis. All regressions include controls
for age, gender, marital status, age of the partner, educational level, presence of children and
grandchildren, parental death, health status, household income and wealth, sector of employ-
ment, type of occupation, pre-sample period inheritance receipt as well as country and time
dummies. See main text for further details, Appendix 5.A for variable definitions and summary
statistics, and Appendix 5.B for full regression results. *Significant at the 10% level, **significant
at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level.
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all cases very close to zero, rarely implying an increase (decrease) larger than
1% in the probability of retirement due to inheritance receipt. Regarding the
longer term effect, there are a few estimates that are significantly different
from zero. The significant estimates are negative, suggesting that inheritance
receipt delays retirement. However, the effect is significant only when not
considering retirement expectations.36 It is therefore not appropriate to view
this as a causal effect. When retirement expectations are taken into account,
i.e. in Panel (c) of Table 5.6, the estimates of the longer term effect become
not significantly different from zero. In this case I can rule out any change
in the probability of retiring significantly larger than around three percent-
age points in the short term and around five percentage points in the longer
term.
The retirement results suggest that the SHARE does not offer enough
statistical power to reject the results by Brown et al. (2010). The latter find,
when not taking into account inheritance and retirement expectations, that
inheritance receipt is related with increases in the chance of retiring of about
two percentage points in the short term and about four percentage points in
the longer term. When taking into account inheritance and retirement ex-
pectations, they find a point estimate of about five percentage points. These
are effects of a magnitude that I cannot rule out given the precision of my
estimates. Using the SHARE, Eder (2016) finds a significant increase in the
probability of being retired at wave four of five percentage points as a response
to inheritance receipt between waves one and four, regardless of whether the
latter is expected or unexpected. However, Eder (2016) does not exploit in-
formation on labour market status provided in wave two. Table 5.6 shows
that his result does not stand when introducing waves two, five and six in
the analysis. Regarding previous results on the effect of inheritance receipt on
the intensive margin of labour supply (e.g. Joulfaian and Wilhelm, 1994; Sila
and Sousa, 2014; and Bø et al., 2018) they usually reflect either a small effect
or an effect that is not statistically significant. When significantly different
from zero, their findings cannot, in most cases, be ruled out by the results
in Table 5.5. However, in this case the outcomes are not directly comparable
due to methodological differences.
effect of the receipt of an unexpected inheritance, while in all further periods the individual
will already have adapted her decisions to the new information. A theoretical and empirical
analysis of longer term effects of these responses is left for future work.
36As explained in Section 5.5.1, I lose 430 observations due to lack of information on
retirement expectations. When I exclude this observations from the samples used in Panels
(a) and (b) of Table 5.6, the change in the results is negligible.
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5.7 Conclusions and Discussion
In this chapter I investigate the effect of receiving an inheritance on be-
havioural responses of older Europeans. Employing waves one to six of the
Survey on Health Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), I differenti-
ate between expected and unexpected inheritances and estimate their effect
on consumption, labour supply and retirement. The results show that the
estimated effects are in all cases not significantly different from zero. Re-
garding the results of the analyses on retirement and the extensive margin
of labour supply, I reject (at the 95% level of confidence) any jump in the
relative change of hours worked much larger than five percentage points, and
any change in the probability of retiring larger than five percentage points
when taking into account retirement expectations. These results allow ruling
any substantially large effects, and imply that the findings by Brown et al.
(2010), who conclude that inheritance receipt increases chances of retiring by
around five percentage points, cannot be clearly rejected using the SHARE.
However, they are compatible with most of the literature on labour supply
and retirement effects of inheritance receipt, since the latter usually reports
effects that are either very small or not significantly different from zero.37
Regarding the consumption analysis, the estimates are less precise and thus
it becomes more difficult to draw conclusions.
The results that I find are compatible with different explanations. First
of all, given that I do not find substantial effects on labour supply and re-
tirement, which seems to be the general trend in the literature, the results
are compatible with individuals smoothing the effect of an inheritance over
time. If inheritances are not very large in general, and individuals still ex-
pect to live many years after receiving them, this smoothing behaviour will
lead to very small immediate effects, that could nevertheless accumulate over
time. Unfortunately, the SHARE does not provide enough information on the
inheritance amounts. The latter are only available for those inheritances re-
ceived between waves one and two. Table 5.7 shows the distribution of these
amounts and how they correlate with pre-inheritance wealth. Out of the 2604
households initially observed in wave one, 326 report to have received an in-
heritance between waves one and two, out of which 29 do not provide the
inherited amount.
Table 5.7 shows that the likelihood of receiving an inheritance increases
with wealth but not very substantially. However, recipients tend to be wealth-
37See Cox (2014) for a review of this literature.
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ier than non-recipients and inherited amounts increase with pre-inheritance
wealth. More interestingly, Table 5.7 shows that inheritances tend to repre-
sent about one tenth of pre-inheritance wealth, and that inheritance-wealth
ratios increase with pre-inheritance wealth. Even though inheritances are
transitory shocks that can be large, Equation (5.8) shows that what matters
is not their absolute amount but their relation to previous wealth and fu-
ture income streams, as well as to expected remaining lifetime. The evidence
in Table 5.7 suggests that, specially for the wealthiest, inheritances do not
represent a substantial increase in lifetime income.38 Nevertheless, more re-
search needs to be done to fully understand the relation between inherited
amounts, previous wealth, future income streams and life expectancy to fully
grasp how relevant inheritances are with respect to lifetime income.
Secondly, the results I find are compatible with substantially large effects
of inheritances on consumption. The lack of precision of the estimates does
not allow ruling out effects of up to 20 percentage point jumps in food con-
sumption growth due to inheritance receipt. Previous evidence on this effect
is very scarce and thus there is no benchmark to which my results can be
compared. Intuitively, it makes sense to think of larger responses in consump-
tion compared to labour supply and retirement decisions, since the latter are
usually restricted by labour market and social security regulations, while
consumption might be more discretionary. This is not captured by the theo-
retical model presented in this chapter, it does provide however a plausible
explanation for the possibility of larger responses in consumption compared
to labour supply and retirement.
The SHARE data are not rich enough to thoroughly study consumption
responses. However, they do allow distinguishing between food consumption
inside of the household and food consumption outside of the household. A
very preliminary analysis of these data suggests that food consumption out-
side of the household is more responsive to inheritances than food consump-
tion inside of the household. However, due to the frequent presence of zeros
in food consumption outside of the household, one needs to build a model
that considers different types of goods (normal goods versus luxury goods)
and allows for corner solutions. More research needs to be done in the future
to fully understand whether inheritances increase consumption and whether
certain types of goods are more affected than others.
Thirdly, the results are compatible with a line of research which claims
38Table 5.7 does not include social security wealth. In case it did, the ratio of inherited
amounts over pre-inheritance wealth would be lower.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































that bequest planning is linked with the experience of inheriting. This has
been explored by Cox and Stark (2005) and more recently by Stark and
Nicinska (2015). The latter use the SHARE and test the implications of a
model that includes in the utility function the term α(B− I), where B refers
to the bequest parents leave to their children, I is the inheritance parents
themselves receive and α is a parameter measuring the effect of family tradi-
tion on bequest behaviour. This model implies that receiving an inheritance
increases the incentive to leave a bequest. In their empirical analysis, the au-
thors find that inheriting has a positive impact on the intention to bequeath
even after controlling for the increase in wealth that it implies. Incorporating
this argument in the model I present in this chapter would leave less room
for the behavioural responses that I consider, which is compatible with the
small effects that I actually find.
In summary, the results that I find seem to agree with the stylized fact
reported in the literature stating that inheriting does not have substantially
large effects on labour supply and retirement. However, it is difficult to tell
whether this is because individuals have a low taste for leisure, because of
tight labour market regulations, or because inheritances are actually small
in general in relation to lifetime income. In addition my results cannot rule
out large effects on consumption, and they are compatible with a model that
incorporates a family tradition term in the utility function. More research
needs to be done in the future to incorporate additional trade-offs in the
model and better understand how individuals react to inheritance receipt.
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Appendices
5.A Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics
Table 5.A.1 Number of Observations Estimation Samples
Individuals Households Individual Household
-wave units -wave units
Narrow retirement 3093 2604 7994 6760
Broad retirement 3093 2604 7349 6201
Retired before expected 2663 2249 7120 6013
Consumption (singles) - 431 - 935
Consumption (couples) - 1317 - 2589
Labour supply 2082 1764 4591 3601
Notes: The narrow retirement and broad retirement samples form the baseline sample. All other
samples are sub-samples of the base line sample. For more details, see Section 5.5.
Table 5.A.2 Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Dependent Variables
Narrow retirement Dummy variable indicating whether respondent retired be-
tween waves t−1 and t. Considers as retirement transitions
to labour market status retired from any other labour mar-
ket status. For the classification of labour market statuses
in the SHARE, see Table 5.2.
Broad retirement Dummy variable indicating whether respondent retired be-
tween waves t−1 and t. Considers as retirement transitions
from employed or self-employed to any other labour mar-
ket status. For the classification of labour market statuses
in the SHARE, see Table 5.2.
Retired before
expected
Dummy variable indicating whether respondent retired be-
tween waves t−1 and t. Considers as retirement transitions
from employed or self-employed to any other labour market
status, as long as they take place before expected as of wave
one. For the classification of labour market statuses in the
SHARE, see Table 5.2.
Change log food
consumption
Change in the natural logarithm of household food con-
sumption between waves t− 1 and t.
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Change in the natural logarithm of weekly hours worked
(regardles of contracted hours) between waves t− 1 and t.
Inheritance Indicators
Inheritance Inheritance or transfer larger than five thousand Euros re-
ceived by a member of the household between waves t − 1




Inheritance or transfer larger than five thousand Euros re-
ceived by a member of the household between waves t − 1
and t when probability of inheritance receipt was reported





If an inheritance or transfer larger than five thousand Euros
is received by a member of the household between waves
t− 1 and t, takes value equal to the difference between one
and probability of inheritance receipt reported at wave one.
If no inheritance or transfer is received, takes value one.
Control Variables
Age category 1: age < 55; 2: 55≥ age < 60; 3: 60 ≥ age < 65, 4: age ≥
65.
Gender Dummy variable indicating whether the individual is
female.
Marital status 1: Married, living with the spouse; 2: Registered partner-
ship; 3: Married, not living with the spouse; 4: Never mar-
ried; 5: Divorced; 6: Widowed.
Age category
partner
0: no partner; 1: age < 55; 2: 55 ≥ age < 60; 3: 60 ≥ age
< 65, 4: age ≥ 65.
Children Dummy variable indicating the presence of children.
Grandchildren Dummy variable indicating the presence of grandchildren.
Mother death Dummy variable indicating the death of the respondent’s
mother between waves t− 1 and t.
Father death Dummy variable indicating the death of the respondent’s
father between waves t− 1 and t.
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Table 5.A.2 Variable Definitions (Continuation)
Variable Definition
Education International standard classification of education (ISCED)
1997. 0: None; 1: Primary education or first stage of basic
education; 2: Lower secondary education or second stage
of basic education; 3: Upper secondary education; 4: Post-
secondary non-tertiary education; 5: First stage of tertiary
education; 6: Second stage of tertiary education; 7: Do not
know.
Poor health Dummy variable indicating poor health.
Health improved Dummy variable indicating individual moved out of poor
health status between waves t− 1 and t.
Health worsened Dummy variable indicating individual moved to poor health
status between waves t− 1 and t.
Household income Total yearly income of the household.
Household wealth Total household net worth.
Sector Sector of employment. 0: Labour market status is not em-
ployed; 1: Private sector; 2: Public sector; 3: Self-employed;
4: Labour market status is employed but sector is unknown.
Occupation International standard classification of occupation (ISCO).
1: Legislators, senior officials and managers; 2: Armed
forces; 3: Professionals; 4: Technicians and associate profes-
sionals; 5: Clerks; 6: Service workers and shop and market
sales workers; 7: Skilled agricultural and fishery workers;
8: Craft and related trades workers; 9: Plant and machine
operators and assemblers; 10: Elementary occupations; 11:
Do not know.
Previous transfer Inheritance or transfer above five thousand Euros already
received before wave one.
Marital status
transition
Change in marital status between waves t − 1 and t. 1:
Married or registered partnership to separated or divorced;
2: Married or registered partnership to widowed; 3: Sepa-
rated or divorced to married or registered partnership; 4:
Widowed to married or registered partnership.
Change children in
household
Change in the number of children living in the household
between waves t− 1 and t.
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Change in the number of parents of the respondent living
in the household between waves t− 1 and t.
Survival
probabilities
Subjective probability of surviving up to the following 10
to 15 years.
Missing survival Dummy indicating missing information on the subjective
probability of surviving up to the following 10 to 15 years.
If missing survival equals one, survival probabilities is set
to zero in the regression analysis.
Country 1: Austria; 2: Germany; 3: Sweden; 4: Spain; 5: Italy; 6:
France; 7: Denmark; 8: Switzerland; 9: Belgium.
176 Behavioural Responses to Inheritance Receipt
Table 5.A.3 Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max.
Consumption Analysis Singles
Change log food consumption -0.035 -0.025 0.558 -3.292 3.064
Inheritance 0.101 - - - -
Unexp. inheritance (dummy) 0.015 - - - -
Unexp. inheritance (continuous) 0.041 0 0.170 0 1
Consumption Analysis Couples
Change log food consumption -0.044 -0.043 0.458 -2.315 2.009
Inheritance 0.138 - - - -
Unexp. inheritance (dummy) 0.031 - - - -
Unexp. inheritance (continuous) 0.057 0 0.204 0 1
Labour Supply Analysis
Change log hours worked -0.034 0 0.381 -3.114 3.738
Inheritance 0.140 - - - -
Unexp. inheritance (dummy) 0.026 - - - -
Unexp. inheritance (continuous) 0.057 0 0.202 0 1
Retirement Analysis
Narrow retirement 0.293 - - - -
Broad retirement 0.345 - - - -
Retired before expected 0.083 - - - -
Inheritance 0.127 - - - -
Unexp. inheritance (dummy) 0.026 - - - -
Unexp. inheritance (continuous) 0.053 0 0.198 0 1
Notes: For economy of space only summary statistics on dependent variables and main explana-
tory variables are provided. Summary statistics for control variables are available upon request.
Summary statistics for narrow retirement, broad retirement and retired before expected are
based on the short term regressions, i.e. Columns (1) to (3) in Table 5.6. Summary statistics for
inheritance variables in the retirement analysis are based on the narrow retirement regression,
i.e. Pabel (a) of Table 5.6.
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5.B Full Regression Results
Table 5.B.1 Results Consumption and Labour Supply Analysis
Change log food Change log food Change log
consumption (singles) consumption (couples) hours worked
(1) (2) (3)
Inheritance 1 0.038 -0.017 -0.018
(0.061) (0.026) (0.019)
2 0.116 -0.027 0.009
(0.209) (0.094) (0.049)
Change children 0.112** 0.030 -0.011
in household (0.045) (0.017) (0.012)
Change parents 0.075 -0.062 0.091
in household (0.128) (0.101) (0.096)
Health -0.004 -0.140 -0.049
worsened (0.203) (0.090) (0.078)
Health 0.247* 0.037 -0.160
improved (0.133) (0.116) (0.097)
Mother death -0.091 0.052 -0.002
(0.083) (0.039) (0.023)
Father death -0.078 0.085* -0.006
(0.107) (0.050) (0.034)
Lagged hhld 0.010** -0.003 0.001*
wealth (arsinh†) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001)
Age category 2 -0.001 0.027 -0.017
(0.667) (0.033) (0.017)
3 0.001 0.054 -0.044**
(0.069) (0.033) (0.017)
4 -0.003 0.071 -0.176***
(0.086) (0.044) (0.032)
Survival -0.101 0.019 -0.009
probabilities (0.103) (0.055) (0.032)
Missing -0.137 0.024 0.009
survival (0.15) (0.087) (0.045)
Education 1 0.049 -0.011 -0.009
(0.123) (0.080) (0.064)
2 0.044 0.019 -0.009
(0.118) (0.079) (0.063)
3 -0.033 0.058 -0.034
(0.119) (0.080) (0.062)
4 0.027 -0.004 -0.029
(0.129) (0.088) (0.068)
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Table 5.B.1 Results Consumption and Labour Supply Analysis (Cont.)
Change log food Change log food Change log
consumption (singles) consumption (couples) hours worked
(1) (2) (3)
5 0.016 0.056 -0.026
(0.123) (0.081) (0.062)
6 -0.227 -0.012 -0.041
(0.183) (0.139) (0.081)
7 -0.638 0.097 -0.029
(0.295) (0.115) (0.070)
Wave 4 0.173 0.043 -0.042
(0.138) (0.081) (0.039)
5 -0.028 0.006 0.011
(0.057) (0.028) (0.016)
6 -0.026 0.033 0.026
(0.068) (0.037) (0.017)
Germany -0.044 0.015 -0.024
(0.102) (0.054) (0.038)
Sweden 0.007 0.093 -0.015
(0.093) (0.051) (0.038)
Netherlands -0.219 -0.033 -0.035
(0.112) (0.060) (0.039)
Spain -0.067 0.047 0.012
(0.113) (0.058) (0.044)
Italy -0.176 -0.035 -0.014
(0.121) (0.057) (0.044)
France -0.007 0.048 -0.002
(0.103) (0.061) (0.039)
Denmark 0.060 0.075 -0.008
(0.097) (0.054) (0.036)
Switzerland 0.045 0.085 0.006
(0.094) (0.055) (0.044)
Belgium 0.021 0.077 -0.017
(0.100) (0.053) (0.038)
Observations 935 2589 4591
R2 0.074 0.030 0.018
Notes: Reported results correspond the same regressions as in Columns (1) and (4) of Table
5.4 and Column (1) of Table 5.5. For the couples regressions, all individual level variables
are included for both members in the couple. For economy of space, here only results for one
household representative are reported. Estimates of the partner variables are available upon
request. For economy of space estimates of the effect of changes in marital status on labour
supply are not reported here. They are available upon request. See Tables 5.A.2 and 5.A.3 in
Appendix 5.A for variable definitions and summary statistics. See notes under Tables 5.4 and
5.5 for further information on the regressions. † arsinh stands for the inverse hyperbolic sine
transformation. *Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at
the 1% level.
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Table 5.B.2 Results Retirement Analysis
Narrow retirement Broad retirement Retired before
expected
(1) (2) (3)
Inheritance 1 -0.019 0.007 -0.073
(0.056) (0.054) (0.075)
2 0.039 0.077 0.004
(0.159) (0.156) (0.228)
Gender -0.074* 0.055 -0.067
(0.041) (0.040) (0.055)
Lagged marital 2 -0.146 -0.172 -0.140
status (0.112) (0.106) (0.153)
3 -0.036 -0.197 0.249
(0.190) (0.184) (0.235)
4 0.034 -0.121 -0.037
(0.186) (0.179) (0.251)
5 0.178 -0.067 0.275
(0.176) (0.171) (0.236)
6 0.369** 0.117 0.276
(0.187) (0.183) (0.253)
Age category 2 0.892*** 0.513*** 0.683***
(0.114) (0.073) (0.137)
3 1.949*** 1.323*** 1.200***
(0.116) (0.078) (0.140)
4 3.267*** 2.524*** 1.222***
(0.126) (0.093) (0.155)
Age category 1 0.157 -0.009 0.224
partner (0.175) (0.168) (0.233)
2 0.300* 0.172 0.222
(0.170) (0.165) (0.228)
3 0.375** 0.255 0.168
(0.170) (0.165) (0.229)
4 0.317* 0.176 0.181
(0.174) (0.170) (0.235)
Children -0.190*** -0.221*** -0.220**
(0.073) (0.070) (0.092)
Grandchildren 0.153*** 0.194*** 0.105**
(0.040) (0.039) (0.053)
Mother death 0.079 -0.032 0.128
(0.067) (0.066) (0.084)
Father death -0.072 -0.100 -0.096
(0.090) (0.084) (0.120)
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Table 5.B.2 Results Retirement Analysis (Continuation)
Narrow retirement Broad retirement Retired before
expected
(1) (2) (3)
Lagged poor 0.315 0.597** 0.406*
health (0.195) (0.259) (0.239)
Health worsened 0.121 0.994*** 0.108
(0.127) (0.118) (0.161)
Health improved -0.311 -0.437 -0.504
(0.242) (0.307) (0.307)
Education 1 0.048 0.156 0.061
(0.157) (0.157) (0.227)
2 0.079 0.232 0.066
(0.157) (0.157) (0.227)
3 0.075 0.162 0.002
(0.156) (0.155) (0.226)
4 0.029 0.076 0.088
(0.180) (0.179) (0.252)
5 -0.059 0.003 0.000
(0.159) (0.159) (0.230)
6 -0.364 -0.303 0.014
(0.253) (0.249) (0.346)
7 -0.139 0.028 -0.048
(0.205) (0.203) (0.371)
Lagged household -0.054 -0.062* -0.038
income (0.034) (0.033) (0.048)
Lagged household -0.001 -0.006** -0.001
wealth (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Lagged sector 1 -0.124* -0.355***
(0.069) (0.084)
2 0.034 0.070* -0.362***
(0.076) (0.041) (0.094)
3 -0.633*** -0.396*** -0.610***
(0.083) (0.055) (0.108)
4 0.582 0.845** 0.541
(0.382) (0.401) (0.520)
Occupation 1 0.545*** 0.588*** 0.027
(0.171) (0.165) (0.223)
2 -0.040 -0.065 -0.069
(0.066) (0.063) (0.087)
3 0.161** 0.084 0.139*
(0.065) (0.063) (0.085)
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Table 5.B.2 Results Retirement Analysis (Continuation)
Narrow retirement Broad retirement Retired before
expected
(1) (2) (3)
4 0.072 0.068 0.084
(0.077) (0.075) (0.099)
5 -0.105 -0.063 -0.102
(0.078) (0.075) (0.105)
6 0.131 0.137 0.031
(0.114) (0.109) (0.156)
7 0.123 0.170** 0.121
(0.084) (0.081) (0.107)
8 0.222** 0.273*** 0.076
(0.099) (0.098) (0.128)
9 -0.096 0.011 -0.184
(0.089) (0.086) (0.120)
10 -0.017 0.056 -0.300
(0.147) (0.143) (0.251)
Previous transfer 1 0.135*** 0.077** 0.130***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.049)
2 0.698 0.336 0.038
(0.246) (0.241) (0.361)
Wave 4 0.111** 0.050 0.029
(0.046) (0.044) (0.060)
5 -0.411*** -0.375*** -0.263***
(0.055) (0.053) (0.074)
6 -0.519*** -0.489*** -0.371***
(0.061) (0.061) (0.084)
Germany -1.019*** -0.683*** -0.644***
(0.106) (0.104) (0.119)
Sweden -1.412*** -1.151*** -1.00***
(0.105) (0.102) (0.121)
Netherlands -0.954*** -0.609** -0.884***
(0.109) (0.106) (0.132)
Spain -1.295*** -0.789*** -0.992***
(0.118) (0.114) (0.146)
Italy -0.721*** -0.448*** -0.652***
(0.110) (0.108) (0.129)
182 Behavioural Responses to Inheritance Receipt
Table B2 Results Retirement Analysis (Continuation)
Narrow retirement Broad retirement Retired before
expected
(1) (2) (3)
France -0.483*** -0.315*** -0.802***
(0.104) (0.102) (0.124)
Denmark -1.306*** -0.953*** -1.016***
(0.105) (0.101) (0.121)
Switzerland -1.313*** -0.983*** -0.929***
(0.119) (0.115) (0.140)
Belgium -0.715*** -0.444*** -0.724***
(0.099) (0.098) (0.115)
Observations 7994 7349 7120
Pseudo R2 0.287 0.228 0.102
Notes: Reported results correspond to the same regressions as in Column (1) of each
panel in Table 5.6. Here the coefficient estimates of the probit regressions are reported.
For marginal effects (evaluated at the sample means) of the variable inheritance, see Table
5.6. Standard errors (clustered at the household level) are reported in parenthesis. See
Tables 5.A.2 and 5.A.3 in Appendix 5.A for variable definitions and summary statistics.
See notes under Table 5.6 and the main text for further information on the regressions.
*Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level.
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5.C Theoretical Framework (Extensions)
5.C.1 Closed Form Solution
As shown in Section 5.3.2, the first order conditions of the optimization prob-
lem yield an expression for cs and ls in terms of λ. As Equations (5.6) and
(5.7) show, consumption and leisure at any other period can be expressed as
a function of cs and ls respectively. Substituting Equations (5.4) to (5.7) into































which shows how shows how lambda captures all relevant information affect-
ing cs and ls from all periods other than s. Substituting (5.C.1) in Equations



























































which show how consumption and leisure depend positively on In. Equations
(5.6) and (5.7) can be used to find optimal leisure and consumption for all
periods other than s. How In is allocated across periods depends on the
relative values of r and ρ. How it is allocated between consumption and
leisure within every period depends on θ.
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5.C.2 Derivation of the Forecast Error
Equation (5.8) provides the expression of the forecast error for the case in
which R is fixed. In that case, λn and λs differ only because of the inclusion
of In in λ
n. If the retirement age is affected by the inheritance receipt, they






































































Considering the case in which the retirement age is revised downwards, i.e.
Rn < Rs, the difference between Y n and Y s is given by In plus the change in













which is negative since the present value of full retirement income increases
with R, and the earlier the individual retires the less years she will receive
wage income. The difference between Xn and Xs is implied by the fact that,
for a given year, consumption expenditure if retired differs from the addition
of consumption expenditure and the wage value of leisure if working. This








which is also negative as long as 0 ≤ θ < 1. This results shows that if leisure
provides some utility, i.e. θ is not equal to one, in this model being retired
is always cheaper than being employed. That is because during retirement
leisure is free, while during working life it has a cost. Taking into account
that Y n = Y s+Bn+Q1 and X





Y s +Bn +Q1
Y s
. (5.C.4)
A negative Q1 reduces νt, while a negative Q2 increases νt. This two effects
are thus offsetting each other. That is because on the one hand retiring earlier
reduces lifetime income, but, on the other hand, it frees up resources since
being retired is cheaper than being employed.If Q1 is large enough relative
to Q2 such that it exactly offsets In, then ln νt = ln 1 = 0. In that case the
inheritance is spent completely on retiring earlier and there no consumption





where substituting in the expression for Y s delivers the same expression as
in Equation (5.8).
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Samenvatting (Dutch
Summary)
Huidige demografische ontwikkelingen die leiden tot een vergrijzende bevolk-
ing in ge¨ındustrialiseerde landen (met name een afname van de vrucht-
baarheid in combinatie met een stijgende levensverwachting) impliceren be-
langrijke uitdagingen voor pensioen- en zorgstelsels. Deze moeten financieel
gezond blijven, terwijl ze tegelijkertijd adequate pensioenen en voldoende
toegang tot zorg moeten garanderen aan een vergrijzende bevolking. Hoewel
er in de afgelopen jaren veel hervormingen zijn gedaan om deze uitdagingen
het hoofd te bieden, moet er nog veel werk worden verricht om te garanderen
dat pensioen- en zorgstelsels duurzaam blijven.
In deze context heeft dit proefschrift als doel het beantwoorden van
verschillende onderzoeksvragen omtrent vermogensaccumulatie en spaar-
motieven van oudere huishoudens. De studie naar spaarmotieven en pro-
cessen van vermogensaccumulatie is cruciaal voor een goed begrip van de
mate waarin gepensioneerden, en individuen die binnenkort met pensioen
gaan, wel of niet in staat zijn om een adequate levensstandaard in stand te
houden in de huidige snel veranderde omstandigheden.
In hoofdstuk 2 beantwoord ik de vraag of individuen het bezit van hun
huis zien als een manier om te sparen voor hun pensioen. In hoofdstuk 3
onderzoek ik de evolutie van het vermogen van gepensioneerden in de vorm
van huizenbezit gedurende hun pensioen, en maak ik een connectie met het
nalaten van een erfenis als spaarmotief. In hoofdstuk 4 verlaat ik de focus op
huizenbezit en geef ik volledige aandacht aan de vraag of individuen sparen
met het oog op het nalaten van een erfenis. In hoofdstuk 5 blijf ik bij het
onderwerp van erfenissen, maar verander ik het perspectief van de gever naar
de ontvanger, door het stellen van de vraag hoe de ontvangst van een erfenis
de economische omstandigheden van individuen rond de pensioengerechtigde
leeftijd be¨ınvloedt
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Ik maak gebruik van verschillende onderzoeksmethoden om de bovenge-
noemde onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden. Deze focussen op de theoretische
analyse van het gedrag van individuen binnen een levensloopmodel (life cycle
model), als ook op de econometrische analyse van microeconomische data. In
hoofdstuk 2 en 3 gebruik ik data van de Dutch National Household Survey
(DHS). In hoofdstuk 4 gebruik ik administratie data van het Centraal Bu-
reau voor de Statistiek (CBS), terwijl ik in Hoofdstuk 5 gebruik maak van
data afkomstig van de Survey on Health Ageing and Retirement in Europe
(SHARE). Hoewel het moeilijk is om aan te geven in hoeverre de Nederlandse
situatie vergelijkbaar is met die in andere landen, voorziet het begrip van de
Nederlandse situatie wel in een benchmark die gebruikt kan worden als ref-
erentiekader voor latere studies.
Het empirisch bewijs dat ik in Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 presenteert suggereert
sterk dat huishoudens in het algemeen terughoudend zijn in het gebruik van
vermogen in de vorm van huizenbezit voor de financiering van consump-
tie gedurende hun pensioen. In hoofdstuk 2 laat ik zien dat een eenvoudig
levensloopmodel met huizenbezit en zonder erfenismotief voorspelt dat in-
dividuen aan het einde van hun leven huis verkopen om daarmee hun con-
sumptie te financieren. In een dergelijk model zullen individuen fluctuaties
in de waarde van hun huis opvangen door andere vormen van sparen. Echter,
het empirische bewijs in Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat Nederlandse huiseigenaren
hun spaargedrag niet aanpassen in navolging van onverwachte veranderingen
in de waarde van hun huis. Deze uitkomst geeft aan dat individuen het bezit
van hun huis niet zien als een vorm van sparen, ondanks het feit dat hun huis
een belangrijk onderdeel van hun totale bezit vormt.
In lijn met de bevindingen in Hoofdstuk 2, laat ik in Hoofdstuk 3 zien dat
gepensioneerde huiseigenaren in Nederland zelden verhuizen. Daarnaast laten
ze een lage bereidheid zien tot het liquideren van het vermogen dat is ingebed
in het bezit van hun huis. De literatuur omtrent vermogen in de vorm van
huizenbezit gedurende het pensioen suggereert dat dit een algemeen patroon
is dat in Europa en de Verenigde Staten zichtbaar is. Ik analyseer twee the-
oretische modellen (Yang, 2009; Nakajima and Telyukova, 2013a, 2017), die
drie factoren onderstrepen als de belangrijkste oorzaken van dit fenomeen;
transactiekosten, nutsvoordelen van huizenbezit, en het erfenismotief voor
sparen.
Het beschrijvende bewijs dat ik in Hoofdstuk 3 presenteer laat een
sterke correlatie zien tussen huizenbezit en gerapporteerde bereidheid tot
het nalaten van een erfenis. Deze correlatie houdt stand wanneer er wordt
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gecorrigeerd voor vermogen, inkomen en een reeks andere economische en
demografische variabelen. Dit resulteert lijkt in overeenstemming te zijn met
de bevindingen in Hoofdstuk 2, en met de belangrijkste uitkomsten van het
model van Nakajima and Telyukova (2013a, 2017). Deze wijzen allemaal sterk
richting het idee dat huizenbezitters niet bereid zijn het vermogen dat is in-
gebed in hun huis te liquideren, omdat ze dit vermogen zien als een belangrijk
onderdeel van de erfenis die ze hun kinderen willen nalaten.
Waar Hoofdstuk 3 laat zien dat Nederlandse individuen (met name hui-
seigenaren) in het algemeen aangeven bereid te zijn hun kinderen een erfe-
nis na te laten, toont Hoofdstuk 4 dat de onthulde-preferenties-benadering
gebaseerd op Kopczuk (2007) een vergelijkbare uitkomst oplevert. Wanneer
deze wordt toegepast op Nederlandse administratieve data, laat de benader-
ing van Kopczuk zien dat individuen met chronische ziekten bij overlijden
minder vermogend zijn dat individuen die plotseling sterven. Het verschil is
echter alleen sterk en significant bij mannen uit de bovenste helft van de
vermogensverdeling die bij overleden getrouwd zijn.
Deze uitkomst is redelijk aangezien de meeste individuen in de steekproef
die als vrijgezel overlijden eerder het overlijden van hun partner of een schei-
ding hebben meegemaakt. Dit zijn gebeurtenissen die gewoonlijk een negatief
effect op het vermogen hebben (zie van Ooijen et al., 2015 en Poterba et al.,
2015). Bovendien zijn de meeste individuen die overlijden terwijl ze getrouwd
zijn man, vanwege de lagere levensverwachtingen van mannen in vergelijking
met vrouwen. Ik volg daarom Kopczuk en interpreteer de uitkomsten voor
getrouwde mannen als een indicatie van vermogensoverdrachten aan erfgena-
men bij de verwachting van kortstondig overlijden. Deze interpretatie wordt
gesteund door het feit dat, in Nederland, de institutionele context voorkomt
dat medische uitgaven en inkomensschokken een belangrijke rol spelen als
verklaring voor de afname in vermogen voor individuen die onverwacht over-
lijden.
Het bewijs in Hoofdstuk 5 toont aan dat erfenisontvangsten een
veelvoorkomend fenomeen zijn die een relevante impact zouden kunnen
hebben op de economische omstandigheden van individuen rond de pen-
sioengerechtigde leeftijd. Echter, de empirische resultaten die ik presenteer
laten zien dat, zelfs wanneer alleen wordt gekeken naar onverwachte erfenis-
sen, de ontvangsten geen effect lijken te hebben op de pensioenleeftijd of op
het aantal gewerkte uren per week. Met het hoog op de onzekerheid van de
schattingen, kunnen kleine toenames in de waarschijnlijkheid van pensioner-
ing en kleine afnames in het aantal gewerkte uren niet worden uitgesloten.
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Echter, deze veranderingen zouden dermate klein zijn dat ze nauwelijks im-
pact hebben op de economische omstandigheden van individuen rond de pen-
sioengerechtigde leeftijd.
De verschillende studies die ik in dit proefschrift doe laten een aantal mo-
gelijkheden open voor verder onderzoek. Hoewel ik in Hoofdstuk 2 bijvoor-
beeld een belangrijke stap voorwaarts maak door het gebruik van subjectieve
korte-termijn verwachten van de huizenprijzen als maatstaf voor onverwachte
schokken in huizenprijzen, is er nog ruimte voor verbetering. Een voorbeeld
is het meenemen van lange-termijn verwachten voor huizenprijzen, die mo-
gelijk belangrijker zijn dan korte-termijn verwachten wanneer het gaat om
duurzame goederen zoals huizen.
Daarnaast wijzen de bevindingen in Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 op een belangrijk
samenspel tussen de evolutie van vermogen in de vorm van huizenbezit en
het erfenismotief voor sparen, hoewel het bewijs tot nu toe nog niet wijst op
een bepaalde richting van causaliteit. Ofwel door het structureel model van
het type in Nakajima and Telyukova (2013a, 2017), ofwel door een analyse in
gereduceerde vorm, zou toekomstig onderzoek moeten focussen op een groter
begrip van de relatie tussen huisbezit, erfenissen en sparen voor het pensioen.
Hoofdstuk 4 biedt verschillende uitbreidingen van het eerder gedane werk
door Kopczuk (2007). Echter, ook hier is nog ruimte voor verbeteringen. Het
meest belangrijk onderwerp dat aandacht vereist is de rol van medische en
niet-medische kosten als verklaring voor de evolutie van vermogen gedurende
de laatste levensjaren. Bovendien moet er meer werk worden verricht met het
oog op de koppeling van de evolutie van vermogens van ouderen en kinderen,
om zo overdrachten van ouders naar kinderen gedurende de laatste levens-
jaren beter in beeld te brengen.
Tenslotte vereist de studie in Hoofdstuk 5 verder onderzoek om tot een
verklaring te komen voor het gebrek aan veranderingen in arbeidsaanbod en
pensioenleeftijd in reactie op erfenisontvangsten. De bevindingen in Hoofd-
stuk 5 suggereren dat onderwerpen als de relatieve grootte van erfenissen ten
opzichte van het bestaande vermogen, de striktheid van arbeids- en pensioen-
wetgeving, en/of het effect van erfenisontvangsten op de bereidheid tot het
nalaten van een erfenis een belangrijke rol zouden kunnen spelen als verklar-
ing voor het ontbreken van een groot effect.
